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ABSTRACT

Rice is a leading farm crop in Louisiana, generally being
the source of about 15 per cent of the total agricultural income
received by farmers of the state.

Economic problems of the rice

industry have received relatively little attention from organized
research agencies, since the industry is important only in the four
states of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and California.

Difficult

economic problems exist, however, particularly those associated
with the marketing of rough rice by the numerous small-scale growers
in Louisiana.

This study describes and analyzes rough rice market

ing problems and recommends economic policies which, if adopted, may
increase the returns of growers from their rice crops.
Price trends for rice have become particularly significant
to Louisiana growers because of a 30 per cent increase in United
States rice production since 1935 > a period during which Louisiana
production increased only 19 per cent.

The chief factor affecting

the long-run trend of price is the general price level, as modified
by the 3upply of rice available for sale in the domestic market and
the quantity which must compete with Asiatic rice in foreign markets.
The demand for clean rice in the protected domestic market is rela
tively inelastic, and the export demand, although more elastic, is
subject to highly erratic fluctuations since worId prices are conxii

trolled by Asiatic rice, and since nationalistic policies greatly
affect world rice trade.
Rough rice prices closely follow movements of clean rice in
the wholesale markets, with farmers usually receiving about 81 per
cent of the equivalent wholesale price.

Although variety price dif

ferentials are well established, increased production of varieties
bringing highest prices apparently tends to reduce these differences.
According to the best data available, quality differentials in rice
are generally accompanied by distinct price differentials, in spite
of frequent complaints that quality factors are overlooked in rough
rice trading.

The time of sale is an extremely important factor af

fecting the price received by an individual grower, since iuany farmers
store rice after harvest and sell during the winter.

If a consistent

policy is followed, sales in November or in January will bring the
highest average returns, but the irregular price fluctuations result
ing from abrupt changes in demand make the seasonal variation expected
from supply forces highly uncertain.
Data gathered during a survey of public rice warehouses used
by Louisiana farmers during 1940-41 Indicated that warehouse facili
ties and storage charges vary greatly throughout the rice belt.

More

than half of the storage space available to farmers was controlled by
large enterprises engaged in financing or processing rice, so that
considerable pres -ure could be exerted on farmers in rice bargaining.
Few farmers used warehousemen as marketing agents, since selling of
rough rice was usually carried out by individual negotiation between
xiii

farmers and mill buyers.

Storage on the farm was relatively unimpor

tant, although apparently highly economical on large rice farms*

The

survey indicated a need for independently operated storage facilities
where competitive rice selling could be encouraged, for the use of
marketing agents to reduce the expense of individual bargaining, and
for more general utilization of rough rice grades and standardized
buying practices.
Since there are no middlemen between the farmers and the
millers, and since there is no rice futures market to pemit hedging
of inventories, the holding of rice stocks by either fanners or
millers is a highly speculative operation.

Rice mils ers are often

more concerned with shrewd speculation in rice than with technical
milling problems.

Ordinarily the millers have a better insight than

farmers into market conditions and farmers frequently are out
bargained, being forced to hold rice when the mafcket is dangerous and
to sell rice at prices which permit large inventory gains for millers
when market conditions are improving.

Fortunately, the milling indus

try in Louisiana is highly competitive, so that farmers, by intelli
gent action, can take advantage of the anxiety of millers to utilize
the great excess milling capacity existing in the Louisiana area.
Farmers need en improved current market news service to give them
adequate knowledge of market situations, in order to avoid unusual
discrepancies between rough and clean rice prices rising from specu
lative operations.
Rice exports, which in the past several years have absorbed
xiv

as much as 25 par cent of the southern crop, are extremely difficult
to maintain in markets where Asiatic rice is available.

In Europe,

American rice in normal times has a fairly stable outlet for small
quantities on a quality basis, but in Latin America, United States
growers can s e U very little rice unless substantial tariff or quota
preferences are granted by the importing countries.

Since 1940, the

war shipping shortage has automatically restricted the movement of
Asiatic rice and American growers have secured an excellent outlet in
Cuba, but the restoration of normal shipping conditons would quickly
wipe out this export market. ^Consequently, rice growers should exert
constant pressure toward legislation favoring tariff or quota prefer
ences for American rice, and toward the establishment of a differential
price policy between domestic and foreign markets which will permit the
sale of American rice abroad in competition with Asiatic supplies.^!
A historical analysis of the effect of government adjustment
programs in the rice industry indicates that the various adjustment
measures, including marketing agreements, processing taxes, soil con
servation, and subsidy programs have resulted in few permanent changes
in the rice industry.

Their main effects have been temporary price

increases and subsidy payments to farmers.
Cooperative marketing, which has developed in the rice industry
since 1910, has been responsible for the chief improvements so far ac
complished in rough rice marketing.

The American flic-' Growers Cooper

ative Association operates in the Texas-Louisiana area and markets more
than half the rice produced in Texas, although it has seldom handled as
xv

much as 20 per cent of the Louisiana crop.

The association has less

support in Louisiana than in Texas because of the many small-scale
growers in Louisiana who have intimate credit and personal relation
ships vidth buyers and millers.

’Hie cooperative organization, however,

has accomplished much for Louisiana growers in the distribution of
market news, in the enforcement of competition, and in presenting the
growers* point of view in federal legislation.
The study concludes with a positive program for the improve
ment of rough rice marketing in Louisiana.

Recommendations include

the establishment of independent storage and credit facilities to en
courage competitive bidding for rice, centrally located sales offices
to reduce the expenses of individual negotiation, and a daily market
news service over local radio stations during the months of active
rice marketing.

In addition, public support is needed for the cooper

ative association and for legislative measures enforcing competition
among millers, for research in the processing and utilization of rice,
for governmental policies retaining essential export xnarkets, and for
both producer and consumer education concerning rice markets and rice
qualities.
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CHAPTisR I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOUISIANA RICE INDUSTRY

Economic problems associated with the marketing and distribution
of rough rice^ have never drawn attention in Louisiana comparable to that
given to cotton and sugar cone, since the industry is localized and has
seldom pressed into the national spotlight.

Important marketing problems

exist, however, particularly those associated with the imperfect nature
of the market for rough rice.

The absence of objective grades for rough

rice and the personal nature of bargaining between producers and proces
sors lead to numerous difiiculties, such as unequal bargaining power and
unequal knowledge of the demand and supply conditions determining the
competitive price of rice*

Failure to understand and utilize familiar

marketing principles frequently causes misunderstandings and at times
has impaired the economic welfare of Louisiana rice farmers*
Specific objectives of this study, sponsored by the Louisiana
Agricultural Experiment Station, are to clarity the present situation in
regard to the marketing and processing of rough rice in Louisiana, to
analyze the available historical data relevant to rough rice marketing
problems, and to examine past, current, and prospective plans for the
improvement of rice marketing.

Various attempts at market improvement

^•The term "rough rice” describes threshed but unhulled rice as it
comes from the thresher* Rough rice is termed "paddy” in the Orient and
occasionally in the United States.
1

2

have been made by government, grower, and processor agencies, and within
a few years, new or revised schemes will likely be added to those already
injected into the market structure.

These aspects of the rough rice

marketing problem make this study of more than historical interest, since
public representatives must consider the past record in formulating de
sirable future policies affecting the idee industry.
In conducting this study, all available statistical data con
cerning rice were assembled from government, trade association, coopera
tive organisation, and private sources, and adapted for analysis from the
marketing point of view.

The writer made a personal survey of ill rice

mills and public rice warehouses in the state and interviewed the manag
ers to obtain uniform statistics on processing and storage procedures.

A number of rice farmers were visited in order to obtain data on farm
storage and opinions on marketing problems.

Irrigation companies, credit

organizations, government agencies, research workers, and private indi
viduals were sources of valuable information never presented in published
form.

The reconciliation of this large collection of objective and sub

jective data with known principles of marketing and economic theory es
tablished a problem of academic as well as of practical interest.

Importance of the Louisiana lice Industry

Kice is a principal food crop for a great portion of the world'a
population.

Its production requires the major attention of agriculture

in China, India, the Japanese iitopire, Indo-China, Siam, the butch East
Indies, the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and Madagascar.

About 97 per

cent of the world's annual rice crop is produced in these eastern

3

regions.2

In past yeara, the world rice crop has been estimated near 7

billion bushels, of which Chinese and Indian production alone has ap
proached 5 billion bushels*

In these countries, rice is the principal

food stuff, and per oapita consumption is very liigh.^
The principal producing countries outside of the eastern regions
are the United States, Italy, Spain, li&ypt, and Brazil*

In none of these

latter regions is rice as important as other staple crops from the nation
al point of view*

However, in restricted areas of these nations rice pro

duction has become highly specialized, and to the residents of these
specialised growing areas rice is the most important cash crop grown*
The annual United States rice production of 50 million bushels a year is
the largest among western nations*

Extreme concentration of production

makes the crop of prime importance In limited areas of the United States*
There are only three important rice-producing sections in the
United States, although the crop is important in four states*

The princi

pal producing region is the broad level prairie bordering the Gulf Coast
of southwestern Louisiana and southeastern Texas*

About 34 million

bushels have been produced annually in this area in recent years, or
about 65 per cent of the United States orop.^ The remaining production is
split between the Grand Prairie section of eastern Arkansas, and the

^Jones, Jenkins, Wyche, and Nelson, Rice Culture in the Southern
States, Farmer's Bulletin No* 1608, United States Department of Agricul
ture, October, 1936, p* 1*
3ftice and wheat together constitute the major element in food sup
plies for four-fifths of the world's population* For an adequate dis
cussion of the world importance of rice, see V*D* tfiokizer, Rice and 'ffheat
in World Agriculture and Consumption* Aheat studies of the Food Research
Institute, Stanford University, Vol. XVII, Wo* 6, March, 1941#

culture*

4Agricultural Statistics. 1940* United States Department of Agri
Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1941$ p. 96.

4

Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys of California*

In the rice trade, a

designation of only two rice-produc 1ng areas is commonly used.

These are

the Southern area, including Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas; and Cali
fornia, where production differs considerably in variety and market from
the southern states*
A century ago rice was an important crop in South Carolina, Morth
Carolina, and Georgia, but these states dropped out of production when
new areas in the southwest wore opened up after the Civil Car.

5

Rela

tively rigid physical requirements for profitable American rice culture
make unlikely any future shift in the general locale of production areas*
Louisiana has been the most important rice-producing state since
production shifted from the South Atlantic States.

The principal growth

in production has come since lS90f shortly after rice was introduced on
a largo scale in the southwestern prairies*

Closely followed by Texas,

production expanded steadily in Louisiana until it reached a peak in
World War I*

The present importance of rice in Louisiana is shown by the

fact that 4 7 9 ,0 0 0 of the 4,193,OCX) acres harvested in 46 principal crops
were in rice in 1939*

The farm value of the 1939 rice crop was approxi

mately 16 million dollars, or about 15 per cent of the total f a m value
of 105 million dollars for all crops in the state.^

In 1940 there were

10 parishes with more than 100 rice farms each, and 24 parish s of the
64 had an appreciable amount of rice production.

7

Production is concen-

5The rise and fall of rice cultivation in the South Atlantic
States is recorded by D.C. Heyward, Seod from kadapaacar. Chapel Hills
University of North Carolina Press, 1937.
6Agricultural Statistics. 1940. 0£. cit, p . 96 and p. 546.
7From data made available by the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis
tration, Baton Rouge.

5
trated, however, in the five parishes of Acadia, Vo raillion, Jefferson
Davis, Evangeline, and Calcasieu (see accompanying map).

Here rice is

the principal crop, and the economic structure of these parishes is built
upon rice production.
specialise in rice.

About 6,000 large farms in the five parishes
Rice milling as an associated industry furnishes

considerable additional employment.
Additional areas along the Mississippi River between Now Orleans
and Baton Rouge and along Bayou Teche on the border of the Atohafalaya
swamp, are minor areas of specialisation in which rice production is
olosely associated with sugar cane production.

Cultivation practices are

those of small-scale producers and differ greatly from those in the high
ly specialised region of the southwest.

The principal acreage is in St.

James pariah, and the principal characteristics of the rice in this area
are that it is early, has different growing problems, and is generally
marketed promptly after harvest in contrast to storage practices in the
southwest.
This study is an eoonomic analysis of the Louisiana rice industry,
and is concerned principally with problems of marketing rough rice in the
chief commercial area of Louisiana.

The study thus concerns largely the

structure of the marketing system and the problems of farmers in the five
leading rice parishes of the state.

The problems, however, are similar

for all rice producers in both Louisiana and Texas, and in many respects
the study must consider the entire national and world situation in regard

®According to the Census of Manufactures, 34 large rice mills in
Louisiana employed an average of 1,024 workers in 1937, ranging seasonally
from 1,573 in October to 531 in July.
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to rice.

The particular objective of the study, however, is the evalu

ation of the economic situation from the point of view of the rice farmers
in Louisiana.

Rice Investigations in Louisiana

Since rice is a highly localized crop in the United States, a
great deal of research attention has not been focussed on either its pro
duction or economic problems.

Die four rice producing states, therefore,

have a specialized problem in agricultural research.

Since Louisiana is

the leading state in rice production, much of the research in the United
States has been centered here.

Scientific investigations along the lines

of seed improvement, soil fertility, Insect pests, noxious weeds, irriga
tion requirements, idee diseases, crop rotation, and cultural methods were
begun by the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station in 1396, shortly
after southwest Louisiana became the principal rice producing section.^
Considerable work in variety development was done by leading farmers,

IQ

and the United States Department of Agriculture supported a number of
cooperative experiments on various farms.
In 1909, a Rice Experiment Station was established at Crowley,
Louisiana, as a cooperative project between the United States Department
of Agriculture and the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station.

Since

that date, the Louisiana station has been prominent in developing improved

^T.C. Quereau, Rice Investigations. Bulletin No. 172, Louisiana
Agricultural Experiment Station, September, 1920.
•^Important varieties now in common use were developed by Sol
Wright, a leading Louisiana rice faraer in the early days of the industry.
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varieties of rioe and in improving the methods of rice culture*

Other

work of considerable importance has been done in Arkansas, California,
and Texas*

The field of American technical literature on rice, however,

is not large*

Principal compilations of the technical aspects of rice pro-

duction draw heavily on research conducted in India and the Far East*

11

In no field of agricultural production is research into production
technique the entire answer to a faraer*® problems*

The economic problems

of f&xm management, price behavior, and marketing in many seasons are of
more immediate concern to a faraer than production problems*

Study of

the economic problems of rioe farmers in Louisiana has been limited, con
sidering the importance of the crop in the economy of the state*

In

1930* A* J* Saville published a bulletin describing the general economic
problems of the Louisiana rioe farmer,

and followed this with an eco

nomic study of irrigation problems in the rice area*^

In 1933 & study

was published describing the fans management problems on rice farms
These three studies comprise the principal experiment station work on
the economic problems faced by Louisiana rice fanners*

■^"Copeland, E*B*, Rice*

Londons

Macmillan and Company, 1924*

^Seville, ft.J*, Some Economic Problems in the Rice Farming Area.
1929, Bulletin Mo* 217, Louisiana agricultural Experiment Station,
November, 1930*
^Seville, ft.J*, Rice Farm Irrigation Systems in Louisiana. 1929*
Bulletin Mo* 216, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, November, 1930*
^^Saville, R*J..Factors in the Organization and Successful Oper
ation of Louisiana Rice F a m e . 1930. Bulletin No. 233, Louisiana Agrioultural Experiment Station, January, 1933*
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The principal Investigations into marketing problems have been
conducted by the Division of Grain Investigations of the Bureau of Agri
cultural iiconojnios (now the Agricultural Marketing Service).

W. D. Smith

pioneered in study concerning the handling and processing of rice, with
the object of eliminating the marketing confusion caused by the absence
of grades and lack of knowledge of rice quality.

His studies, reported

frequently between 1920 and 1930, produced a considerable volume of
practical information which was used in the construction of government
grades, and later had considerable influence in the establishment of co~
15
operative enterprise and government programs for rice farmers. '
The marketing of rough rice in Louisiana has several character
istics which differentiate marketing problems from those of other staple
commodities*

All of the product must pass from the farms of a restricted

area through the hands of a relatively few processors, the rice mills*
The market for rough rice as it comes from the farm is directly to the
rice mills.

Hough rice has no other domestic and a very small foreign

market, for the commodity moves in trade channels only as clean rice*
Bough rice demand is derived from demand for clean rice, and
rough rice prices tend to reflect clean rice prices less costs of pro
cessing.

The relatively small size of the industry, both in producing

and processing, has resulted in the absence of an organised market for
either rough or clean rice in the United States.

Marketing, particularly

^ S e e abstracts and references, The Handling. Grades, and Uses
of Bice, compiled by C* L. P. Corbett and E. G. Boemer, mimeograph,
United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Eco
nomics, Washington, March, 1937*
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of rough rice, is characterised by personal transactions and intimate
knowledge between individual growers and processors.

These conditions

result in a market which lacks the impartial, impersonal elements im
portant to both business men and students of economics whenever repre
sentative price and economic data are desired.

Charact eristic s of the Louisiana Rice Area

Louisiana rice production is centered almost wholly on a flat
prairie bordering the coastal marshes of the Gulf of Mexico.

The popu

lation is a mixture of Louisiana native stock, largely of French ex
traction still maintaining the French language, and a considerable in
filtration of farmers from the states of the Midwest.

These northern

farmers sett Led in Louisiana when rice production first became impor
tant, and it was largely due to their experience and initiative that
large-scale mechanised methods adapted rice as a profitable crop on
the low poorly drained prairies, previously used only for cattle range.^
The farms of the area are in general large, with quarter section
units being common.

The 1935 average acreage per farm of 101 acres was

the largest among Louisiana type-of-farming areas, and compared to a
state average of 64 acres.17

Farm buildings differ notably from those

generally found throughout the South, with substantial frame houses and
ample outbuildings reflecting the midwestern background of many of the

■^Lauren C. Post, "The Rice Country of Southwestern Louisiana,"
The Geographical Review. 30:574-590, October, 1940.

17

'Census of Agriculture, 1935, Bureau of the Census.
Government Printing Office.

Washington:
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farmers*

Tractors are in ccranon use, and cultivating and harvesting

machinery resembles closely the equipment used for sni; ll grains in other
parts of the country.
Since the establishment of rice cultivation in the specialised
area, rice prices have been favorable relative to most, other southern
crops, particularly cotton,

Except for a drastic decline in 1932, grow

ers have not experienced any protracted period of acute price depression
such as has affected the cotton growers of the 3outh,

This fact, can>-

bined with the large acreages in the area, reduced pressure of population
on the available resources, and better educated oomnnnities, has enabled
the farmers in the rice area to achieve an economic position superior to
that in any other type-of-farming area in the South,
Although there is a considerable amount of tenancy, the simple
sharecropper relation of the cotton areas is not generally found in rice
production.

Average capital investments in land and machinery per person

gainfully employed in agriculture are large, averaging £3*105 per worker
as compared to §1,362 per worker in an upland cotton area.

18

Wages paid

laborers on rice farms consistently average the highest in the state,

19

indicating higher productivity per worker. 7
The farmers of the rice area, however, generally require con
siderable credit advances in making a rice crop.

In past years these

advances were made largely by banks and local merchants, but in recent

Census of Agriculture, 1930*
^ W * g. Heman, "Farm Wage Rate Differentials Between Areas of
Louisiana," Louisiana Rural Economist, Vol, 3, Ho, 2, April, 1941,
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years the Production Credit Association# have largely replaced the local
institutions.

Since a rice crop is unusually certain and rice fanners

ordinarily have acceptable credit backing in real estate and machinery
investment, improvement in credit facilities has been relatively easy to
establish#^
There are a considerable number of large rice holdings operated
by tenants in the specialised areas.

The ownership of these large hold

ings is vested in estates, irrigation companies, land companies, and in
dividuals*
the owners*

Share rents are paid, and credit is generally advanced by
A large volume of rice thus passes into the control of a re

latively few companies or persons, which is sufficient to complicate
marketing problems because the action of a few holders can affect the en
tire market.

This is particularly true for large irrigation companies,

which receive a one-fifth share of numerous rice crops as a water rent
and thus control the sale of large rice stocks*

21

Rice Acreage and Production

Technical factors of rice production are outside the scope of
this study, except for general background and necessary facts pertaining
to marketing and the general situation for the industry.
is adetailed analysis of

More important

changes In acreage and production of rice in

^ R , L. Thompson, The Agricultural Credit Situation In Louisiana,
Bulletin Ho. 208, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, January, 1930.
^;Yater rents may be one-fourth of the rice on farm® where yields
are low or the irrigation company incurs high coats for watering.
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the United States, with particular reference to Louisiana.
The physical conditions controlling rice production arc temperature, water supply, and soils.

22

High mean temperatures during the grow

ing season are necessary, and a dependable supply of fresh water for
irrigation must be available.

In Louisiana the soils especially suited

to rice production are the Lake Charles anti Crowley series, which are
rich, dark-colored alluvial soils with impervious subsoils capable of
holding irrigation water over the surface for a considerable period, with
good facilities for drainage, and with a solid footing for cultural m a 
chinery after removal of the water.
These limitations of soil, topography, temperature, and water sup
ply for irrigation limit rather closely the extent of land available for
rice production in the United States.

In Louisiana, the rice area is

definitely outlined by the prairie soils area of the southwestern parishes.
Since 1379# land has been planted at some time to rice in practically

every parish of the state outside of the hill parishes, but production
gradually became restricted to the prarie soils area except for the
limited Mississippi river and Teche acreage.

In 1909, 32 of the 64

parishes had 100 or more acres in rice as compared to 22 parishes having
100 or more acres in 1934*

23

The rice areas of Texas and Arkansas are similarly limited, al~

brief but adequate discussion of these factors is available
in ’’The boll Requirements for Economic Plants,” Soils and Mon. United
States Department of Agriculture Yearbook, 1938. Washingtons Government
Printing Office, p. 759.
^Censuses 0f Agriculture, 1910 and 1935*
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though less than in Louisiana and by somewhat different factors*

Ex

pansion in Texas, where suitable land is available, is limited largely
by the difficulty of securing an adequate water supply for irrigation,
while soil and topography requirements limit Arkansas acreage.

Both of

these latter states, however, are capable of expanding rice acreage pro
portionately more than in Louisiana, where rice production already has
been attempted on all available acreage.

Rice acreage in California is

limited largely by the competition of other crops for water and land in
the irrigated valleys where it is grown*
The acreage of rice harvested in each of the four producing
states and in the United States since 1909 is shown in Figure 3.

Although

Louisiana has consistently been the largest rice producer among the four
principal states of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and California, the acre
age and production of Texas has been experiencing the most rapid growth
in recent years*

Rice acreage received an enormous stimulus by the de

mand for foods, especially cereals, accompanying World War 1*

Previous

to 1913# changes in acreage such as the decline in the Carolina pro
duction, and the rise in southern acreage, were brought about chiefly by
shifts in natural comparative advantages and changes in techniques of pro
duction*

In other words, changes in supply conditions were relatively

more important than demand changes prior to the World War*
Beginning in 1914, however, change In demand almost doubled the
acreage of rice grown in the United States within six years.

In 1914

there were about 640,000 acres of rice in the United States; by 191S,
almost 1,300,000 acres were harvested*

Louisiana acreage more than

doubled in this period, rising from 320,000 acres in 1914 to 676,000 acres

16

Table X.

Tear

Acreage, yield, production and farm value of rough rioe in the
United States, 1909 to date*

s

Acreage
1.000 acres

662
1909
1910
666
636
1911
1912
643
722
1913
646
1914
740
1915
1916
843
1917
953
1918
1,101
1,083
1919
1920
1,299
1921
990
1922
1,053
1923
874
838
1924
1925
853
1,016
1926
1,027
1927
972
1928
860
1929
966
1930
965
1931
1932
874
798
1933
812
1934
817
1935
981
1936
1,088
1937
1,076
1938
1,040
1939
1940*
1.051 __
^Preliminary.
Source*

:

field

1

Production

t

Bushels

1.000 bushel.

3 5 .6
3 7 .1
3 5 .6
3 6 .9
3 3 .5
3 6 .3
3 5 .3

23,586
24,731
22,662
23,700
24,210
23,478
26,107
39,544
34,714
39,998
42,911
51,648
39,274
41,663
33,238
32,643
33,036
42,025
44,497
43,834
39,534
44,929
44,613
41,619
37,651
39,047
39,452
49,820
53,372
52,506
53,722
.... .......... ...

46.9
36.4
36.3
39.6
39.8
39.7
39.6
38.0
39.0
38.7
41.4
43.3
45.1
46.0
46.5
46.2
47.6
47.2
48.1
48.3
50.8
49.1
48.8
51.7
50.2

Farm value
1.000 dollars
18,758
16,785
18,257
22,159
20,824
21,702
23,656
35,162
85,804
76,696
114,210
61,006
37,239
38,686
36,615
43,934
49,017
47,513
40,413
39,950
39,474
35,214
21,642
17,416
29,248
30,854
30,479
41,567
35,132
33,714
39,095
37.052

Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Eco
nomics by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
Southern Division.
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in 1920, thus accounting for about half of the national increase.

The

balance of the acreage was put into production in California, where rice
production was just beginning when the war brought on unusually favorable
conditions for expansion, and in Arkansas, where the acreage increased
from 100,000 in 1913 to 180,000 in 1918*

Acreage in Texas showed no ex

panding tendency during the World War, which is in distinct contrast to
recent years.
With the close of the war, rice acreage declined precipitously,
but in spite of the decline the total United States acreage remained far
above that which preceded the war.

In 1914 the acreage was 646,000, while

the lowest point since that year has been 798,000 acres in 1933*

Although

acreage contracted immediately following the war, the impulse of relative
ly high prices in 1924 and 1925 caused a sharp expansion in 1926 and 1927*
Acreage soon dropped from its level of 1927, however, since prices
for crops in that year were not such as to encourage rice production on
land adapted to other crops,

In 1929 acreage dropped temporarily to

360,000, but i&aediately recovered to 965,000 in each of the following
two years.

Prices then declined so precipitously in 1930 and 1931 that

acreage reacted sharply and by 1933 was 798,000 acres, the lowest point
since before World War I.
Just as Louisiana acreage accounted for most of the war-time ex
pansion, it also accounted for most of the post-war acreage reduction,
and for most of the acreage fluctuations up to recent years.

Since 1935

the change in national acreage has become somewhat less closely associ
ated with changes in Louisiana.

Acreage in the state of Texas has become
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Table II.

Tear

Acreage of rough rice harvested in the United States by States, 1909 to date.

: N.G. t Mo.

■

s.c • t Ga. : Fla. tArkansas sLouisiana s Texas j Calif. : U.S.
1.000 acres

1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
191S
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925

1

19
19
14

12
8
12
7
7
6
9
7

1
4

1926

10

1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940*

3
10

6
6
4
3
2
5
4
4
4
5
4

1
1
1
1
1

1.
1
2
2
2

27
60
72
91
105
93
100
125
152
170
160
180
140
163
143
166
176
196
179
173
156
173
177
163
147
141
138
160
189
189
171
191

370
360
350
315
350
320
335
435
485
565
543
676

549
555
474
430
414
492
520
495
465
491
458
as
395
U5
412
479
517
494
480
_____ 4.5.1.....

238
220
195
220
250
200
213
212
216
230

212
261
166
195
151
151
156
169
165
162
144
192
205
186
148
143
167
204
250
268
269
291

662
666
636

1
6
15
30
59
88
120
155
162
135
140
106
90
103
149
160
132
95
110
125
110
108
108
100
138
132
125
120
118

643
722
640
740
843
953
1,101
1,083
1,299
990
1,053
874
838
853
1,016
1,027
972
860
966
965
874
798
812
817
981
1,088
1,076
1,040
1.051

^Preliminary.
Sources

Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division.
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increasingly important, expanding from 148,000 in 1934 to 291,000 in 1940*
This expansion in acreage since 1935 reversed a fifteen year post-war de
cline in the American industry, and has had drastic effects on the econo**
mic situation of rice farmers*
Figure 4 presents on ratio scales the relative growth of rice
acreage in the principal producing regions of the United States.

The close

association in movement of the Louisiana and United States acreage is
clearly shown here, together with the rapid early growth of the Arkansas
and California industry, and the recent growth of the Texas producing
area*

Texas had a definite downward trend until 1933, when acreage ex

perienced its sharpest upward movement since rice production began in the
state*

Qy 1940, however, the total acreage change in the United States

appeared to have leveled off at a point below the maximum acreage of World
War I days*

Rioe production since that time has become more specialized,

and future expansion of the specialized type is possible only in Texas*
Arkansas and California production apparently rose to their maximum level
at an early stage in their production, and have not showed the marked re
cent growth characteristic of Texas production*
The principal contraction in Louisiana rice acreage has been on
the periphery of the belt on farms where the production of other crops
can be adapted to the land*

The trend in the United States has been

toward increased specialization and concentration of rice acreage, with
the scattered production of minor areas gradually passing out of existence*

P ro d u ctio n o£ R ios

The production of rough rice is probably more closely associated
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Figure 4 . Rate of change in rice acreage harvested in the United States and
in principal rice producing states, 1909 to date.
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with the acreage harvested than is the production of any other principal
crop.

Rice| in oonnon with other Irrigated crops, is little affected by

weather and growing hazards beyond the farmer’s control.

As a result,

yields are relatively stable, and the total production is largely a re
sult of acres planted and harvested.
The yields per acre in the United States and in each of the four
producing states are presented in Figure 6.

The most outstanding fact

shown by these data is the general trend toward higher yields In the
past 15 years, particularly in Texas and California.

Louisiana yields

have been uniformly the lowest of the four states, which of course heavi
ly influences the average yield for the United States since Louisiana is
the principal producer.

In only one year, 1916, have yields in Louisiana

been sharply above the average.

In most years the yield per acre in

Louisiana can be safely estimated as lying within much less than a five
bushel limit from the preceding year.
In fact, since 1920 the standard deviation from the average yield
of 33.2 bushels per acre in Louisiana has been only 3*2 bushels, which is
remarkably stable for any large agricultural crop.

This figure is derived

without removing the trend in yields, which since 1920 has been constantly
tending upward.

Removing trend for the 19 years, 1920 through 1938, by

fitting a least-squares straight line, the standard error of estimate is
only 1.96 bushels.

In other words, 69 out of 100 chances the yield of

rice In any given year would be within 4 bushels of the average yield,
allowing for the trend toward higher yields.

In only one year of the

past nineteen years, between 1926 and 1927, did the yields between years

23

change as much as 3 bushels*
The high yield of rice in Texas as contrasted to Louisiana rice
is particularly significant when considered in relation to the increasing
acreage in Texas shown in Figure 1. Louisiana and Texas form one contigu
ous producing area, and the increase of yield combined with growing acre
age affords serious competition to Louisiana, where there is no new land
for future acreage expansion and rice yields have little prospect of
further increase*
Since yields are stable, production and acreage, even with the
rising trend of yields included, show statistically a remarkable associ
ation*

For the United States, the coefficient of correlation for the

years 1920-1938 is *74*

In other words, about 55 per cent of the annual

variation in production can be directly attributed to variation in acre
age.

However, this figure does not allow for the observable trend in

yields*

tfith the trend in yields for the United States included in a

multiple correlation by a least-squarea straight line, the relationship
between acreage, production, and trend in yield is shown by a corrected
coefficient of correlation of .87* and 76 per cent of the variation in
production may therefore be said to be explained by changes in acreages
and trend in yield*

The significance of this fact in regard to the ea3e

of establishing effective production and price control in the rice indus
try is obvious.
Figure 5 shows the changes in United States rice production since
1909*

It will be noted that rice production has been at an all-time high

since 1938, at more than 50,000,000 bushels each year.

Only once before

wes this peak of production reached— in 1920, when production skyrocketed
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Table III.

Tear

Production of rough rice in the United States by states, 1909 to date.

* N»C* : Mo. i

s.c.

: Ga. : Fla. $Arkansas :Louisiana: Texas t Calif. : U.S.
1.000 bushels

1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1916
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1926
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1936
1939
1940*
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526
522
161
276
176
276
147
150
123
166
131

50
300

610
75
400

^Preliminary

139
139
60
66
44
112
86
80
68
86
58

20
21
20
21
20
18
18
18

36
34
33

1,264
2,700
3*168
3,958
4,410
3,952
4,600
6,312
6,916
7,140
7,600
6,820
7,490
7,824
5,646
7,138
7,568
10,349
7,697
8,287
7,956
3,216
9,735
8,313
7,203
6,655
6,072
8,752
10,564
9,715
8,430

12,617
13,320
11,725
11,182
11,200
11,520
12,898
20,010
16,005
18,080
19,005
2 5 ,0 1 2

18,501
19,314
15,879
15,050
14,159
16,236
19,812
18,860
18,632
19,149
16,030
16,392
16,195
16,766
17,296
21,076
20,660
20,748
21,120
___ l&JMl__

3,996
8 ,0 3 0

79$06
8,140
8,000
6,700
6,496
9,434
6 ,2 6 4

7,590
6,784
9,554
5,993
6,825
6,040
6,040
6,209
6,844
7,953
8,116
7.027
10^291
10,598
9,114
7,3a
7,370
6,684
10,608
13,000
13,668
15,172

57
360

900
1,860
3,540
5,280
6,900
9,300
8,262
7,290
7,700
5,671
4,365
4, 800
7,986
8,960
3,171
5,719
7,271
8,250
7,800
8,912
8,256
7,400
9,384
9,108
8,375
9,000

23,586
24,731
22,662
23,700
24,210
23,478
26,107
39,544
34,714
39,998
42,911
51,648
39,274
41,665
33,238
32,643
33,036
42,025
44,497
43,834
39,534
44,929
44,613
a , 619
37,651
39,047
39,452
49,820
53,372
52,506
53,722

•

Source:

Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economica by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division.
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to 51# 500,000 bushels under the impetus of high war prices prevalent for
several years*

Although production in recent years has exceeded th© 1920

total, this production has been caused partly by th© prevailing upward
trend of yields, since recent acreage has remained substantially below
the 1920 peak*
The recent rise in total production took place in the face of a
marketing and crop control program designed to stabilize both the pro
duction and price of rice*

Production of rice clearly decreased in re*

sponse to lower prices after 1929, and the adjustment was pronounced
until the government marketing program of 1933*

The first marketing pro

gram, effective in raising price but not in controlling acreage, abruptly
halted a downward adjustment in acreage*
established but was not effective*

In 1935, acreage control was

Production increased phenomenally

in 1936, and until the present date has remained extremely high*

The

recent change of acreage in relation to government control programs is
a matter of sufficient interest so that a large portion of this study
will be devoted to its analysis*
Since acreage expanded in 1936, Louisiana has produced slightly
more than 20,000,000 bushels of rioe each year, or approximately 5“1/2
million barrels*^

The increase in Texas acreage has resulted in an

annual Texas crop near 14,000,000 bushels, with Arkansas and California
contributing about 9,000,000 bushels each to the United States total.
The Louisiana total therefore accounts for almost 40 per cent of all rice

bushel of rice weighs 45 pounds* In the Louisiana and Texas
area rice is sold on the basis of a barrel of 162 pounds, which is equiva
lent to 3*6 bushels.

1910
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Comparison of rough rice yields in the rice producing states, 1909 to date.
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produced domestically, which concentrates problems of the rioe industry
in this state.

Production by Varieties

There are thousands of varieties of rice grown throughout the
world*

The principal distinguishing characteristics of the grain secured

from the various varieties are in length and plumpness of the kernel*
The varieties are generally distinguished as long, medium, or shortgrained varieties*

These varieties vary considerably in appearance, in

milling quality, and in appeal to the consumer*

Considerable research

has been done in the selection and improvement of rice varieties in the
United States, the object being to combine a high yielding type in the
field and at the mill with cooking qualities attractive to consumers*^
Medium and long-grain rices are generally preferred by American con
sumers*
Varieties of rice grown in the southern states, however, are not
altogether determined by consumer demand*

The planning of farm operations

requires that several varieties of rice requiring different length of

^"Perhaps the greatest problem in the breeding program is the
difficulty encountered in combining high milling quality with flaky table
quality. Cooking and milling tests indicate that the characteristics of
the grain, principally vitreousness, which make it resistant to breakage
in milling, probably are the same properties that cause it to be more or
less pasty when cooked* Varieties in which large localized, chalky spots
occur may not mill well but are often flaky when cooked* Flakiness is
preferred, by most consumers, to pastiness* The replacement of varieties
tending to have pasty cooking quality by flaky ones may help to increase
the popularity of rice*” N. J£* Jodon, 11Advances Toward New and Improved
Rice Varieties," Biennial Report of the Rice Experiment Station* 19391940. Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1941, p* 22.
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growing period be planted*

Harvest requirements bring a peak labor load,

and total costs of production can be reduced if varieties are selected so
that the harvest period for the entire crop will not coincide*

Since

such selection is generally practiced in the southern states, the rice
harvest and marketing season is spread over two to three months— a rela
tively long period for harvesting a grain in a compact geographical

Some rioe varieties have a fairly constant requirement in days be
tween seeding and maturity, while other varieties vary in their require
ments according to date of seeding*

In addition, certain varieties have

a short growing period regardless of date of seeding*

When sown between

April 15 and May 15, the varieties may be classified as early, midseason,
and late*

27

Early maturing varieties require about 120 to 129 days from

seeding to maturity, midseason varieties about 130 to 139 days, and late
maturing varieties li»0 days or more*

^ S e e k. Nelson and C. Adair, Rioe Variety Experiments in Arkansas*
Bulletin No* 403, Arkansas Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1940, p. 3*
"The rice grower is interested in raising two or three varieties that dif
fer in maturity and grain type, the reasons for this being to get better
distribution of labor, to be able to take advantage of such differential
prices as may occur among varieties, and to be able to sell part or all
of his early rice to finance the harvest of the later varieties* Th© labor
of harvesting early, midaeason, and late varieties can be distributed over
a month or 6 weeks* If a grower raised only one variety, h- s average net
income over a period of years might be as high as if he grew tv/o or three
varieties* But, because of the variation in price among varieties, the
income of the one-variety farmer would probably fluctuate over a wider
range than if he had for sale each year rice of two or three varieties."
^Farmers Bulletin No* 1808, op* clt.* pp. 10 ff.
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The following table, assembled from annual estimates of rice
crops prepared by the Rice Millers Association, shows the approximate
distribution by varieties of rough rice produced In Louisiana*

By far

the greatest proportion is Blue Rose, which has contributed about 70 per
cent of the total production in recent years*

This percentage has been

declining in the last few years, largely because of a rapid rise in the
production of Rexoro, a long-grain rice which contributed 13 per cent of
the Louisiana crop in 1939 and surpassed Early Prolific in total pro
duction*

Other Varieties, including Fortuna, Hire, Lady Wright, Edith,

and Japan, form only a very small part of the Louisiana crop*

The pro

duction of Rexoro has increased principally at the expense of Blue Rose
and has displaced other varieties relatively little*
Varieties grown in Texas and Arkansas are the a m© as in Louisiana,
but with a much different distribution*

In 1938 and 1939$ only 31 per

cent of the Texas crop was Blue Rose, with Rexoro holding a position of
equal importance*

Hie percentage of Early Prolific was also substantial

ly higher in Texas in 1939, with 16 per cent of the total production*
In Arkansas, Early Prolific is unusually important and accounts for 37
per cent of the crop partly because of the shorter growing period in that
area*

Blue Rose and Early Prolific together accounted for 65 per cent of

the Arkansas crop, the remainder being principally Nlra and Japan*
The Blue Rose variety tends to mature at nearly the same date re
gardless of the date of seeding*

Generally harvest takes place at the

same time each year, beginning in late September and early October*
Tests at Crowley, Louisiana have shown that Blue Rose sown on March 15
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matures in about 189 days, but when sown May 15 it matures in about 135
days*23
Early Prolific, if seeded on March 15, usually requires 141 days
to nature*

If seeding is delayed two months, this requirement is reduced

only 19 days*

Ordinarily Early Prolific is seeded at the same date as

Blue Rose, and therefore natures about 40 days prior to Blue Rose.

This

enables the harvest to begin in late August and early September*
The principal long grain variety grown in Louisiana is Rexoro,
followed by Fortune and l&ra.

These varieties mature at about the same

time as Blue Rose, and therefore are not grown to distribute harvest re
quirements as is Early Prolific*

In addition, these long grains require

a long and relatively uniform growing period, so that they must be seeded
early in the spring*

Edith and lady Wright varieties were formerly grown

as early maturing long grains, but because of susceptibility to disease
and low yields on old land are being replaced by Rexoro*
Since Early Prolific is the best market variety with a short
growing period, it is the variety most generally combined with Blue Rose
in large rice acreages*

Ordinarily the Early Prolific harvest is com

pleted before the Blue Rose harvest is begun*

This enables a more con

tinuous use of harvesting labor and equipment, eases credit obligations,
and reduces costs.

Since Early Prolific brings lower prices than other

varieties, a principal reason for its continued production is the harvest
ing problem.
In southwestern Louisiana, the harvest season is practically the

^Ibld.
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same for all sections of the rice belt*

For river rice between Baton

Bouge and New Orleans and for the Teohe urea, the harvest season is
considerably earlier, running from August through October.
planted earlier in these areas, often in late February.

The crop is

Since a large

proportion of the crop is Early Prolific, which has a relatively constant
growing period, the crop matures several weeks before rioe in southwestern
Louisiana*

Rice in these minor areas is also cut while relatively green,

and remains in the shook only a few days instead of several weeks.

As a

result, the growers along the Mississippi River are able to market their
crop rapidly, since other new crop rice is not available to the mills.

Consumption of Rice

Rice is not a bread grain, and it is poorer than other cereals
in both fat and protein.

These deficiencies, however, give it excellent

29
keeping quality in hot, humid climates. 7 Because rice is expensive to
produce, and since it must be supplemented in the diet by other foods,
the fact that the poorest peoples of the world rely on rice most inten
sively appears strange at first sight.

This phenomenon is explained by

the following characteristics of principal rice eating economiess
(I) subsistence economy, (2) poor transportation facilities, (3) no al
ternative occupation for labor, and (4) dietary habits are exceedingly
tenacious.
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Washington:

Wheat, on both a pound and caloric basis, can be produced

C. Finch and 0. E. Baker, Geography of the Worlds Agriculture.
Government Printing Office, 1917# P* 46.

^ E . W. Zimmerman, World Resources and Industries.
Harper and Brothers, 1933# P« 234*

New York:
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more cheaply* and in larger quantities than rice, but will not respond to
intensive cultivation as much as rice when high yields per acre are es
sential regardless of labor costs.^

The residents of areas in which

wheat is produced tend to consume little rice.
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More than half of the 50 million or more bushels of rice produced
annually in the United States are used to satisfy consumption needs within
the 43 states.

Average consumption per capita of rice is lower in the

United States, however, than anywhere else in the world.

Per capita con

sumption in the United States varies between 5 end 6 pounds per year.*^
Nevertheless, the total volume of rice consumed in the United States has
increased substantially during the past 20 years because of increasing
population.
The continental market is protected by a 2-1/2 cent tariff duty
on clean rice.

This barrier is effective in preserving the market for

American rice growers, although small quantities of rice for special pur
poses are Imported each year.

Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska also fall

within the United States tariff walls, and furnish a fairly consistent
market for /merican rice.

Per capita consumption in Puerto Rico and

Hawaii is very high, well over 100 pounds per capita, but total volume of
sales is limited by relatively small populations.

In recent years, rice

33-lhld.
^^Wloklz.r, o£, clt. Hie. is boat adapted of all cereals to a
subsistence economy, since seed requirements are lowest and yields re
spond most to intensive cultivation.
-^Agricultural Statistics, 1940, o£. clt. P. 98.
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consumption within the United States tariff boundaries has provided an
outlet for three-fourths of the American crop.
The remaining fourth of the crop must find an export outlet.

The

difficulties faced in exporting a commodity whose production is at least
partially sustained by tariff protection in the domestic market will be
discussed in a later chapter.

Here it is sufficient only to point out

the fact that the domestic market is remarkably stable, while the export
market is highly unstable because of foreign competition.
The low average per capita consumption in the United States is
virtually meaningless for specific analysis, since there are wide dispari
ties in rice consumption between areas.

Although there are no definite

figures available on consumption by states, some compilations have been
made which indicate the various levels of consumption. ^

These figures

show that Maine, Idaho, Hew Mexico, and North Dakota each has a per capita
consumption of only one pound; that In California and Alabama the per
capita consumption is nine pounds each; that North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida have a per capita consumption of 21 pounds and that
Louisiana has a per capita consumption of UO pounds.

For all other states

the per capita consumption is only about two pounds.
The South Atlantic market is thus the most important outlet for
rice, since the population is accustomed to using rice as a cheap source
of food energy.

The negro population particularly have the habit of

eating rice as an Important item in their diet.

^Bulletin No. 3, Home itoonomics Department of the Southern Rice
Industry, New Orleans, 1932.

CHAPTER II
PRICE MOVEMENTS FOR ROUGH RICE

Previous to 1930, research workers in the field of price analysis
made intensive studies of supply-pric© relationships, which, under condi
tions of relatively uniform demand over a period of years, were extremely
useful in price prediction.

Since the advent of the depression, however,

both the domestic and foreign demand situation have been subjected to un
usual and sudden changes, complicated by monetary manipulation and an un
usual psychology of price expectation.

At the same time, government

control of farm production has limited normal responses of supply to price
changes.

In this situation, emphasis has swung from supply-price relation

ships to dem&nd-price relationships.

Adequate statistical, psychological,

and political tools are lacking for analysis and prediction of demand, so
that quantitative analysis of price does not ordinarily contribute more to
price understanding than purely descriptive analysis of a price situation.
For these reasons, this chapter attempts little more than a
tative analysis of price movements for rough rice.

quali

There has been one

quantitative study made of rice prices, by Carlos Campbell of the United
States Department of Agriculture.

The specific relationships analyzed in

this statistical study are applicable to the present rice industry only if

^Carlos E. Campbell, Factors Affecting the Price of Rice. Technical
Bulletin No. 297, United States Department of Agriculture, April, 1932*
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government price and production control programs should be abolished, and
if the export situation should revert to the situation of the 1920 decade*
Since these events are not probable, the relationships are useful only as
general principles furnishing a base point for further interpolation*

The Trend of Prioes

There is no central market quotation or generally accepted trade
quotation on the price of rough rice, since each sale of rough rice is in
the nature of an individual bargain between the producer and the processor*
Clean rice price quotations are available from brokers handling rice sales
in the New Orleans and New fork markets, although there is again no uni
form trading price beyond scattered reports indicating the general level
at which sales are being made in the wholesale trade*

The most reliable

indication of annual price movements for rough rice is the monthly aver
age price received for rice by farmers as reported by the Agricultural
Marketing Service.

Although this average is based on a small sample of

actual sales and makes no allowance for highly important factors of va
riety and quality, various tests indicate that it describes the actual
trend very closely.
The chart presents the annual average farm prices in Louisiana
since 1909*

2

The southern rice industry had just become well established

by 19H* when the World War inflation sent prices skyward*

The crash in

1920 brought rice prices back to their pre-war levels, but small crops
and export demand resulted in a pronounced upward movement from 1922 to

2Prior to 1924# the annual averages are taken as the Deoember 1
price*
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1925*

Froa that point, prices began a precipitous decline, which, al

though checked In 1926 and turning into a slight rise in 1929, continued
without interruption until 1932.

The sharp rise in 1933 was caused

largely by the establishment of minimum price regulations under a market
ing agreement sponsored by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
and by a distinct upward movement of the general price level.
1936, however, price again slumped

After

with the cessation of export demand

until the outbreak of war in 1939 disrupted the shipping situation,
whereupon the dependence of Cuba on United States rice caused a sharp
rise in prices.
Small differences in average prices are evident between the four
producing states.

California rice is almost wholly of the Japan variety,

enters a different market than southern rice, and is marketed under less
competitive conditions, therefore prices do not always move closely with
prices in the southern states.
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.

Prices move in very close relation in
According to the trade, Texas rice is

on the average somewhat superior in quality to Louisiana rice, and higher
milling yields of clean rice and a greater proportion of long-grain rice
results in a higher average price.

Arkansas rice tends to average the

lowest of the three states, which can be attributed at least partially to
the greater proportion of Early Prolific rice in that area.

In addition,

claims have been made that Arkansas prices are lower than in Louisiana
and Texas because of fewer mills and less competitive bidding, and be
cause of the fact that rice is sold in bulk with lower sacking costs to
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Table V.

Tear

1909
191D
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Averags annual pries received by farmers for riee in Louisiana,
Texas, Arkansas, California, and United States, 1909 to date*

Louisiana
bu*

bbl.

i

♦

79
67
79
93
84
93
90
90
190
195
271
110
86
89
107
136
153
105
87
90
100
76
53
43
78
82
71
90
69
60
74
80
Source:

Texas
bu.

Arkansas

bbl.
J L _ _

bu.
♦

California

bbl.
♦

bbl.

bu*
_

United States
bu.
,*

bbl.
1...

90
2.81
78
79
2.84
2.84
3.24
68
66
70
2.52
2.41
2.34
2.45
65
2.45
80
82
80
2.83
2.70
2.88
75
2.84
2.95
3.28
3.38
3-38
3.38
94
91
3*35
94
94
86
86
3.10
3.02
90
3.60
3.10
3.24 100
92
90
3.60
92
3.31
3.31
3.24 100
3.35
3.42
90
3.28
3.20
91
3.24
3.24
89
95
86
3.20
2.81
96
3.10
89
78
3.47
3.24
190
6.30
200
7.20
190
6.84
6.84
6.84 175
7.02 197
6.48 190
6.91
6.84 192
7.09 180
9.61
9.61 267
10.08 240
9.76 280
8.64 267
4.28
4.50 131
3.96 125
4.72 121
4.36 119
3.42
92
3.10 101
95
3.64
4.14
3.31 115
88
90
3.96
3.20
3.35
3.17 H O
3.24
93
3.96
4.14 112
4.39 112
4.03 110
3.85 H 5
5.00
5.98 139
4.90 125
4.50 138
4.97 166
5.40 170
6.12 154
5.36 150
5.54
5.51 149
3.60 031
3.96 100
3.96
3.78 110
4.75 110
86
90
3.10
3.24 115
3.35
4.14
93
3.13
3.20
88
86
3.10
88
89
3.24
3.17
3.17
3.60 103
3.78 100
3.60
3.38 105
94
3.71
2.81
2.81
78
78
79
2.84
2.74
83
2.99
50
1.80
1.58
1.58
1.94
54
44
44
1.91
1.48
42
1.58
38
44
1.37
41
1.51
1.55
81
2.81
2.92
80
2.88
2.56
78
2.81
71
82
2.99
2.95
2.41
79
2.95
83
2.34
67
76
3.06
2.56
2.74
85
87
3.13
77
2.79
82
66
2.38
3.02
3.24
2.95
87
3.13
84
2.56
60
2.16
66
2.43
58
71
2.09
2.38
2.16
56
2.02
2.12
63
59
2.27
54
1.94
2.81
2.12
2.66
78
2.70
2.63
73
59
75
2.SI
2.52
3.06
2.56
70
78
2.88
71
Compiled from data of the Bureau of Agricultural £&onamica
as presented in the annual Issues of Agricultural Statistics*
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the

farmer.3 ftj® average United States price, of course, follows the

Louisiana average closely since it is heavily weighted by Louisiana pro
duction.
The price movements in Figure 7 show the aGtual average annual
price

reported by farmers, with no adjustments for the pronounced changes

in the general price level which have taken place since 1909.

The general

trend of rice prices, as for other farm product prices, is closely related
to movements in the general price level, with greater fluctuations than
the general price level itself.

When deflated by the Bureau of Labor Sta

tistics index of wholesale prices, rough rice prices show less violent
fluctuations, but the major peaks and trends remain about the same.

In

terns of purchasing power, the secular trend of rough rice prices has been
downward, with major peaks occurring in 1919, 1925* 1933* and 1940.
Since the general price level has such a strong influence on the
fluctuations of rice price, price analysts often utilize purchasing power
series rather than actual price series.

The objective of this method is

to eliminate the effect of changes in the general price level.

In recent

years, however, serious defects have be n recognized in this method of
price analysis.

Adjustments in acreage and production are rarely based on

purchasing power expectations, but rather on expectations concerning actual
dollar prices.

This is true because of the relationship of past prices and

debt structure to current prices, and the feeling that past prices repre-

^These claims are difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate
with empirical evidence. A discussion of factors entering into the Arkansas
price situation is available In Arkansas Rice Traffic Bureau vs. Aberdeen
and Rockfish Railroad Company* et al., Interstate Commerce Commission Docket
26430 et al*> Transcript of Hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commis
sion, 1934 and 1935, PP. 997 and %jgE
LIBRAE*
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sent a "normal" to which prices will return.

Changes in both demand and

supply may also be initiated by changes in actual prices and by the gener
al price lerel itself, with no relation whatsoever to the relative pur
chasing power of a commodity.

A changing general price level affects the

psychology of demand and supply for a commodity irrespective of the fact
that the commodity price itself is rising, falling, or remaining constant
in relative purchasing power.

To farmers who base their expectations on

past and present price levels, a change in actual prices is of chief con
cern, since it affects production adjustments more directly than purchas
ing power relationships.^
The average animal price is often of less significance to a rice
grower, of course, than the fluctuations of price during the course of a
marketing year.

The most pronounced fluctuations which occur during a

year are usually a reflection of the general price level trend, but there
are numerous erratic movements often countering the trend of prices in
general.

The marketing year begins in August, and rice can be sold at any

time during the following winter.

Sharp fluctuations away from the gener

al price level occur, but there is a strong tendency toward regaining the
previous position.

Thus, the principal value of general price level com

parisons is the demonstration of an inherent tendency of the price of rice
to move in accord with the general price level.

^This reasoning applies to relationships between demand and price
as well as bet sen supp ly and price. "Elimination" of changes in the
value of money has no effect on demand if all prices change proportionate
ly, except through expectations developed by the changing price level it
self* See G. J. Stigler, "The Limitations of Statistical Demand Curves,"
Journal of the American Statistical Association. 34:472-473, September,
1939*

uu

The relationship of rice prices to prices in general is clearly
illustrated by a comparison of prices received by United States farmers
for rice and vrheat since 1909•

Both products sell in the long run at

practically the same price per bushel, and their fluctuations have been
remarkably similar.

In only on© year, 1927* has there been a distinct

opposing trend in movement*

In fact, the relationship has been so close

that rice price movement over a period of several years could accurately
be measured by indexes of wheat price change, although wheat and rice are
limited as substitute goods and do not compete for land in production.
Both are highly susceptible to changes in domestic purchasing power and
export demands, however, and respond to similar demand factors in almost
identical fashion.

Rough and Glean Rice Prices

The priae a fanner receives for rough rice is a direct reflection
of clean rice prices in the wholesale market,

Pdce milling in Louisiana

and Texas is highly competitive, and the price paid by a miller for rough
rice is determined by the price he receives for clean rice less processing
costs.

Any unusual spread that appears between clean and rough riae

prices offers an immediate opportunity for mills with excess capacity to
profit by bidding higher on rough rice.

Temporarily, of course, spreads

may increase when clean rice price advances during a period when mills
are holding large inventory stocks of rough rice bought at lower prices,
or may decrease when mills are bidding up rough rice in expectation of
higher clean rice prices in the future.
A comparison of the monthly price of clean fancy Blue Rose rice
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at Mew Orleans anti the average prioe received by Louisiana farmers for
rough rice indicates that there were only two periods in which rough rice
prices failed to reflect changes in clean rice prices*

The first period

was from 1933 to 1935, when an Agricultural Adjustment Administration
marketing agreement gave the mills monopolistic power to establish a con
version charge obviously well above the competitive level.

The second

period was in 1935, when a processing tax of one cent a pound caused an
unusual spread between rough and clean prices which was not totally dis
pelled until the crop of 1936 was harvested, even though the processing
tax was declared unconstitutional in January, 1936*
In general, it appears that rough rice prices under competitive
conditions satisfactorily reflect prices paid in the wholesale market for
the clean product*

Hough rice price fluctuations tend to be more abrupt

and more frequent, however, since the influence of prices expected one or
two months in the future reacts on current relationships*

In addition,

clean rice quotations are often nominal and therefore more stable in a
declining market when few sales are being made, since the leading price
trend then appears in rough rice*
Price spreads between rough and clean rice are usually greatest
on a declining market, or when prices are high, because of the greater
risk attached to buying and milling the rice*

On an advancing market,

these spr.ada grow smaller because of the reduced risk in holding rice
stocks*

These relationships are clearly evident in the chart showing index

numbers for rough and clean rice*

Fluctuations in the value of by-products

are also a minor factor related to changes in price spreads.

The above

Dollars

Figure 10.

Barrel Rough Rice

Wholesale price of clean fancy Blue Rose rice at New Orleans and price received for rough rice
by Louisiana farmers, 1929 to date.
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comparison relates only to clean head rice, whereas broken rice, bran,
and polish are also obtained from rough rice*
The relationship between prices can be emphasised by comparison
of rough and clean rice prices converted to cents per pound*

Since 1931

the average monthly price of clean Fancy Blue Rose at Mew Orleans has
varied from a low of 1*8 cents per pound in February, 1933, to a high of
4*7 cents per pound in December, 1935*

During the same years, the aver*

age farm price of rough rice in Louisiana has varied from 0*8 cents per
pound in February, 1933, to 2*2 cents per pound in early 1937*

The net

spread has varied from 1*0 cents in 1932 to 3*1 cents under the proces
sing tax of 1935,

to 2*1 cents without a processing tax in 1939*

In

recent years the monthly spread has tended to fluctuate around 1*5 cents
a pound when clean rice wholesale price was at 3 cents a pound, narrowing
whenever clean rice was lower than 3 cents and Increasing when clean rice
rose above this level*
This indicates that the price of rough rice per pound tends to
average about 50 per cent of the price of clean rice per pound on the

wholesale market*
equivalent to

Roughly, about 62 per cent of a pound of rough rice is

a pound of clean rice, with the remaining 38 per cent going

into by-products, hulls, and invisible loss*

On the basis of 1*62 pounds

of rough rice equivalent to one pound of d e a n rice, the farmer receives
2*43 cents for each pound of wholesale d e a n rice sold at 3 cents per
pound*

The remainder, *57 cents per pound plus the vaiue of by-products,

accrues to the mills as a processing and selling margin*

In other words,
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farmers receive about 81 per cent of the wholesale price of clean rice.'*
During the years 1933-1936, the spread between clean and rough
rice prices advanced substantially,

A marketing agreement program regu

lating both rough and clean prices in October, 1934, fixed a greatly In
creased conversion charge over low margins pzevailing in 1932.

Average

d e a n rice prices in Mew Orleans in the winter of 1933-34 rose to 3.9
cents, more than doubling the 1,3 cent quotation of February, 1933*
Rough rice rose a full cent to 1,3 cents a pound, or roughly the same per
centage rise.

This was a substantial increase in the milling spread, how

ever, raising it to 2,1 cents, or practically double that of early 1933*
Great difficulties were experienced in the maintenance of this
spread in the highly competitive market structure,

A reduction in the

margin failed to save the marketing agreement program, and it was dis
carded in favor of a processing tax.

In marketing the 1933 crop, this

tax was apparently shifted largely to the farmer.

The mills were able

to increase their own margins simultaneously with the tax, for a 2 cent
spread appeared even after deduction of the tax.
When the processing tax was invalidated in January, 1936, clean
rice prices fell by less than the one cent tax, while rough prices, rose.
This fact even more clearly indicates the extent to which the processing
tax was passed back to the farmers.

However, clean prices soon recovered

without corresponding further rises in rough rice prices, and the highest

^Retail margins are
estimated that rice fanners
of clean rice in the United
price Analysis. Ames: The

greater and much more rigid. In 1939 it was
received only 30 per cent of the retail price
States. Seo Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Agricultural
Iowa State College Press, 1941, p, io9.
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spread of the past decade, 2*5 cents, appeared in August, 193&» before
the new crop was harvested.
After the effects of the early government oontrol programs were
obliterated, the price spread tended to be relatively stable at 1.5 cents,
as previously described,

Evidently the government programs were more ef

fective in raising clean rice prices than rough rice prices.

The fact

that high conversion margins could not be sustained when government con*
trol was withdrawn is evidence of the advantage to the farmer of a com
petitive industrial structure wherein consumer prices are directly refleeted in farm prices.

Factors Affecting the Prioe of Rice

The general conclusion drawn by all investigators into market out
lets for United States rice is that domestic demand is relatively ine7
lastic.
This conclusion is readily substantiated by examination of
relevant data.

Per capita consumption in the United States has ranged

consistently between five and six pounds per year, regardless of the ex
treme price fluctuations of the past twenty years.

Increases in the

total domestic consumption are best explained by population growth and
increased purchasing power, not by the effect of price reductions in in
creasing consumption,

large supplies of rice in the United States have

^3ee Chapter 71 for a complete discussion of government programs
in the rice industry•
^Saville, op. clt.

Campbell, op. cit.
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been accompanied by drastic price declines.®
The difficulties of constructing statistical demand curves have
become increasingly evident in recent years.

Adequate methods have not

been developed to allow for shifts in demand over a period of years* such
as are caused by annual changes in consumer's incomes*

long-time demand

curves are likely to be misleading as to the true slope of the short-run
curve*

On the other hand, there are no sources of information concerning

immediate consumer response to changes in price such as would be neces
sary to construct an instantaneous demand curve.

For these reasons, the

inelastic nature of the doaand for rice can best be assumed from the re
latively stable domestic consumption*

This is also true when rice is

sold on a quality basis in European markets, although not true when It
is sold on a competitive price basis in Latin American markets*
Froea. similar facts, Campbell

9

concludes that "the demand for rice

in both continental United States and Puerto die o is relatively inelastic.*,
price increases or decreases within fairly wide limits have little effect
upon the amount of rice consumed. •.foreign demand for southern type rice

^Foreign demand for rice on a price basis tends to be elastic,
since vast quantities enter the export market and American rice could
find a ready outlet if its price were competitive with Asiatic rices.
In 1940-Al, when costs of shipping made the Asiatic rice prices com
petitive with American rice in Cuban markets, foreign demand became
highly elastic for American rice. In normal times, however, American
rice is priced out of the competitive market. In the quality market, de
mand is relatively inelastic, since American rice has distinct quality
characteristics differentiating it from other rice*
^Wickizer, in his study of world rice consumption, concludes that
United States and European consumers pay highest prices for the highest
quality rice, and that the quantity of high quality rice consumed in the
world is little influenced by price. Wickizer, op, cit., p. 297.
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is more elastic than the domestic demand, but the quantity exported has
not been sufficiently large to provide a good measure of this elasticity.*^
Findings concerning elasticity of demand are frequently derived
from supply-price relationships.

11

From 1921 to 1929 demand was relative

ly stable, therefore the relationship of price to supply yielded a fair
indication of the nature of demand,

without constructing a mathematical

curve, it is clear from the graph that these years present a remarkably
consistent relationship.

Large production was uniformly associated with

low price, and low production with high price.

Seville, in a statistical

analysis of these nine years, found that a crop 60 per cent of the average
indicated a price 22 per cent above the average for the period.

12

This

indicates that farmers tend to receive more for a small crop than for a
large crop of rice, since price increases more than proportionately with
decreases in production.
It is also evident from the graph that 3upply-price relationships
cannot be clearly defined for any other period than 1921-29.

From 1930

to 1938 there has been a tendency toward inverse movement between price
and production; however, the effect of the depression in 1930 and pricefixing programs in 1933 and 1934 makes this relationship of little value

^Campbell, o£. cit.. p. 6.
^Technically there is a distinction between a demand curve and a
supply-price relationship, although they have often been used interchangea
ble. A demand curve relates price and consumption, and therefore may pro
duce slightly different results than a curve expressing the relationship
between supply and price for a farm crop.
^Saville, Bulletin No. 217* Louisiana Agricultural Experiment
Station, p. 12.
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Figure 12,

Relationship between price and production of
rough rice in the United States, expressed as
percentages of average price and production for
the years 1920 through 1938.
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in economic analysis.

The addition of the years 1930 through 1938 to a

supply-price analysis does not invalidate, however, the conclusion that
price changes proportionately more than supply.

It will be noted that

the curve is affected principally by the 1921-29 data, and that the 1930-

39 data if taken alone do not describe a similar relationship.
When demand for any commodity is relatively inelastic, the prin
cipal factor affecting price is supply.

That this is true for rice has

been demonstrated by Campbell in his statistical correlation analysis of
the

1920-1930 period.^3 The second major factor is the general price

level of a similar index reflecting changes in demand, the effect of which
has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter.

The third factor is the

supply of American rice that has to be disposed of in the foreign price
market in relation to the price and supply of surplus Asiatic rice. Analy
sis of these three factors yields a complete explanation of the fluctu
ations of rice price in the United States, except for the brief period of
price fixing and price maintenance from 1933 to 1935*^
Campbell*s analysis of factors affecting rice prices deals with
these three factors with multiple correlation techniques.

His data, how

ever, are manipulated with so many devices that their quantitative aspect
is highly obscured.

In present situations where the third factor, change

in the export situation has become dominant in influencing rice prices,
further experiment with statistical techniques is inferior to reliance on
qualitative analysis.

13Campbell, o£. cjt.
^Campbell, op. clt.
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In recent calculations, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics
found that most of the fluctuations in the retail price of rice in the
United States can be explained by annual supply and the income of indus
trial workers.^

The export situation does not influence retail price

as much as wholesale price, since retail margins are a large proportion
of the price paid by consumers and domestic sales are protected by a
tariff wall against cheap rice*

16

Rice Acreage and Prices

As previously discussed, the production of rice depends largely
on the acreage harvested, since yields are unusually stable.

For most

crops, there is a strong tendency for fanners to expand acreage when the
price per unit of that crop has advanced the preceding year, or was high
relative to the price of other crops.

These acreage changes are not al

ways reflected in production changes because of fluctuations in yields.
Acreage, supply, and price of lice, however, afford a relatively clear
example of farmers* response to price*

^These conclusions are presented by the methods of graphic
multiple correlation in An Analysis of the Effects of the Processing
Taxes Levied Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, United States Treasury
Department, 1937* p. 58,
^Retail demand for farm products is mol's elastic than demand in
the wholesale market or at the fam, since the rigid retail margin results
in a difference in the proportionate changes in quantity and price. The
demand curve is always more inelastic in the lower priced market. An
arithmetic proof of this proposition is given by Geoffrey S, Shepherd,
op. cit,, p. 205—206.
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The response of acreage to price Is illustrated in the graph of
the preceding section*

Years of high prices have almost invariably been

followed by increased production in the next year, while low prices have
been followed by declines in acreage and production.

In 18 years between

1920 and 1938, this adjustment in acreage occurred in 13 years in the
United States.

The five years for which there are exceptions can be ex

plained by temporary lags and by the effect of government control programs*
In Louisiana, this adjustment in acreage is not as closely defined, since
acreage is more stable in a specialized producing area*

However, here

also the expected response to price took place in 11 out of the 18 years,
demonstrating the strong tendency of rice acreage to adjust itself to
changing price conditions.
There are certain peculiarities of ric© acreage which affect the
immediate response of acreage to price in the preceding year.

The situ

ation has been well described by Carlos Campbell, who saysi
"Growing rice under irrigation requires a large amount of capital
in addition to land and labor* Before rice can be grown profit
ably on most of the rice land, wells must be dug, canals built,
or seme other source of water provided, and expensive pumping
machinery installed. As nearly as is practicable, the watering
equipment is adjusted to the Yarn acreage so that the optimum
watering capacity of the equipment can be used each year* That
is, a farm on which 160 acres of land were prepared for rice
growing probably would have a plant capable of supplying water
to 120 acres*"™
Thus, a rice farm in Louisiana is not a readily elastic unit in
o far as rice acreage is concerned*

Additional acreage can be put into

cultivation only if irrigation facilities are readily available, and

•^Qampbell, op, cit.. p* 2*
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ordinarily the expensive water facilities will not b® expanded under the
impetus of one year’s high price.

The chief source of additional acreage

in a year following high price is the retention in cultivation of acreage
which ordinarily would be fallowed or dry-famed in other crops the second
year, as is customary in the rice belt rotation.

Other sources are the re

turn of rice cultivation to land on which irrigation facilities are avail
able but which has been planted to other crops because of low rice prices,
and the renting of additional water from irrigation companies which are
favorably located in relation to available new rice land*
The chief point is that rice acreage expansion is limited in short
period fluctuation by water and capital requirements*

Over a long period

of prolonged high prices, of course, additional investment in irrigation
facilities can bring more acres into cultivation*

VJritlng in 1932, Camp

bell reasoned that one year of high pricea would cause an increase in
acreage by keeping land in rice an extra year, but that more than on©
year would maintain acreage at too great an expense of rice yield and
quality.

Therefore, two years of high prices will result in stability or

even an actual decrease of acreage when the land must lie out a year.
However, three years of high prices are likely to result in the instal
lation of new watering equipment and a general expansion of available rice
acreage*

Tne resulting increase in acreage and production would be so

large a- to make a fourth year of high prices improbable.

As prices fall

the acreage would again be contracted, both by a return to regular ro
tation practices and by the contraction of the acreage recently brought
into production.
Campbell thus reasons that there is a tendency toward a six-year
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cycle in rice prices— three years up and three down*

The chief fault in

his reasoning as to such a cycle is his failure to explain the three year
downswing of the cycle•

Once prices start downward, there is no particu

lar reason why acreage should contract over a three-year period, consider
ing the fixed investment in land find water facilities*

LYen if acreage

should contract in three years with falling prices, the acreage from the
previous expansion would be immediately available whenever price was high
for a year, thereby destroying Campbell's argument &o to the necessity of
three years of high prices to cause any considerable expansion of rice
acreage*

Unless there were a rather sharply rising secular trend in rice

acreage, Campbell’s reasoning concerning a rice price and acreage cycle
of six years does not appear altogether logical*

IS

analysis based on

the 1921 to 1929 period in which Campbell was working has led to frequent
conclusions concerning price and production cycles which are apparent for
no other years than that period.

Prioes by Varieties

At times the price range between the different varieties of rice
grown in the southern states may be more than one dollar per pocket of
one huixir^d pounds of extra fancy clean rice in the wholesale market,
garly Prolific rice brings the lowest price of popular Louisiana varie
ties, generally selling on the 'wholesale market at 20 to 30 cents per

^Conditions necessary for cycles in acreage are similar movements
both up and down the supply curve, with the violent adjustments explained
by Aordeeai Lzekiel in his development of the "cobweb” theorem, Recently
economists have recognized that many supply curves are ’’one-way” curves,
and that acreage does not contract in a manner similar to its expansion in
response to price changes. See Geoffrey Shepherd, op. cit., Ch. 15.
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pocket under Blue Rose*

Early Prolific and Blue Hose prices are the basis

of the price structure, and define the trend of rice price in general.
The prices of long grain rices such as Rexoro and Fortuna do not always
bear a constant relationship to Blue Rose prices, since they appeal to a
more limited quality market with a more rigidly inelastic demand.

When

rice prices are low or declining, the long-grain quality rices are sold at
substantially higher levels, but do not rise as much when the market is
high or advancing.

The spread between the price of quality long-grain

rices and Blue Rose is thus greatest when the market is low, and relative
ly small when the rice market is high.

In addition, a period of sus

tained low price results in an increase of long-grain production, which
narrows the price advantage of these varieties.

The more pronounced price

fluctuation for Rexoro is probably due to the limited market which it
enters, and the absence of real quotations in some months.
About 70 per cent of the rice produced in Louisiana is Blue Rose,
19
and. about 10 per cent is Early Prolific, 7

The average prices received

by farmers in Louisiana, as analyzed in preceding sections, are thus based
largely on Blue Rose and Early Prolific prices. Rexoro and Nira bring the
highest prices, but form only a small percentage of the crop.

The extent

to which rough rice prices reflect the variety price differentials of the
clean rice market cannot be definitely ascertained, since rough prices of
varieties other than Blue Rose and Early Prolific are difficult to obtain
in sufficient numbers to be representative.

l^See table on page 31,

The Early Prolific-Blue Rose
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price spread is well reflected in rough rice prices, but it is probable
that the price spreads for the other varieties are not as great as in
clean rice prices.

The long-grain rices often have a smaller yield of

head rice per barrel of rough rice than Blue Rose and more care is neces
sary in the milling process, so that processing costs cut more heavily in
to the clean price quotation.
Wholesale price quotations for clean rice are often nominal, since
there is no organised exchange on which constant sales are being made*

At

times there are lengthy periods during which few sales are made, with con
siderable indefiniteness In the trade as to what the true market price is.
The quotations reported above are gathered from brokers and mills trading
in rice in New Orleans, and are a good indication of clean rice market
prices only for periods when the market was active.

Prices by Grade

In 1923 the United States Department of Agriculture devised a
system of rough rice grades in an attempt to remedy certain market de
fects discussed in Chapter III.

Jixcept for a brief experience with com

pulsory grading in 1934, rough rice grades have never come into general
use in the marketing structure.

Consequently, there is little informa

tion available concerning the extent to which a farmer secures a premium
or discount for various qualities of rice.

The single source of data is

the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, which has followed a
practice of obtaining a certificate showing the grade of each lot of rice
sold for its members.

When sales are made, the grades and prices are cir

culated among the members in the cooperative's weekly market report.

6h

These grade and price data form, the basis for this analysis of prices by
grade.
In general, the level of prices received for sales through the
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association follows very closely the
fluctuations in price shown by the Agricultural Marketing Service in its
monthly price series.

This comparison is shown in the accompanying chart.

Ho comparative data are available for months during which no sales were
made by the cooperative, which usually occurred in periods of sharp ad
vances or declines in the rough rice market.
Although the general level of prices received by members of the

cooperative averages slightly higher than the Louisiana farm price, the
differences are not sufficient to warrant any conclusions regarding dif
ferences in prices received by members and non-members of the association.
There is some presumption that prices obtained through the cooperative
tend to be higher, since the cooperative members sell in an organized
manner and know the quality and market conditions when the rice is sold.
In addition, members of the cooperative are located principally in the
western part of the rice belt where the rice is generally considered of
superior milling quality and top market prices are paid.
The rough rice grades used by the cooperative association range
from one to six.

The grade is based largely on the estimate of clean

head rice and total rice products, excluding hulls and waste, which will
be obtained from a barrel of 162 pounds of rough rice.

This estimate is

commonly expressed in terms such as 90-112, which means 90 pounds of head
rice and n ? pounds of total rice products.

The second important factor

influencing grade is the moisture content, expressed as a percentage.
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Finally the milling quality is estimated, which relates to general ap
pearance, quality, and ability to withstand the milling process*

This

milling quality is influenced by the percentage of red rice, chalk
kernels, seeds, and damaged kernels in the rice*

As a general rule, the

red rice content is perhaps the most important single factor influencing
quality, although damaged or dirty rice may sometimes be of greater impor~
tanee.

20
The analysis of the prices and grades of numerous lots of Early

Prolific and Blue Rose rice sold through the American Rice Growers Associ
ation since 1930 revealed that premiums and discounts for varying quali
ties of rice may range more than 10 per cent from the average price paid
for rice*

When the market is stable, however, the majority of rice of the

same variety is sold within a 25 cent price interval*

In 1938, the only

recent year during which prices did not experience a severe fluctuation
which complicates the study by introducing a market change, 113 out of
sales of Early Prolific were made between $2.01 and §2.25 a barrel,
and 200 of the 221 sales were made between $1*76 and $2.2$ a barrel*
the

In

year, out of 257 lots of Blue Rose sold, 135 lots were sold be

tween $2*26 and $2*50, and 237 lots were sold between 12.01 and $2*50.
Analysis of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association
price data during most years is prohibited by constant market changes,
with insufficient data available at any given price level to permit ade
quate analysis.

Obviously, market changes obscure grade premiums when

^°For a more adequate discussion of rough rice grades, see Chapter
III*
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all sales are compared without regard to date, and there have been very
few periods other than 1938 when rough rice prices were sufficiently
stable to warrant any valid comparison of grade and price*
Further analysis of the 1938 grade and price data reveal the rela
tionships tabulated in the following table*

For both Early Prolific and

Blue Rose rice, high prices were uniformly obtained by the best rice, indi
cating that the mills paid premiums to secure the best quality rice and
that farmers marketing poor rice were penalized by lower prices*

Eighteen

lots of Early Prolific rice with an average yield of head rice of 84
pounds, with low milling quality and clean grade estimates, and relatively
high percentages of red and damaged kernels, was graded by the cooperative
at an average of 1*5 and sold at prices ranging between $1*51 and #1*75 a
barrel.

Rice receiving the top prices between #2*01 and #2*50 a barrel

had an average milling yield estimate of 91 pounds, high milling quality
and clean grade, and was classed on the average near grade on© for the
rough lice*
Similar associations are found for Blue Rose rice.

Fifty-two lots

selling between $2*01 and $2*25 a barrel had a low milling estimate of 93
pounds, and were graded low in milling quality, clean grade, and rough rice
grade because of red rice and damaged kernels.

The highest prices of

$2.51 to $3*00 were brought by rice with materially higher milling yields,
higher milling quality, and high clean rice and rough rice grades*
The following three tables attempt to distinguish grade and price
relationships by smaller price divisions within a short period of time*
For this analysis, three months were chosen during which sufficient sales
were made on a relatively stable market to furnish data for the tabulation.

257

Average
1.278

621
1,27*
1.957
2.2*3

1,23*

l.*2?
1.113
1,287
1,258

Average
no. tag#
In lot

l.fc

1.7
l.fc
l.*4
1.0

1.3

1.5
1 .*
1,2
1.3

Average
grade

3.*
2.3
1.7
1.0
2.5

13.0

1.1

M
1.6
0.6
2,0

13*2
12.9
13.3
13.5

13.2

13.5
13.^
13.0
13.3

16,3

22.6
i M
lU.g
8*3

1*4.0

16.9
18,7
10.3
1*4.0

Average
Average
red
total
Average
noletur# n.lift.— . damage

5*2

9.1
5*3
5.0
?.b

5.P

6.1
M
5**
M

Average
atfllk

1.6

1.0

X.k

1.9
1.6

2.0

2.6
2.1
1.8
1*3

Average
Billing

Relation of grading factor# to prio## for lot# of riee told by the
Amerloan Rio# Orowere Cooperative Association, 193®*

Weekly market releases of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association.

52
185
17
3

H u e Rote:
2.01- 2,25
2.26-2.50
2.51-2.75
2.76-3 .OO

Source:

221

1®
82
118
3

Ifoaier
in
erouo

Average

Sarly Prolific:
1.51-1.75
1.76*2.00
2.01- 2.85
2.26-2.50

Prio#

fable VII.

1.6

1.9
1.6
1.6
1.3

2.1

2**4
2.1
2.0
2.0

9^-113

93-112
96-II3
95-llt
99-11*4

87-110

8*4-108
86-109
88-110
91-110

'Average
Average
clean
Billing
-grade...... eetluate

In Hay, 1931* the cooperative association sold 133 lots of Blue
Rose within a 56 cent prlae range, from $2.63 to $3.21 a barrel, with 70
of these lots sold between #2.96 and $3.10.

Rice bringing the lowest

price during this month had the lowest average milling yield estimates,
the lowest milling quality, and the lowest rough rice grade.

Rice that

brought higher prices, tabulated in five cent intervals, advanced fairly
consistently in milling yield, quality, and grade.

Red, chalky, and

damaged kernels percentages were necessarily lower as grade improved.
The same general conclusions are Indicated in the tabulation of
price and grade for 102 lots of Blue Rose sold in March, 1933*

In gener

al, high milling yields, quality, and grade were associated with high
prices relevant to the general market level at which rice was being sold.
The month of February, 1935, when 340 lots of Blue Rose were sold
on a relatively stable market, presents the best data available for tabu*
latlng price and grade relationships.

Milling yields of head rice on all

these lots were variously estimated from 36 pounds to 99 pounds.

The

lowest price of $2.51 was obtained for the 36 pound rice, the highest
price of $3.50 for the 99 pound rice.

Milling quality ranged from three

on the lowest priced riee to one on the highest priced rice.

Similarly,

rough rice grade advanced from low to high in accordance with higher rice
prices.

Red rice, chalky kernels, and damaged kernels were again corre

lated with the grade factor.
ufln operators, in a survey in 1941, were almost unanimous in
saying that they paid no attention to the grade certificate when buying
rice from members of the cooperative, and many operators expressed doubt
that the grade certificates presented an accurate description of the rice
because of bias in favor of the seller.

It is apparent from these tabu*
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Table VIII*

Price
2*56-2*60
2.61-2*65
2*66-2*70
2.71-2.75
2*76-2.80
2.81-2.85
2.86-2*90
2.91-2.95
2.96-3.00
3.01-3.05
3.06-3.10
3.11-3.15
3.16-3.20
3.21-3.25
Average of
all

Halation of grading factors to prices received for Blue Rose
rice sold by American Rice Growers Cooperative Association
in May, 1931.

No. lots
in grouo

Grade

Red
rice

Moisture

Total
damage

Milling
quality

Milling
estimate

1
5
5
15
13
7
4
4
46
4
20
5
4
5

4.0
3.2
2.6
1.9
1.6
2.0
2.0
1.8
1.7
2.0
2.0
1.2
1.5
1.4

0.0
12.0
10.6
6.0
2.4
3.6
4.5
0.8
2.0
4.5
1.8
4.0
2.0
0.6

14.7
13.5
14*1
13.5
13.7
14*1
13.8
13.5
13.4
13.5
13.8
13.6
13.5
13.3

25.0
37.6
41.8
27.2
23.6
28.3
29.8
27.8
24.9
25.5
30.8
13.2
16.0
21.0

3.0
1.8
2.8
2.3
2.3
1.7
2.5
1.5
1.6
2.0
1.4
1.6
1.0
1.2

89-112
89-110
91-112
91-112
93-112
91-111
94-112
94-113
94-112
95-112
95-113
99-114
96-113

138

1.8

26.6

1.8

93-112

20...— . 131.6..
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Table IX. Relation of grading factors to prices received for Blue Rose rice
sold by American Rice Grovers Cooperative Association in March,
1933.

Price
1.31-1.35
1.36-1.40
1.41-1.45
1.46-1.50
1.51-1.55
1.56-1.60
1.61-1.65
1.66-1.70
1.71-1.75
Average of
all

No. lots
in group

Grade

Red
rice

Moisture

19
14
10
16
11
15
1
5
11

2.3
1.4
2.1
1.8
2.3
1.9
1.0
1.4
1.4

7.7
0.9
0.8
2.5
1.5
4.0
0.0
0.0
0.2

12.7
13.0
12.9
12.5
12.7
12.8
13.5
13.8
13.1

1 4 .5

102

1.9

.,4-3

12.8

.,._S2s?...

Total
damage

Milling
quality

Milling
estinat.

32.6
21.2
21.3
20.0
25.7
29.4

1.9
1.4
1.3
1.4
1 .1
1.5

93-112
96-113
96-112
97-113
96-112
96-112
98-116
92-112
98—113

n.o
18.0

1.0
2.0
1.2

...iSdlft.
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Table

X*

Relation of grading factors to prices received for Blue Rose
rice sold by American Rice Growers Cooperative Association in
February, 1935*

Price
2.51-2.55
2.56-2,60
2.61-2.6$
2.66-2.70
2.71-2.75
2.76-2.80
2.81-2.85
2.86-2.90
2.91-2.95
2.96-3.00
3.01-3.05
3.06-3.10
3*11-3.15
3.16-3.20
3.21-3.25
3.26-3.30
3.31-3.35
3.36-3.AO
3.41-3*45
3.46-3.50
Average of
all
Source;

No. lots
in group

Grade

2
2
2
7
6
5
12
17
9
15
32
34
a
30
28
37
33
12
12
4

3.5
3.5
5.0
2.7
3.8
2.8
3.1
2.8
2.4
1.7
2.1
1.9
1.6
1.7
1.6
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.0
1.2

1.8

Red
rice
5.3
2.0
1.3
4.0
5.6
1.2
3.5
1.8
9.1
4.4
5.8
7.2
6.5
5.3
5.0
2.5
2.1
1.2
1.2
2.8

Moisture

Total
damage

Milling
quality

Milling
estimate

12.2
13,6
12.6
14.1
12.9
13,8
13.5
13.2
13.5
13.7
13.5
13.4
13.3
13.6
13.3
13.3
13.1
13.1
13.4
13.4

31.5
69.5
14.5
46.7
28.2
31.2
34.6
34.2
37.1
24.3
29.3
22.6
19.3
20.8
16.8
15.7
14.6
16.1
15.4
12.8

3.0
3.0
3.5
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.4
2.6
2.2
2.0
1.9
1.7
1.4
1.4
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.2
1.0

86-108
88-110
85-109
88-111
90-112
90-111
90-111
90-111
90 - i n
92-111
92-112
92-112
93-112
94-112
96-113
96-113
96-113
98-114
9 7-U4
99-114

1.7

94-112

-JkL. .ISA. , ,

Weekly market releases of the American Rice Growers Cooperative
Association.
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lations that the mills usually agree with the grade certificate placed on
the rice by the cooperative, and that the grade i s an accurate guide to
premiums and discounts on rough rice.
The data also indicate that mills pay the farmers premiums for
better rice, and that a fanner producing poor or damaged rice is severely
penalised when selling his rice*

Prices for low grade rice may be 25 to

50 cents a barrel below top grades when prices are near 13 a barrel, and
still more for extremely bad rice*

It is likely that farmers in general

tend to receive these premiums and disoounts for rice because of the com
petitive nature of rice buying*

It is doubtful, however, if these premi

ums and discounts are as marked as those of cooperative members, for
without a grade certificate certain advantages accrue to an experienced
rice buyer with which a farmer can never hope to contend*

Seasonal Variation

Rice in Louisiana is harvested in September, October, and Novem
ber*

The farmer faces a choice of selling his crop at harvest timp, or

storing his rice and selling later in the following winter or spring.
Ordinarily, supply and demand conditions remaining the same, there would
be a normal tendency toward a mild seasonal variation in rice prices*
Price would have a normal tendency to rise from the time of harvest by
an amount roughtly equivalent to the costs of storage and interest*

This

rise would be greatest in the first three months, since the chief costs
of storage are traditionally paid in these months in Louisiana, and later
carrying charges are small*

There would likely be some Improvement in

the grade of rice due to moisture loss and shrinkage which would offset
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a portion of the coat of storage.
The coats of storing rice from October 15 to March 15, over much
of the rice belt, would average about 15 cents a barrel for storage, plus
about 5 cents for insurance and about 7 cents for interest (on $3 rice)*
The total coat of carrying rice for five months, therefore, approximates
25 cents a barrel, allowing for same increase in grade because of moisture
loss*

A normal seasonal price variation would thus follow a tendency to

rise by 25 cents a barrel from October 15 to Larch 15*

This rise in five

months would be approximately 8 per cent of an October 15 price of $3 a
barrel for rice*

In other words, March 15 price should tend to be about

108 per cent of the October 15 price*
For commodities whose price is highly unstable, tendencies on the
supply side toward seasonal price variation are generally obscured by
changes in demand*

This is particularly true for rice*

The problem of

whether to sell or store rice at harvest can be answered only by specu
lation as to future demand in relation to the supply that is coming on
the market.

Almost invariably the effect of changes in demand is greater

than the tendency toward a seasonal rise equal to cartying costs on rice*
In addition, speculative operation by large mills anticipating future
changes in rice prices tends to modify the normal tendency of rice price
to be lowest at time of harvest when a large volume of rice is moving to
the mills*

On the other hand, the fact that mills cannot absorb the

entire crop at the time of harvest forces farmers to hold the crop until
a later date or sacrifice it at a lower price.
The average seasonal variation of Louisiana rice prices at the
fara for the years between 1930 and 1939 ie shown on the accompanying
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■-Monthly average for the year equals 100.
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Figure 15* Index of average seasonal variation for rough rice prices in
Louisiana, 1930-1939*
Index*
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Figure 16.

Price received by Louisiana farmers for rough rice expressed as a
percentage of October price, by months, 1920 to 1940 .

% of October
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T a b l e XX .

F l i M i re oe i Y e d by L o u is ia n a fa ra e ra fo r r ic e expressed as a p e r
cen tag e o f O cto ber p r ic e , 1920-41.

leer

1920-21
1921-22
1922-23
1923-24
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
1927-28
1928-29
1929-30
1938-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40
1940-41
Source:

O a t.

Doe.

100.0 100.0
100.0 90.7
100.0 128.6
100.0 96.4
100.0 102.3
100.0 105.5
100.0 99.1
100.0 96.8
100.0 103.3
100.0 100.0
100.0 95.0
100.0 117.6
100.0 97.6
100.0 102.6
100.0 102.4
100.0 107.7
100.0 96.6
100.0 109.1
100.0 106.6
100.0 102.6
100.0 U5.4

Sea.

Ja n .

78.1
90.7
115.5
95.5
110.2
106.2
98.2
97.9
104.4
93.9
91.3
115.7
97.6
96.2
93.9
113.8
94.3
103.0
103.3
97.4
121.5

F eb .

63.3 61.7
114.4 99.9
U5.5 110.7
99.1100.0
112.5110.2
106.9104.2
99.1 96.4
98.9 94.7
107.7105.5
101.0108.1
93.6 97.5
109.3 103.9
90.5 85.7
99.9 101.3
92.7 96.8
127.7130.8
105.7 1U.3
106.1 99.9
108.2 113.1
96.7 90.8
141.5 153.8

lia ro h

A p r il

64.0 39.4
111.3 93.6
129.6 130.9
97.3 100.9
108.5 107.8
99.3 90.9
97.3 93.7
95.7 97.8
105.5 106.6
104.0 108.1
95.0 96.3
101.9 96.1
95.2 107.1
102.5 103.4
102.4 103.6
127.7 129.2
112.6 114.9
95.4 90.9
106.6 104.9
85.5 85.5
155.4 131.5

way

June

Ju ly

65.5 61.0 58.6
39.7 102.1 111.3
104.3 128.6144.0
117.1 121..6123.4
110.9 116.4117.2
95.1 97.9101.4
92.9 91.1 92.9
102.1 104.3 98.9
102.2 103.3103.3
107.1 105.1100.0
92.5 92.5 91.3
96.1 94.1 90.2
133.3 142.6145.2
99.9 96.7 96.2
104.3 108.4106.0
136.9 136.9138.5
109.2 102.3 97.7
37.8 95.4 96.9
104.9 104.9103.3
98.7 98.7103.9
134.6 180.0

Aug.

S e p t.

75.0 76.6
103.2 83.5
122.6 128.6
118.9 116.2
114.1 111.7
85.4 81.9
80.4 81.2
97.3 97.8
109.9 108.3
88.3 79.8
70.0 58.8
92.2 86.3
3fi,7 178.6
101.3 99.9
39.2 66.3
139.9 152.3
87.4 74.7
96.9 83-3
95.1 145.9
103.9 80.3

Agricultural Statistics, United States Department of Agriculture.
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chart*

Daring these years* prices have generally been lowest it'iinediately

preceding the new crop movement in September, and have usually* been
highest in November when the mills are most active in buying*

Price nor

mally declines in December because the mills have filled their storage
space and the market is inactive during the holiday season*

After a price

recovery in January* prices do not show any significant pattern of move
ment during the remainder of the season.
This usual pattern of movement, however, is subject to drastic
shifts when changes in

demand and changes in the

come the influence of supply foroes*

general pricelevel over

Figure 16 shows the pattern of price

movements for each crop year between 1921 and 1939* expressed as a per
centage of the October price*

In no single year does the pattern of

seasonal movement conf ora very closely to the average seasonal index il
lustrated above, since almost always changes in demand or general price
level have a significant influence*
are still apparent*

However, several general tendencies

There is a strong tendency in almost every year for

prices to rise in November, with the advances being greater than the oc
casional declines*

In

in November as high or
U

the 19 years shown* a farmer would, havereceived
higher prices in 13 years

as in October, but in

years the prices would have been lower in December than in October*

During the remainder of the year* the chances are better than 50 per cent
that price will be higher than in October until the month of August, when
prices usually decline on the old crop rice*
General conclusions from these data are that October and December
are the weakest price periods during the active marketing year* and that
November is usually a favorable month in which to sell*

Price changes
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after October, however, are extremely variable and the seasonal pattern
is by no means fixed*

However, during the past 19 years price increases

after October have generally been greater than declines in prices, and a
farmer who stored rioe each year would have sold at a higher average price
during the period than a farmer selling in October.

This higher average

price would probably do little more than cover storage costs except in
years when abrupt changes in demand or in the general price level permit
ted speculative profits.
As a general rule, prices are as favorable in November as can be
expected at any time during the year*

Active buying by the mills in this

month, since the peak of the harvest is passed and supplies are known, is
the chief factor supporting price at this time*

Favorable years for

longer storage are those when the general price level is rising, or when
a change in demand is forcing a rise in prices*

Unfavorable years for

further storage are those when the general price level is declining, or
when domestic or foreign demand prospects are poor.

It is difficult to

forecast these forces, and therefore storage of rice is normally a specu
lative operation.

However, the general practice among rice farmers of

storing their rice is largely responsible for the November peak, since
the mills sust bid up the price in order to encourage farmers to sell
immediately and forego speculation*

CHAFTiiE XIX
STORAGE ANb M R K O T N G

In Louisiana, rice is harvested from late August into November*
Early Prolific is the variety first to mature, and by late September the
bulk of this variety has been harvested*

Harvest begins earliest in the

minor Mississippi river and Teche regions where the rice is cut green by
hand labor and threshed immediately in order to avoid losses due to storms
or inability to secure sufficient labor later in the season*

Since the

first rice of the new Early Prolific crop comes frcm this area, mills In
both Louisiana and Texas buy here so that milling operations may begin.
Mills at Baton Rouge and New Orleans have a decided advantage in buying
most of the river crop, however, because of favorable location and custom
ary credit relationships with the fanners.
Blue Rose, which forms the bulk of the Louisiana crop, is harvested
from late September through October*

Rice in the principal growing area

of southwest Louisiana is out by a binder, cured in the shock from ten
days to two weeks, and then hauled to the separator and threshed*

At the

thresher the rice is placed in bags with capacities ranging from 150 to
250 pounds, with a four-bushel bag averaging above 180 pounds the most
casnon weight*

Rough rice then moves into the marketing process, either

moving directly to the mill or going into storage for later sale*
Rice is sold by Louisiana fanners on the basis of a barrel of 162
80
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pounds•

The price includes the sacks, with slightly less than an average

of .9 of a sack in a barrel.

In Arkansas, rice is sold in bulk by the

bushel of 45 pounds, and in Texas both methods of sale, by barrel and by
bushel, are found.

Clean rice is sold by the mills in bags, termed pockets,

of 100 pounds each.

Marketing Procedures^

One of the most striking characteristics of rough rice marketing
is the scarcity of middlemen.

Hice moves from the farmer direct to the

mills, and from the processor through brokers to wholesale or export markets*
The trade is an excellent illustration of a marketing process with a mini
mum of middlemen, a procedure which has frequently been advanced as a de
sirable reform in agricultural commodity marketing.

The problems raised

by direct marketing, however, are unusually evident in the rice trade.

Al

though the presence of middlemen in a market spreads the farmer and consumer
farther apart, ordinarily this factor results in distribution of speculative
risks among the various middlemen.

In rough rice marketing, the absence of

middlemen means that rice growers must carry all speculative risks not as
sumed by the mills.

Since the rice milling concerns ordinarily are better

acquainted with market conditions, this means that the farmers are forced
to carry speculative risks when these risks are most dangerous, since there
is no

other speculative element in the market to relieve the pressure.
In recent years retail outlets have tended more and more to main-

^The material in this chapter is bftsed on a survey of rice storage
facilities and marketing practices made by the writer in the spring of
1941*
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tain their stocks of rice on a narrow basis, relying on the mills to make
replacements qtiiokly available.

This increases still further the specu

lative risks on the mills and on the fanners*

Rough rice buying by mills

from fanners is often affected by these speculative risks, with occasional
periods in which no rough rice at all is sold*

Mills are often reluctant

to buy or farmers to sell in face of future price expectations, even
though the current market appears to Justify sales at going prices.
Rough rice marketing therefore is largely a "higgling" transaction
between the farmer and salaried or commission buyers representing the rice
mills*

There is no official market price quotation on rough rice available

to serve as a guide, nor have objective standards been generally adopted to
serve as a basis for price bargaining*

Each lot of rice raised by & far

mer is sold on sample, so that direct comparisons of individual prices are
difficult*

Each sale, within narrow limits of substitution, must be re

garded as a special commodity on which special factors operate in regard
to price establishment.
A lot of rough rice may include all of a farmer *s rice of one
variety, or, if there are distinct differences in the quality of rice be
tween different fields, the rice from one farm may be divided into several
lots*

The couaon practice among all rough rice buyers is to draw a repre

sentative sample from the bags in a lot of rough rice*

A portion of this

sample is "rubbed" or "shelled" in order to remove the huUs,

This opera

tion is carried out more or less thoroughly depending on the attitude of
the buyer and the difficulty of evaluating the rice.

The operation may

be carried out on a rough board or stone, the rice being rubbed with a
block*

Methods frequently differ, the object being to apply sufficient
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pressure and friction to Judge the effect of milling machinery on the
rice*

The rubbing process removes the hulls and part of the bran, and

the proportion of whole and broken rice kernels in the sample provides
a basis for an estimate of the yield of head rice and total yield of rice
products in a barrel of rough rice*

For example, after rubbing a sample

of Blue Bosef a buyer may estimate that 94 pounds of head rice and 110
pounds of total rice products will be secured from 162 pounds of rough
rice*

This yield is the most important factor in evaluating a lot of

rlee.
An estimate of the moisture content, which is important In influ
encing both the quality and yield of rice, is obtained during the rubbing
process by observing the general properties of the hulled rice.

If the

bran curls, a relatively high moisture content is indicated, which lowers
the value of the rice,

A portion of the rice is also weighed in a small

cup to determine the weight per bushel.

Other factors being equal, the

total yield of clean rice products will be greatest for heavy rice, since
less of the volume will be hulls and invisible loss in milling.
The principal additional factor scrutinized by the buyer is the
general appearance and quality of the rioe, Including such factors as red
rice, weed seed, and foreign materials.

This is the basis for an estimate

of the grade of clean rice to be obtained from the lot, whether it will be
choice, fancy, or extra fancy.
After this examination, the buyer makes a bid based upon his cal
culation of current value, or upon instructions from the mill concerning
the particular sample.

The price is based upon the value of the d e a n

rice yield, and by-product prices are generally disregarded.

The terms

of sale may be f,o,b, farm, warehouse, or mill, depending on the bargain

04

between the producer end buyer*

Caah is paid immediately upon grading and

weighing the rloe at the f.o.b. point.

If the rice is stored in a bonded

warehouse* the warehouse receipts are transferred by the farmer to the mill.
The mill reserves the right to reject any rice which does not equal
the sample* although usually such rloe la accepted with a price adjustment
in favor of the mill.

In the absence of objective grades* these rejections

lead to frequent controversies.2

Occasionally rice may be bought uround”,

that is, a price quoted per barrel regardless of discrepancies in grade and
value between different bags in the lot.
is the taking of the weights.

A source of frequent difficulty

Ordinarily the weight is taken at the f.o.b.

point at time of sale, with the buyer and seller, or their representatives*
checking the accuracy of the weights.

Attempts at Rice Marketing Improvement

This system of rice marketing naturally results in considerable
controversy* and complaint is frequently expressed concerning the need for
a more orderly marketing system to replace the traditional procedure whioh
has grown with the industry in Louisiana.

Between 1920 and 1930* numerous

reforms in marketing were urged by government workers and by members of the
industry.

The journals of the rice industry were filled with suggestions

for improvement of marketing* particularly in regard to cooperatives*
grading service* and market news service.

3

In the past eight years agi-

23ee case reported in Chapter IV.
% i c e Journal, monthly issues, 1920 to 1930.
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tation for marketing improvements has subside*, largely because ninor re
folds have been accomplished while major reforms were discredited by their
relation to ill-advised compulsory regulation of the rice industry in 1933
and 1934.
W. D. Smith, in charge of rice investigations for the United States
Department of Agriculture, may be credited with the origination of practi
cally all suggestions for Improvement in rough rice marketing*

Beginning

his work with rice in 1917, Smith immediately proceeded with a series of
research studies related to the improvement of rice marketing*

From the re

sults of these studies he made numerous recommendations, and established an
action program to bring adoption of improved practices.

Projects which re

ceived his particular attention included improvement of grade by elimination
of red rice and selection of better seed, improvement in threshing, recom
mendations for bulk handling, development of rice dryers to permit bulk
handling, warehouse improvement, cooperative marketing, market news service,
and objective grading standards for rough rice,

A rice standardization

laboratory established shortly after 1920 was the center of the research
work of Smith and his associates,

literature relating to rico marketing

in the South is almost totally dominated by the work of Lr. Smith. ^

^Numerous short articles in the Rice Journal. 1920-1934, and miscel
laneous government sources report on Smith's work in rice marketing. Con
cise summaries of his research projects are available in the following mime
ographed publications of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics! Col aerolal
Drying of Rough Rice in the Southern States, August, 1928; Official FederalState Rough Rice Grading in the South, May, 1929 5 The Handling, Grading, and
Uses of Rice, February, 1929, and March, 1937; Seed Rice Survey in Louisiana^
Texas, and Arkansas. March, 1930.
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Since the evaluation of the quality of rice always hi s been the
most controversial issue in rough rice marketing, Smith concentrated his
most intensive work on the development

of

previously described, the chief factor in

rough and clean rice grades*As
rough rice evaluation is the

milling quality, or yield, of the rough rice sample.

In order to remove

the subjective element in the rubbing test, Smith, in 192A, invented a me
chanical device for removing the hulls in

a uniform manner.

vice patent on this device was granted in

1925# and it has been used in

rice grading laboratories since that time.

A public ser

In this device, a weighted

rubbing block automatically passes to and fro ever the sample of rice.
The rubbing (or shelling) operation removes the hulls and breaks the weaker
kernels with effects roughly similar to that of rice mill machinery.
After the rice has been shelled, and the loose hulls and bran re
moved by a Bates aspirator, the percentage of red rice, damaged kernels,
heat damage, and chalky kernels can be ascertained by counting a portion
of the sample.

The milling yields of head rice and total yield of head and

broken rice is readily obtained from their respective weights in the sample,
koisture content is determined readily from the rough rice by use of the
electrical resistance moisture tester.

On the basis of these determinations,

standards have been established to correspond as closely as possible to ac
cepted practices in the rice industry.

Present Grades Used for Hough Hice

With few changes, the present system used for grading rough rice
is essentially that established in 1927*

All rough rice is divided into
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classes according to variety.

For each class, xaaximum limits are pre-

scribed for moisture content, red rice, total damaged kernels (pecky rice),
mud lumps, weed seeds, heat damage, and foreign material.

Milling quality

is determined from the yield of head rice and the total yield of rice pro
ducts as estimated from yields on the Smith shelling device*
The designation that is applied to rough rice is as follows:

5

(1) Designation of milling quality by the estimated yield of head rice per
barrel of rough rice, as Prime, Good, Medium, Fine, Ordinary, and Low.

For

Blue Hose, the required pounds of head rice per barrel of rough rice to
meet each of these designations is 95, 90, 85# 80, 75# and leas than 75
pounds.
(2) Designation of milling quality according to total yield of
milled rice per barrel, as A, B, C, D, K, and F.

For Blue Rose, the re

quired total yields are 110, 108, 106, 104# 102, and less than 102 pounds,
respectively.
(3) Designation of grade according to percentage of red rice, dam
aged kernels, and foreign materials, according to United States grades No,
1* 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

* codjKura limits are prescribed for each relevant

factor within each grade.
The description of a lot of rough rice is given by a plir^so such
as Blue Rose Prime A No. 1, which indicates that the estimated milling yield
of head rice is 95 pounds or better, total yield 110 pounds or bettor, with

^See mimeographed United States Standards for Hough Rice, as amended
effective August 1, 1939, Washington, Agricultural Marketing Service, July
1939.
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a veijr low percentage of red rice, damaged kernels, and foreign material.
Standards were also established for Glean rice so that the highest rough
rice grades correspond to the highest clean rice grades.

Thus Prime A No,

1 rough rice should produce Extra Fancy cleai rice.

Utilisation of Rough Rice Grades

For several years, the rice laboratory undertook to grade rough
rice on an experimental basis until the grades were believed satisfactory
for use in the rice trade.

Official United States standards for class,

quality, and condition for milled, brown, and rough rice were also estab
lished by the Secretary of Agriculture and became effective September 15,
1927*

In general, the trade was hostile toward the use of grades for rough

rice, and on an independent basis there was little possibility for their
general uae,^

The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, however,

was actively seeking to improve the bargaining status of its members through
their local district selling officers.

The determination of the quality of

rice independent of the valuation of mill buyers would do much to aid the
cooperative managers in bargaining for a satisfactory price.

In addition,

the marketing news service being developed between the various cooperative
selling points could not become fully effective unless definite standards
relating quality and price could be ascertained.

^In 1924, Dudley J. LeBlanc introduced a bill in the
legislature for public graders at public rice warehouses for
farmers, along with a provision requiring a public warehouse
ceipts showing grades. This legislation was opposed by rice
failed to pass. See Rice Journal. June, 1924*

Louisiana
protection of
bond and re
mills, and
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The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, therefore,
undertook to utilize the grading standards developed by the United
States Department of Agriculture.

7

The Texas Department of Agriculture

and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the United States Department
of Agriculture established a Federal-State grading ssrvioe at Beaumont,
Texas.

The laboratory here was equipped with sampling devices, moisture

testers, shelling devices, aspirators, sieving machines, scales, and
other necessary apparatus for determining the milling value of the rice,
licensed graders were employed to ascertain the official Federal grades
and to issue rough rice grade certificates.
Beginning with the 1923-29 marketing season, the American Rice
Growers Cooperative Association undertook to secure a grade certificate
for each lot of rice handled for its members.

These grade certificates

were used for bargaining in making sales, and also served as a basis for
the daily reports from the central office of the association on the
prices of rice sold in the various districts.The moisture content

ana

lysis was also useful in determining the practicality of storing rice.
The balance of the trade, however, showed no particular inter*est in rough rice grades.

Non-members of the cooperative made no efforts

to secure grades, and mill buyers continued to buy rice on their own
methods,

The principal use of the rough rice grades by the cooperative

was simply as a basis for their own operations.

^Compiled from mimeographed abstracts and references on The
Handling. Grading, and Uses of Rice, by C. L. Corbett and E. G. Boerner,
March 1937, and One Season1a Record of Official Federal-State Rough Rice
Grading in the South, by
D. Smith, May 1929*
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From th e 1928-29 marketing season until the present time the
A m erican R ice Growers Cooperative Assooiation has continued to grade the

rioe of i t s members •

In the early years the grading was done by the

Federal—State laboratory at Beaumont, Texas*

In reoent years, however, the

cooperative has hired its own graders and done its own work*

Since official

governm ent rough rice grades have found no acceptance in the trade, this
method of utilising the grading standards Is probably as satisfactory as

obtaining an official certificate*

Compulsory Rough Rice Grading

The government standards for rough rice received their most wide
spread use under the price-fixing provisions of the marketing agreements
in 1933 and 1934*

At first, the agreements provided that disputes as to

premiums and discounts on rough rice should be settled by obtaining an of
ficial certificate of grade*

This system, however, was not sufficient to

establish uniformity in rice purchases*

Under authority given him in the

marketing agreement, the Secretary of Agriculture on August 20, 1934, made
compulsory the grading of all rough rice purchased by the mills*

Numerous

grading offices were hastily established, since the expansion in the work
was enormous*

Haste and confusion was the principal characteristic of

this short-lived attempt to establish the use of rough rice grades*
It is little wonder that rough rice grades offered no solution to
the problem of more elderly marketing when they were utilized for four
months in the 1934 marketing season.
summed up as follows i

Reasons for their failure may be

(l) the customary buying practices in the rice belt

could not be radically changed in the course of one season, (2) the hastily
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established grading offices could not be expected to operate efficiently
at once, and (3) the institution of rough rloe grades as a basis for fixing
prices gave every incentive to both growers and processors to criticize and
manipulate the grades in order to gain a price advantage*
It is unfortunate that the rice industry has experienced price-fix
ing along with rough rice standards, for the association of the two programs
has left a bitter memory*

A gradual utilization of rough rice grades would

likely have benefitted both growers and processors, and contributed more
than any other one factor to the improvement of rice marketing*

The experi

ence of 1934, however, has greatly retarded the utilization of rough rice
grades, and many years will pass before conditions are again favorable for
their promotion.
Grade standards for clean rice, however, have come into widespread
use*

Most clean rice is sold on government certificates of grade or on

equal-to-type certificates*

This is particularly true of clean rice for ex

port, where the establishment of clean rice grades has undoubtedly been a
major benefit to the Louisiana rice industry*

Other Marketing Improvements

Although rough rice grading has not been adopted in the rice indus
try, some suggestions for marketing improvement have been taken into general
use*

One of the most important was the establishment of a market news ser

vice in 1928, at present Issued as a weekly mimeographed release of the Agri
cultural Marketing Service, called the Weekly Rice Market Review*

This re

lease contains a description of the behavior of the Southern and Californian
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clean rice markets during the preceding week*

Hie rang© of clean rice

prices by varieties classified as to Extra Fancy and Fancy is given for
rice markets at Houston, New Orleans, Stuttgart, New York, and San Fran
cisco.

The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association issues a dupli

cate of this report to its members, except that it substitutes for the
d e a n rloe price quotations a grade and price report on its own rough rice
sales.
Cooperative marketing, unsuccessfully launched at various times,
became permanently established with a venture begun in 1929# so organized
as to avoid the causes of failure of earlier associations of rice growers.
Hie campaigns to improve the grade of rice by control of red rice, elimi
nation of foreign materials, and seed improvement also resulted in a better
marketing system.

Farmers throughout the area are more and more having

their seed cleaned by fanning or Carter disc equipment, apparently recog
nising the premiums and discounts which are paid for different grades and
qualities of rough rice.
Other proposals for marketing improvement, however, have fared
little better than rough rice grading.

Chief among these suggestions were

bulk handling to reduce sacking and handling costs, improvement in ware
house facilities, and encouragement to farmers to sell on sealed bids
through bonded warehousemen in place of individual bargaining.

Except for

the establishment of bonded warehouses, which has reduced the dangers of
irresponsible storage, there has been little development in these facili
ties since the establishment of the rice industry*
Rice has always been handled in sacks in Louisiana, and stored
by stacking in flat warehouses.

This method developed when rice was grown
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on a small seal©, and parallels handling methods for typo® of grains grovm
on a small seals.

Arguments for continuing sack handling of rice in Loui

siana have been, and still are, identical to those raised by wheat growers
when the government undertook to encourage bulk handling of wheat in order
to improve marketing.

These arguments are (1) sacked grain brings enough

more than bulk grain to cover oosts of sacks, (2) large investments have
been made in flat warehouses, (3) insurance oosts are higher on bulk grain,
(4) sacking is the only economical way of handling large numbers of varie
ties and grades, (3) flat warehouses have a low construction cost compared
to elevators, (6) millers prefer the preservation of the identity of grain,
and (7) bulk handling requires dry grain.

These same arguments have been

sufficiently strong in Louisiana to prevent any change in the method of
handling and storing rice.

In recent years, however, there have been a few

indications that the system of bulk handling of rice in Arkansas and Texas
o
has begun infiltration Into Louisiana.
A low moisture content not only improves the milling quality of
rice, but is an important factor in methods of handling rice.

Many indi

viduals believe that the high moisture content of Louisiana rice is the
principal factor prohibiting the development of bulk storage.

A longer

curing period in the shock does not appear feasible in Louisiana because
of climate limitations.

Rice in bags can be stacked to permit free circu-

^Federal Trade Commission, Grain Trade Report. Vol. 1, 1920, p. 26.
l'-rge private warehouse near Holmwood handles rice in bulk in
bins,
andthe Louisiana State Rice Milling Company plant at Lake Charles
has added equipment to handle rice in bulk. Other large mills can be adapted to bulk storage of rloe, although small mills would experience
difficulty in doing so.
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lation of air, can be restacked to permit drying, or can be shoveled and
resacked if very wet*

In bulk handling, of course, grain can be re-ele

vated and run through various bins in order to dry it*

Commercial dryers

for grain are on the market, and considerable research has been done to
adapt a grain dryer to Louisiana rice. 10
Since drying results in Improved yields of head rice and fewer
broken kernels, several large mills in Louisiana have long boon equipped
with rice dryers which are used when damp or wet rice is purchased*

Such

facilities are not available to farmers, however, since initial cost and
the traditional method of sacking rice prevents their installation in
warehouses*

Dryers now on the market are not pen©rally considered very

efficient by rice growers or millers, moreover, which retards their gener
al adoption*
All of these factors have maintained the traditional method of
handling rice in Louisiana*

Present indications are that sack handling

of rice will continue for many years, except in the western part of the
rice belt where larger lots and drier rice make economies of bulk hand
ling more obvious to the growers*
The improvement of warehouse facilities already existing In the
Louisiana rice belt, therefore, has drawn chief attention In Improvement
of the storage of rice*

The public storage of agricultural products was

at one time In the United States in a very chaotic condition, due to lack
of regulation and the irresponsibility of warehouse operators for products

10
W. D* Smith, Commercial Prying of Rough Rice in the Southern
States. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, mimeographed, Washington,
August, 1928*
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placed in trust with thorn,

A chief objective of the United State® 'Vare-

house Act of 1916 was to aid producers and merchandisers of agricultural
produet® to obtain responsible public storage so that the stored products
would be acceptable collateral for bank loans*

11

Because of inadequate

storage facilities on the f a m and frequent Inability to move the products
to market when desirable, farmers all through the nation store their pro
ducts in public warehouses*

The poor financial standing of many warehouse

men, variety of buildings used, methods of storage, and character of the
warehouse receipt often are such .as to damage the product and limit the
value of the product for collateral on loans.

The federal warehouse act

aimed to correct these conditions by providing federal licensed warehouses
under strict regulations.
In the rice belt of Louisiana, however, few warehouses secured a
federal bond.

Conditions after 1916 were not improved in regard to the

problems of rice storage described above.

As a result, the state of

Louisiana established warehouse regulations, which, although applicable
to all warehousing, were designed principally to improve rice marketing.
In 1926, the Louisiana State Market and Warehouse Commission began opera
tions, although its early efforts were directed largely to commodity inspection services and not to warehousing.

12

In 1934, the state of Louisiana passed an act providing, among
other things, a system of state bonded warehouses for storing farm pro
ducts.^

All warehouses offering public storage and issuing warehouse

^Report of the Chief, Bureau of iigricultural Economics, 1923, p. 1 3 ,
Progress Report, Louisiana State Market and Warehouse Commission
Bulletin No. 5, May, 1939,
'
^ A c t No. 223, State of Louisiana, 1934.
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receipts were to bo licensed and bonded as "State Regulated Fanners' Ware
houses," and it was made unlawful for anyone to operate a public warehouse
or issue negotiable receipts unless licensed under the federal or state
law.

According to the Commission, the duties of the state under this act

included the supervision of warehousemen, furnishing plans and encouraging
warehouse construction, encouraging proper storage of agricultural products,
eliminating unsound or evil practices, developing uniformity in methods and
receipts, and making easier the financing and marketing of f a m products.

14

Since January, 1935, all negotiable receipts on stored rice in Louisiana
have been issued only by state bonded warehouses, except for a few federal
bonded warehouses.

These warehouses are required to report monthly their

movement of rice, periodic inspections are made, and an annual audit is
made in the summer to check on the total movement for the year.

For these

services, the warehouses pay a license fee, post a bond, and are assessed

X/Ut for each bag of rice entering storage.

In 1940, the warehouse regu

lations were simplified and strengthened by a revision of the warehouse
commission organisation, and improvements were made in licensing and inspeotion.

15

Most of the rice marketed in Louisiana passes through the state
bonded warehouses.

Because these warehouses levy a considerable annual

toll on the rloe crop, and are the only marketing service intervening be
tween the farmer and the mills, their position is peculiarly important

^Official Regulations and Resolutions. Louisiana State Market and
Warehouse Commission, Bulletin No. 4, December, 1936, p. 10.
^ A c t No. 218, State of Louisiana, 1940.
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in an analysis of rough rloe marketing.

The remainder of this chapter

will be devoted largely to problems of riee storage and warehousing in
the state.

Movement of Rough Rloe

About half of the rice crop in the southern states moves to the
mills in the months of harvest, August through A%vember.

In the four

years from 1935 through 1938 > when crop movements were not unduly dis
turbed by unusual incidents, 36 per cent of the annual reaeipts of rough
riee by southern rioe mills was received during this four-month period.
Hie peak movement was in October, with an average of 24*4 per cent of the
year* 8 annual receipts, while 29 per cent was split between September and
November.
Rough rice receipts at the mills generally decline during Decem
ber, but rise again in January.
ation.

Several iactors account for this fluctu

First, the harvest season has passed and farmers who have stored

tend to retain possession for a month or more; second, the mills reach
their financial and physical capacity in rough riee during the harvest
season and are not disposed to buy until their stocks are reduced; and
third, the holiday season has a retarding effect on activity in the rice
market.
Although a farmer as an individual has a choice between storing
and selling at harvest, rice farmers as a group do not have this choice.
The mills have neither the financial nor physical capacity to buy the
whole crop during harvest, nor can they afford the speculative risk.
Storing of at least half of the crop by farmers, therefore, is necessary.

9a

If all farmers attempted to sell during harvest there would not be a suf
ficient market at that time to absorb the supplies* since there are no
speculative elements operating in rough rloe except the fanners and the
mills*
Much of the rloe marketed direct from the thresher also passes
through the public warehouses* and may be stored several weeks*

large

growers frequently haul their rice directly out of the field to a public
warehouse in order to assemble a large lot* even though they have no in
tention of holding the rice*

In such cases* the warehouse does not stack

the rice* but furnishes shelter and weighs the lot* for which it charges
a small fee* usually five cents a bag.

Location of Rice Warehouses

Public bonded warehouses specialising In rice storage are distri
buted rather uniformly through the southwest Louisiana producing area*
Public storage is available at practically every trading center* usually
at points where rail facilities and good roads are available*

The dis

tribution is such that very few rloe farms are more than ten miles from
public storage* and most hauls are considerably less than ten miles*
If rice moves a greater distance* special influences are usually in
volved* such as loans on the crop* advance of farm supplies during the
season* or business or personal relationships*
The map shows the location of Independent public rice warehouses
in the rice area in which storage Is available to the farmer.

The map

does not include mill warehouses which store farmer-owned rice, nor
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bonded warehouses used principally by irrigation companies for their own
rice storage*

More than one warehouse building operated by the same com

pany in one town is also shown as a single warehouse*
Milling centers are indicated by the crosses*

Public storage at

milling points is dominated by the policies of mills in regard to storing
farmers1 rice*

Generally, storage charges in mill warehouses are waived

when the storing mill buys the riee*

The operation of large mill ware-

* houses in Vermilion parish explains the scarcity of public warehouses in
dicated for that area.

Large Irrigation company warehouses are also lo

cated in Vermilion parish, and store a great deal of their tenants' rice
in addition to their own large rice stocks*

Services Rendered by Public Warehouses

The services performed by a public rice warehouse are fairly
standardised throughout southwest Louisiana, although performed with con
siderable difference in efficiency at various points*
the rice to the warehouse loading platforms*
the rice, marie, and stack it.

The grower hauls

Warehouse employees unload

The stack of rice is given a lot number,

and the grower receives negotiable warehouse receipts for the number of
bags of rough riee checked in*

State warehouse regulations do not re

quire that incoming rice be weighed, as is necessary under federal warehouse regulation.
When the grower wishes to sell, he may or may not use the services
of the warehouseman*

Usually warehousemen furnish whatever aid the farmer

desires in selling rice, although most growers carry on their own negoti-
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Figure 18.
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ations.

The grower commonly notifies th© warehouseman when he wishes

to sell, and the warehouseman calls the buyers of mills with whom the
fam e r wishes to deal, or buyers whom the warehouseman prefers*

These

buyers call, at the warehouse, obtain samples, and make bids*
Occasionally more than one grower may plan to sell at the same
time, and several lots are put up for sale*

Bids may be made direct to

the farmer, or by sealed bids through the warehouseman*

iihen state

banded warehouses were first established, it was hoped that farmers would
sell through a responsible warehouseman acting as agent.

After limited

experience with this selling method, however, growers have returned to
the method of direct bargaining, apparently because of distrust in the

warehouse operators*

Frequent charges have been made that warehousemen

favor certain buyers at the expense of growers, that they fail to en
courage

competition, and occasionally accept commissions in obtaining

riee for preferred mills*

In exceptional cases a farmer may request a

warehouseman to sell his riGe for him, nmnlng a minimum price, but ware
housemen generally confine their duties to assembling buyers at the
grower's request*
After a lot of rice is sold and the warehouse receipts trans
ferred, the lot is graded by the buyer and weighed by the warehouseman*
The warehouseman's duty in these functions is to insure that the rice
is properly sampled and graded, and that the weights are accurate*
Broken bags are resacked, and labor furnished for moving the rice out
of the warehouse to the buyer's truck or freight car*

In case the mill

Is not in a position to receive the rloe immediately after grading and
weighing# the warehouse makes a charge to the mill for its actual costs
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in restacking and handling the rice.

Storage Sagacity in the Sloe Area

According to th© records of th© State Warehouse Commission* there
aero 101 different bonds Issued to warehouse® which specialized in storing
rice in 1940-41*

Since several companies had more than one warehouse

bonded, the actual number of warehouses was greater*

Six of th© state

bonded rice warehouses, however, were located in Hew Orleans outside of
the producing area, where four of them were controlled by on© large com
mercial warehouse company.

In addition, one of the warehouses on th©

state records was destroyed by fir© in the summer of 1940, another had
ceased operations, one had dropped its bond, two others wore; duplicates,
and one vas located outside the producing area at the Baton Rouge mill.
This left 09 state bonded warehouses inside the southwest Louisiana rice
producing area which stored rice in 1940-41*

Of these 09# 16 were oper

ated in connection with rice mills or were under the direct control of
rice mill interests, leaving 73 warehouses bonded by the state and storing
rough rice primarily for producers.
In addition, there was some rice storage available to farmers
that was controlled by rice mills under federal bond*

Most notable was

the Faroers "arehous© Company controlled by the Louisiana State liioe
Milling Company, which operated eight warehouse facilities for the com
pany in Louisiana*
federal bond*

Three other mills also had storage facilities under

In addition, several mill warehouses that were not bonded

received rice from farmers and stored until the mill bought th© rice at
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a later data.
Total atata bonded warehouse storage capacity in the southwest
producing area in 1940-41, according to the state records, was approxi
mately 3*740,000 bags of rice*

In addition, the federal bonded rice

mill warehouses could handle 675,000 bags.

A surrey of the rice ware

houses and mills in the spring of 1941 indicated that the state records
showed upper limits of warehouse capacity, as in several instances old
warehouses could not be used to their full capacity because of weak
floors or other troubles with building maintenance.

Effective state

bonded warehouse capacity appeared close to 3,500,000 bags of rice.
These figures on total capacity included both rough and clean rice ca
pacity at the 16 mill warehouses.

All storage at Baton Rouge and Hew

Orleans was omitted.
In recent years a n omal Louisiana rice crop has ranged between
5 and 6 million bags of rough rice.

There are approximately 4,400,00

bags of public warehouse and mill storage under state or federal bond
in the producing area of the state.

Another 500,000 bags is probably

stored on the farm or in private warehouses at several points.

The re

maining portion of the crop proceeds immediately into the milling pro
cess and to market, or enters storage after purchase by a mill whoso
facilities do not include public bonded warehouse storage.

Early ma

turing varieties are often milled by the time the late varieties are
threshed and stored.

Total storage facilities for rice in the state,

therefore, are approximately equal to the needs of the annual crop.
The capacities of individual warehouses ranged all the way from
6,OCX) bags to more than 100,000 bags.

Of 88 bonded rice warehouse
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buildings studied in Louisiana, 57 had capacities between 20,000 and
60.000 bags*

X6

The larger capacities wore generally controlled by mills

and irrigation companies, with the independent public storage available
to farmers averaging near 30,000 bags per warehouse*
The isilling centers are by far the most important points for the
storage of rough rice, largely because of the warehouses associated with
the mills*

The mill warehouse space, although needed for storing clean

rice, is often sufficiently flexible so that it can be used for rough
riee storage when necessary*
Crowley, the chief milling center, had almost a fifth of the storage
capacity available in 1940-41*

Its 623, OCX) bag capacity was principally

mill storage, much of which was available to farmers*

Space for only

195.000 bags was available independent of mills and irrigation companies*
Kaplan, another important milling center, was second in storage capacity,
but only 160,000 out of its 520,000 bag capacity were operated for fanners
independently of mills*
Next in order came Gueyd&n, Lake Charles, and Eunice*
tant were Rayne, Welsh, Jennings, Abbeville, and Elton*

Less impor

Storage at other

points exceeded 100,000 bags only at Iota and Mermentau*
In regard to independent storage outside of the control of mills
and Irrigation companies, Eunice with 205,000 bags led all storage points,

^ I n this discussion, the exact number of warehouses is difficult
to determine. Seme operators had more than one warehouse in the same lo
cality, others rented additional space when needed, other© had buildings
lying idle* For these reasons, the number of warehouses presented in dif
ferent parts of this discussion may differ* Although a complete tabulation
was attempted, it was useless to reconcile all the figures so that no dis
crepancies would appear*
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Table XXXI*

Capacity
in
bags

Storage capacity and ownership of 88 bonded rice warehouses
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41*

Individual

Type of Ownership
Partnership
Corporation
and estate

All types of
ownership

6— 20*000

9

7

1

17

21— 40*000

16

16

5

37

41— 60*000

6

12

2

20

61— 80*000

1

2

0

3

80*000 and
over

1

10

0

11

33

47

8

88

Total
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followed by Crowley with 195#000 bags.

Welsh was high in famor storage

with 190,000 bags available, followed by Kaplan, Jennings, Iota, and
Rayne with over 100,000 bags available at each point.

It is at these

points where bidding for rough rice stocks is most active, since the mills
must deal with each farmer and lack the control over bidding they have in
their own warehouses.

Control of Rice Warehouses

Of 95 rice warehouses in southwest Louisiana for which data was
available during 1940-41, only 23 were concerned primarily with general
warehouse and farm supply business.

The remaining 72 were associated with

other business enterprises, usually closely associated with the rice in
dustry.

Twenty-six warehouses were operated by rice millers, and 14 each

by irrigation companies and merchandising concerns*
13 of the remaining IS.

Rice farmers owned

Individual proprietorships were the chief fora

of business organization for the warehouse and fara supply enterprises,
while the warehouses controlled by large interests were organized as
corporations.
As mentioned above, there were public bonded storage facilities
within the southwest Louisiana producing area for about 4,400,000 bags
of rice in 1940-41, including a small proportion of clean pockets in
this figure.

Of this total, rice mills controlled over 1,600,000 bags

capacity, and irrigation companies another 600,000 bags*

In other words,

haif of the public storage capacity was controlled by business enter
prises to which xlce storage was only a related service to their princi
pal rice enterprise.

Local store operators controlled 536,000 bags in
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T ab le X IV .

T o ta l bonded warehouse and mill storage capacities for rice
a t le a d in g rice centers in southwestern Louisiana, in bags.

1940-41.

L o c a tio n
Independent
C row ley
Queydan
la k e C h arles
Sunlce
Bayne
W elsh
Jennings
A b b e v ille
E lto n
Io ta
Men&entau
T o ta l 12 le a d in g
r ic e e e n te rs
A ll o th e r
T o ta l

195,000
1 6 0 ,0 0 0
2 5 ,0 0 0

C o n tro l
Ir r ig a tio n
company
9 0 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0

45,000

M ill

538,000
2 6 0 ,0 0 0
1 6 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0

T o ta l
8 2 3 ,0 0 0
5 2 0 ,0 0 0
2 8 5 ,0 0 0

2 0 5 ,0 0 0
1 1 5 ,0 0 0
1 9 0 ,0 0 0

40,000
80,000

245,000
245,000
195,000

135,000

45,000

180,000

1 0 0 ,0 0 0

1 3 6 ,0 0 0

4 1 ,0 0 0
1 5 5 ,0 0 0
1 2 0 ,0 0 0

1 9 0 ,0 0 0

15,000

155,000
25,000

30.000

1 4 5 ,0 0 0
1 0 0 .0 0 0
1 ,5 2 3 ,0 0 0

130.000
3 ,2 6 9 ,0 0 0

1,1 4 1 .0 0 0
4 ,4 1 0 ,0 0 0

1 ,4 1 6 ,0 0 0

3 3 0 ,0 0 0

681.000

aHUpqo

207.000

2 ,0 9 7 ,0 0 0

5 8 3 ,0 0 0

1 ,7 3 0 ,0 0 0
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Table IV.

Associated business enterprise and type of oimership for 95
rice warehouses located in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41.

Principal business
enterorise
Warehouse & farm supply
Rice mills
Retail 6 wholesale mdse.
Irrigation company
Rice farmers
Miscellaneous
Total

Individual
15
2
7

a
2
....,3fc.....

Corporal,ion
6
22
6
14
2
_____ 3

Partnership
and estates
2
2
1

._

___ 52___

3

8

Total
23
26
14
14
13
?,

n
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connection with their mercantile enterprises, which often included fi
nancing, principally through merchandise advances on rice crops.

Men

whose principal business was rice farming controlled another 400,000
bags of space, principally through individual ownership but also in two
corporations in which local fanners were the principal stockholders.
tiiis left approximately 1,000,000 bags of capacity in the con
trol of local independent warehouse operators, which included a number
of operators dependent on other enterprises such as a profession, or
selling farm supplies*

This demonstrates the extent to which Louisiana

rice farmers depend on rice storage controlled by large enterprises in
the rice industry.

Any consideration of rice storage costs in general,

therefore, must reckon not with the situation as one controlled by the
actual costs of independent warehouse operation, but with the entire
structure of enterprises controlling storage facilities, and the pur
poses and nature of such control.
In one sense, the independently operated storage is more impor
tant than appears from the above figures.

Much of the mill and irri

gation ccxapany capacity is not really public storage since a large
portion of the rice is owned by the warehouse operators— 50 per cent
would be a conservative estimate*

In addition, much rice passes through

the independent warehouses in the early part of the season without uti
lizing permanent storage space, so that effective independent capacity
in handling rough rice is greater than absolute capacity.

Charges for Rice Storage

Rates charged farmers for storage vary greatly, and the facili
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ties available at similar rates also vary considerably.
is the result of several factors s

This situation

(1) the Influence of custom in setting

the rates generally accepted in the cccinunity, (2) the forcing davm of
rates by new warehouse companies attempting to get rice for storage , (3)
the fact that most independent warehouses tie up the rice with crop ad
vances so that they secure it for storage regardless of their charges,
and (4) the practice of mills in waiving storage charges for rice pur
chased in mill-controlled warehouses.
Some warehouses also perform miscellaneous services which cause
rates to differ from the announced schedules.

Special rates are some

times given on large quantities, special services such as turning and re
stocking to dry rice are performed for an additional fee, and rice may be
handled through the warehouse at the beginning of the season without
stacking* for a usual fee of five cents a bag.
A number of the warehouses c a n y a blanket fire insurance policy
on all rice and include the charges in their storage fee.

The reasons

given for this practice are that the growers do not ordinarily care to
take out their own insurance, or will omit doing so and therefore incur
an unreasonable hazard, and that insurance can be furnished somewhat
more cheaply by a blanket policy.

The more common practice, however, is

for the grower to take out his ovm insurance.

Rico is insured for its

stated market value, vdth a premium based on $100 of valuation.

The in

surance company reserves the privilege of replacing the rice instead of
paying a loss in cash.

In general, costs of insurance are estimated at

one cent a bag per month, and several warehouses furnish optional blanket
insurance at this fee.
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The most common charge for rice storage made by bonded ware
houses in 1940-41 was 7 cents per bag the first month, 5 cents the second,
and 3 cents the third month or fraction thereof, with 15 cents a bag being
Twenty warehouses out of 79 made this

the maximum charge for the season*

charge, eight of them including insurance in the fee*

Kext in general use

was a rate of 10 cents flat without insurance, although this rate was con
fined largely to a number of warehouses in one locality*

Other rates were

varied, ranging from a flat rate of 3 cents in one warehouse to various
combinations reaching over periods of five months of storage*

(Table XVI)

Several warehouses offered optional insurance at one cent per bag above
the stated storage charge*
The highest rate charged by any public warehouse in the producing
area was 8-6-4-2-2, which adds to a total of 22 cents a bag for storage of
five months or longer*

This rate included insurance*

The lowest rate in

the area with insurance was 5-5* or a total of 10 cents for the season*
Without insurance, the highest rate charged a grower was 7-5-3-2, or a
total of 17 cents for the season*

The lowest rate without insurance was

a flat 6 cents, but this was established because of an unusual fire hazard
and consequent high insurance costs*

Tor warehouses in general, the low

est rates without insurance were the 10 oents flat rates, although in one
case an 8-2 division was found*
The lowest charges for public rice

storage inthe entire rice

belt were maintained at Crowley, with a usual rate of5-4-3 oents and

a

12 cents M-rimim for the season, including

insurance* Hie forcedeter

mining this low rate has been the activity

of leadingirrigation and

banking interests expanding warehouse operation .nd cutting storage rates.
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Table XVI.

Hates charged for storage in 79 public bonded rice warehouses
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41, per large bag.

Number warehouses

One

Two

Months jointsper bag)
three
Four
Five

Season

Without insurance ($1)

u
12
10
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

10
7
8
6
8
8
7
10
8
10
8
14
8

5
4
4

5
4
5
3
2
2
2

10
15
15
12
16
12
17
15
12
15
10
u
8

3
3
2
3
2

3
2
2
2

1

5
5
6
3&
6
6
4
5
4

3
3
3

2
2

2
1

2
2
2

2
1

4
4
4
6

3
2
3

With insurance (28)

8
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

7
8
6
io i
8
8
8
8
8
15
7
6
5
6
10
5

5

4
4

3
3
2

15
20
20
16J
20
22
18
16
U
15
U
12
12
12
10
10
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and tbs existence of large mill capacities which waive storage on rice at
their warehouses •

All independent warehousemen agreed that they could

not operate at this low charge, and that rates must be raised in the future
if they are to remain in business*
Highest rates were charged in Vermilion parish, with the town of
Gueydan being the most expensive storage point in the rice belt.

Practi-

cally all of the rice stored at Gueydan was controlled by mills or irri
gation companies, however, and little storage was actually paid by the
farmers.

Throughout Vermilion parish the bulk of the rice is stored in

mill warehouses, which partially explains the high established rates of
the few public warehouses in the area.
The lowest rates for a broad area were those prevailing throughout
Jefferson Davis parish.

Most of the storage facilities here are indepen

dently operated, rates are established without insurance, and a 7-5-3 cent
basis appears to be satisfactory to both farmers and warehouseman.
Throughout Calcasieu parish the rates were 8-4-3 without insurance.

This

is the same season charge as 7-5-3 cents but is slightly higher for rice
which leaves within the first month of storage.

Condition of Warehouses

The principal equipment essential in storing rice is a dry, airy
building raised above the damp ground and having a solid floor sufficient
to bear the weight of rice stacked to the ceiling*

A scale is needed to

weigh the outgoing rice, and ordinarily a platform scale built into the
floor is most suitable for this purpose.

In federal bonded warehouses

where rice must be weighed into the warehouse as well as out, a truck 3 cale
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Table XVII.

Usual storage rates a t most im p o rta n t rioe s to rag e c e n te rs
in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41#

P a ris h and town

Number
w arehouses*
© D eratin g

Most common
sto ra g e r a te (c e r t s )

T o ta l fo r

season

S t. Xan&xsr:

3udo«
A cad ia:
Crowlear
Hayne
Io ta
k e ra e rta u
V e rm ilio n :
A b b e v ille
K aplan
Guegrdan

6

10

7
4
3

5
6
4

J e ffe rs o n D a v is :
Jennings
W elsh
E lto n
C ountry p o in ts

4
3
4

C a lc a s ie u :
Lake C h arles
V in to n
O th e r p o in ts

5
2

A lle n :
K in d e r

x In c lu d e s m ill w arehouses.
*W lth in s u ra n c e .

1

10

5-4-3:
7-5-3
10
8—4—3

8—6—4—2
8-5-3-2-2
8—6—3—2—2—1**

10

12"

15
10
15

20
20*
22

7-5-3-2
7-5-3
8—4
7-5-3

17
15
12
15

7-5-3
8-4-3

15
15
15

7-5-3

15

1 0 -2 -2 -1

II?

saves considerable labor and time.
No mechanical equipment is used in handling the bags of rice, so
that all handling costs are labor costs.

At the peak of the threshing

season, a 30,000 bag capacity warehouse may require 10 or more laborers
to handle and stack the rice as it comes from the farms.
kany of the public warehouses storing rice in Louisiana are old,
wood frame buildings with walls and floors in poor condition.
age of all warehouse structures in 1941 was 20 years.

The aver

Only five new

warehouses had been built for public rice storage in the preceding five
years, and only nine since 1930, out of a total of almost 100 warehouse
structures.

Uodern warehouse construction utilizes concrete piers, a

wood frame structure with a heavy plank floor, and sides and roof covered
by galvanised iron shooting.
The recently constructed warehouses are designed principally for
truck traffic and have a ramp on widLch trucks can enter the warehouse for
unloading.

The older warehouses were designed chiefly for rail movement,

since rough rice formerly entered and left the warehouses by rail.

Rail

facilities are still necessary for all warehouses, since a considerable
portion of outgoing rice moves by rail.

Mills located close to a ware

house, if crowded for storage space, occasionally ship rice by rail and
use the car for storage during the demurrage period, as well as using
railroads for long hauls from warehouse to mill.
As recently as 1938 a m o d e m warehouse with a capacity of 30,000
bags could be erected for about £10,000, including land, building, and
necessary equipment.

Costs have undoubtedly risen since that time, par

ticularly for galvanized iron sheeting, so that present cost would be
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considerably higher.

Cost figures lor warehouses built before 1925 are

difficult to estimate.

Several of these older warehouses wore originally

constructed as parts of mills, others have changed hands so often that
cost figures have disappeared, and others were constructed of wood ma
terials with labor for which direct costs could not be ascertained.

The

average appraisal of the value of rice warehouses in 1941 with less than
60,000 bags capacities ranged between $5*000 and $10,000, according to
survey data.

Costs of Warehouse Operation

The total costs for warehouse operation include maintenance and
depreciation, labor, warehouseman1s salary, insurance, and expenses for
licenses, torn bags, and office operations.

A reasonable depreciation

charge on a $10,000 warehouse would be five per cent, although few ware
house operators make this charge.

Maintenance, If the warehouse were

kept in proper repair, would average about $250 a year.

Labor costs are

variable frcta year to year, but an average of 10 laborers employed for
40 days at $2 a day would amount to at least eoGO for labor costs.

An

ordinary v/arehouseiixiinJs salary would be somewhat less than $1,000 a year,
while insurance costs and taxes would be about $500 annually.

A state

warehouse commission inspection fee of 1/4 cent a bag must also be paid.
The sum of these various charges borders on costs of $3,000
annually.

If 30,000 bags were stored and an average of 10 cents a bag

were received for storage during the season, the gross storage income of
$3,000 a year would be practically equivalent to the total costs.

In

this situation, a warehouse operated independently of other business
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ventures could not return large earning® to its owner.

In years when

the warehouse is not filled to capacity, or less than 10 cent a bag
average price is received, a warehouse is not likely to show a profit if
all costs are considered.
Most warehouses in the area ignore depreciation and maintenance
charges, and therefore appear to have a better earning record than this
analysis portrays*

Analysis of actual costs, however, is virtually i®~

possible since few warehouses operate independently of other business
enterprises,

j&ther public rice warehouses are operated as sidelines to

other enterprises or the warehousemen themselves operate various side
lines in addition to public storage*

Actual out-of-pocket costs are

only labor, insurance, and supplies, which are readily covered by a low
storage charge.
Practically every individually owned public rice warehouse sells
fertilizer, bags, twine, and occasionally feed.

The Liinismm amount sold

is that sufficient for the needs of the farmers storing at the warehouse,
but in several cases the business extends into general farm supply and
farm implement agencies.

The farm supply business is frequently carried

on by a mercantile store owning the warehouse.

The supplies are sold on

credit, the rice is stored at the warehouse, and payment is made when
the rice is sold.

About half of the warehouse operators also make cash

advances on rice crops,
prises.

ither directly or through associated enter

As a result, the cost aspects of warehouse operation are sub

merged in the general business enterprises of the operators.
Irrigation companies, watering rice for 1/5 or 1/4 shares of
the crop, maintain large warehouses to handle their own rice*

Frequently,
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excess storage space is available to their water tenants as public
storage.

Rice mills also make their excess storage space available to

farmers, waiving storage charges if the mill buys the rice, which it
almost invariably does.

Local financiers who own land or advance on

crops also operate warehouses.

All of these operators hire a low-paid

warehouseman to supervise handling the rice, and are able to furnish
storage at low rates.
Only a few individuals rely un large
prises for a living, and these

rice storage business enter

few depend onfarm supply sales, advances

on crops, or rice farming to maintain their operations.

Any evaluation of

reasonable charges for rice storage must consider these facts.

Storage

charges in Louisiana under present competitive conditions are likely to
be reasonable except where credit influences are powerful enough to permit
unduly high rates.

The best means of insuring reasonable storage charges

in Louisiana would be to free the farmers of dependence on warehouse oper
ators for credit, although this might raise rates by eliminating credit
earnings now applied to warehouse costs.
In general, rice storage rates in Louisiana appear to have been
forced down to actual costs by competition, so that there is little possi
bility of further reduction by ary means.

If additional services should

be offered at the warehouses, charges would have to be increased in order
to cover additional costs, since present receipts cover only minimum
services.

Miscellaneous Services

Rice warehouses In Louisiana assume no liability for damage or

121

losses to rice other than that due to deficiencies in the warehouse,
such as a leaking roof.
farmer suffers the loss.

Wet rice is accepted and if heat-damaged the
However, the warehouseman, if aware of the con

dition, will turn and restack the rice.

If this task involves much labor,

the fanner is charged for the cost of the services.
In state bonded warehouses rice is weighed only when sold.

Such

shrinkage as occurs does not beoome evident, therefore, and the loss is
carried by the farmer.

Sacks of rice which are cut in handling or by

rats are resacked by the warehouse, with any loss of rice being carried
by the farmer.

In some cases the farmer is charged for the sacks used in

resacking the rice, although the sweepings are fanned and sold by the
warehouse operator.
Rice in public warehouses receives relatively little protection
from rats and insects.

Most warehouse operators poison for rats at regu

lar intervals, but rats are difficult to control and usually damage a
number of bags.

Several warehouses are so constructed as to make rat con

trol practically impossible.

Few warehouses make any effort at control

ling insects, although there is evidence that such efforts were more
generally made some years ago when whitewash and creosote were used.

Ac

cording to the warehouse operators, raost buildings are too loose to do
much of anything.

In addition, the public warehouses usually are empty

when the inseot season is at its peak in the summer.

The general senti

ment is that more efficient rat and insect control costs more than the
saved rice is worth.
Seed rice is stored by most warehouses at the usual season charge.
Thirteen warehouses in the rice area have Carter disc equipment for
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ole a n in g seed rice, with a uniform charge of fifteen cents a bag*

Another

two warehouses are equipped for fanning seed rice at a lower charge of ten
oents a bag*

Other cleaning facilities are available at huller and feed

mills at scattered locations*
The average number of years which the present warehouse owners
have been operating their enterprises was eleven years in 1941*

Warehouses

apparently change hands frequently, since twelve had changed ownership in
the preceding five years*
The number of farmers storing at each warehouse averages about 20,
but ranged from 15 to 200 depending on the size of farms in the locality
and the capacity of the warehouse*

Problem s in Rough R ice S to rag e

The wide variance in operation and control of rice warehouses
makes them difficult to analyze*

So many of them are run for purposes

other than profit out of rice storage that a cost analysis is of rela
tively little value*

There is an apparent trend, however, toward the

crowding out of independent storage operations by large financial in
terests in the rice industry, particularly the large rice mills and the
irrigation companies*
The structure of the rice storage system rests largely on custom,
and on methods of financing the crop*

Farmers are in the habit of running

their rice into a public warehouse as soon as it is threshed, even though
they may Intend to sell almost immediately.

In addition, crop liens

generally require bonded storage, and the majority of Louisiana rice is
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Table X7IXI.

Age of 31 individually owned public rioe warehouses in
southwest Louisiana, and years operated by present
owners, 1940-41*

Ace of warehouses
1— 5
6— 10
11— 15
16— 20
21— 25
26— 30
31— 35
36—“40

Number of
warehouses
5
4
1
9
4
3
3
2

tears operated
by present owner
12
$
3
2
5
1
0
0
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subject to crop liens*

To some extent this customary practice is being

broken down by provision of storage facilities on the farm, and by
easier credit which permits some farmers to finance their crop without
offering a crop Hen.
Mills which waive storage charges contend that they do not take
the storage charge out of the price of rice paid to farmers*

This is

probably true in the early part of the season, for the famer has hauled
the rice to the mill warehouse, and therefore the mill can pay more for
rice in its warehouse because of its saving in drayage.

Also, a mill

incurs relatively little additional cost in storing rioe for farmers*
The mills usually buy all the rice stored, and would use the space any
way if they were buying heavily*

Before they buy the rice, it merely

occupies the same space as when the mill owns it, and the farmer has
saved the mill the expense of hauling*

Overhead costs are low, since the

regular mill staff furnishes most of the supervision*

As a result, the

independent warehouses must meet very sharp competition when they are lo
cated near extensive mill storage facilities.
The chief argument against use of mill storage is that the farmer
loses control over his rice, since the storing mill has the advantage in
bidding, and usually other mill buyers do net bid on the rice (although
the f a m e r has the nominal privilege of selling elsewhere if he pays
storage charges).

In several oases, warehouses are operated independently

but are in reality controlled by a mill*

This allows the warehouse to

advance farm supplies and affords ioore freedom to other buyers, but also
leaves the controlling mill in a strong position to obtain the rice.
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The location of a farmer's rioe probably has some effect on price
bide for the rioe, but this effect is likely small when there is compe
tition between mills.

The cost of drayage to a mill may have some effect,

but the fact that rioe is often sold to a mill far distant when nearby
mi ls are bidding demonstrates that drayage charges are not particularly
significant in influencing price.

A famer has an advantage if he stores

his rice at nearby points in order to save on his own hauling costs*
Naturally, no information that is definite can be obtained con
cerning practices of warehousemen injurious to farmers*

Common gossip

gives clues to such abuses, however, among the most serious of which is
the failure of the warehouseman to give proper aid in selling rice*

This

may include favoritism in notifying certain buyers of a rice sale, or
failure to assemble an adequate number of buyers.

Also, there are rumors

that some warehousemen occasionally sell rice to a mill at a higher price
than a grower had named as acceptable, and pocket the difference*

The

latter hap ening is probably rare, but there are numerous opportunities
for the previously described practices*
There also appears to be some question of proper weights, which
may favor either the buyer or seller of the rice*

Proper weights are a

highly important part of the warehouseman's function, and should be
scrupulously accurate*
obtained for grading*

Care is also necessary that proper samples are
The warehouseman's negligence in any one of these

factors leads to abuse of the grower or of the mill*
Warehousemen in Louisiana have done little thinking toward the
possibility of bulk storage, or toward any changes in the customary
storage of rice.

The general attitude toward bulk storage, where ware-
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housemen are acquainted with it, is that it is impractical because
Louisiana rioe is too wet and needs to be sacked and stacked to dry, and
because Louisiana lots are so small that bin handling would be too cost
ly, since sacks are more convenient*
In general, independent warehousemen favor cooperative marketing,
for the present association relieves them of oil duties in connection
with the sale of rice.

It reduces the function of warehousemen to one

strictly of storage, and relieves him of all selling responsibilities.
Bad debt losses in the warehouse business are negligible.
warehousemen secure payment when the rice is sold.

The

Often the check Is

written to the warehouse operator, who distributes the proceeds to the
various parties concerned.

Storage on Farms

County agents in the rice producing areas estimate that less
than five per cent of the rice fanners own facilities for storing rice
on their farms, although the requirements are simple and the necessary
investment is snail*

The tradition of public storage, practices estab

lished when farm to market roads were poor, general neglect of out
buildings on southern farms, storage requirements for rice under Hen,
and warehouse control of rice because of crop advances have prevented
extensive development of storage on fari;us*

Such storage is feasible in

the area, however, particularly with good roads, nearness of rioe pro
duction to market, and the ease of storing rice in sacks.

In recent

years there has been a tendency toward expansion of storage facilities
on the larger rice fame.
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A surrey of 38 fanners storing rioe on their farms in 1940*41 re
vealed that an
these farms#

average of 288 acres was planted to rice each year on
Total acres available for rice on these; farms were approxi

mately double this acreage, so that the average farm had almost 600 acres*
The average capacity of ell farm storage facilities studied was 3,360 bags.
There was a considerable range in capacities, however, from 1,575 bags on
farms with 250 to 350 total rioe aores, to a 5,112 bag average on eight
farms with more than 80C rice acres#
The average size of a warehouse of 3,360 bags was about 2,400
square feet, or about 60 by 40 linear feet.

Of 40 different structures,

21 were built of wood frame covered more or less completely with galva
nized iron sheeting, particularly for roofing; 18 were frame with galva
nized iron sheet siding and roofs; and one was a complete wood structure#
Six of the structures were barns converted for storage by construction of
suitable floors and roofs,
lor 30 rice warehouses constructed in recent years, the average
cost to the farmer was $827*

This coat varied with capacity, ranging

from $223 for four very small warehouses to $1,340 for five warehouses
with capacities over 5,000 bags#

Usually the farmer furnished most of

the labor himself, so that costs were principally for materials.
The peak of construction was reached about 1933, whan large
carryovers accumulated in farmors hands, construction costs were low,
and storage charges wore higher than at present.

Of 30 warehouses con

structed specific? lly for farm storage, 25 had been constructed after
1930.

Their owners estimated that the average life of a farm warehouse

was 29 years, and that average outlays for maintenance per year were
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Table 1X1*

Capacity of farm warehouses related to total rioe acres in
farm, 38 f a m e in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41 •

T o ta l rice

acres in farm
250350
351450
451600
601800
801-2,000

Number of
Storage capacity on
____ _______ farms in bags
f a r m s ____ t
6
6
10
8
8

1,575
2,050
3,465
3,800
5,112
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very low, probably leas than ten dollars*
storage on the farms would be about $33

Thus, the average cost of
depreciation and mainte

nance, plus the f a m e r 1s labor and interest on the investment*

Inter

est at five per cent would be slightly more than $40, giving an average
cost near $75 a year for a storage capacity of 3#360 bags*

Sinoe an

average of 10 cents a bag storage cost on 3,000 bags of rioe would be
$3^0, the farmer apparently can obtain a return in excess of $200 a year
for labor used in building and caring for a farm warehouse of this ca
pacity*

Insurance costs are about the same on the farm as at the public

warehouses*
There is, of ccurse, a cost for hiring labor to stack the rice
in the farm warehouse*

Most farmers, however, estimated that the savings

in costs of hauling to public storage are equivalent to the cost of hir
ing labor for stacking and loading rice*

The average distance of the

farmers having storage facilities from a public warehouse was 4*7 miles*
Estimates of the farmers as to their annual savings in storage
charges averaged v342*

This figure is biased upward by failure to in

clude interest cost, personal labor, and perhaps additional labor costs
at harvest*

However, the evidenos is clear that the materials invested

in a farm warehouse for storing rice easily pay for themselves in the
course of five years*

The fa m e r receives a substantial retuin on his

labor invested in construction of such a building*
Fanners who own storage facilities are unanimous in their o~
pinion that a farm warehouse Is a profitable investment, even at the
high construction costs and low public storage rates of 1941*

Several

famers estimated that storage savings paid for the warehouse in three
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Table XX,

Type of building used Tor rioe storage on 40 farms in south**
west Louisiana, 1940-41.

Tsroe of structure
Galvanised Iron
^
Wood— iron combination
Wood frsae
Total
g>

Includes 6 converted barns.

Number
id

21
1
40
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Table XXX.

Average capacity and coat of 30 recently constructed rice
warehouses on f a m e in southwest Louisiana, 1940-41.

Capacity in base
Under— 1,000
1,000— 2,000
2,000— 3,000
3,000— 4,000
4,000— 5,000
5,000 & over
Total

Number
warehouses
4
3
9
7
2

Average cost
to famer
$

223
700

809
821
1,050

Jl
30

% 827
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years*

In addition* the buildings are commonly used for storing farm

implements* fertiliser, and seed, and savings are realized from more
adequate shelter for these supplies*

Fire insurance on rice at the

farm was carried by 36 of the AO farmers, and the rice was usually better
protected from rats, Insects, and other damage than rice in public storage*
The farmers interviewed did not feel that there was any disad
vantage in marketing rice stored on the farm*

In fact, several farmers

contended that there was an advantage in that no buyers could b® discrimi
nated against by a warehouseman.

Buyers are willing to visit large farms

and bid on rice, and sales to mills are generally made f.o.b. a arm, al
though occasionally a fanner may contract to deliver his rice at the mill*
Responsible farmers are able to borrow money on the security of their
stored rice even though negotiable bonded warehouse receipts are not
available*
Although storage on the farm apparently has very few disadvantages,
it is unlikely that the practice will have more than limited expansion in
the future*

Three principal factors act as retarding influences*

Small

farms producing less than 1,000 bags are most numerous In the Louisiana
rice area, and the amount of saving is not highly attractive when com*
blned with possible difficulties in marketing small lots at the farm.
Further, credit arrangements for most rice fanners draw the rice into
public warehouses, either through credit advances from the warehouse
operator or by the need for securing negotiable warehouse receipts in
order to borrow funds*

Finally, present low storage rates at public ware

houses and the mill practice of waiving storage charges cause most farmers
to follow customary practices in handling their rice.

CHAPTER 17
ECONOMICS OF THE RICE MILLING INDUSTRY

Rough rice, in its unhusked Iona, is similar to barley and oats
in that the hulls must be removed before the grain Is ready for human
consumption.

All rice for human consumption therefore is processed with

rice milling machinery before it reaches the consumer.

The prim© object

in milling rice is to remove the hull while preserving as many as possi
ble of the kernels as whole grains.

In addition, the trad© demands that

the bran layers be thoroughly removed, and that the rice kernels be
polished to a glossy appearance.

Certain markets also require that the

finished product be coated with glucose and talc.

These operations are

accomplished by a series of processes on specially designed rice milling
machinery. ^
Before actual milling is begun, the rough rice is fanned and
screened to remove dust, stubble, seeds, and other foreign material.
The rice then proceeds into the initial and most fundamental operation,
which is the shelling of the rice between stones to remove the hulls.
This operation requires considerable care, as the kernels in each lot of
rioe may require different speed and pressure in order to avoid undue

M. Reid, The American Rice Industry, mimeographed address
at Lafayette, Louisiana, October 17# 193o. See also Abstracts and
References on the Handling. Grading, and Uses of Rioe, United States
Department of Agriculture, o£. cit.
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breakage*

The product out-turned Is brown rice retaining the g e m and

all of the seven br&n layers*

The hulls are immediately separated out

and disposed of as fuel; sold at a low price for by-product uses, or
dumped and burned in the vicinity as cheaply as possible*
Brown rice is distributed on a limited seal®, but has no general
demand nor is its keeping quality very good, as it becomes rancid.

The

brown rice is therefore processed in order to scour the g e m and layers
of bran from the rice*

Again, breakage of the kernels from speed and

pressure must be avoided, although a certain amount of breakage is in
evitable.

After the rice has been scoured practically free from bran,

it is brushed to remove the remaining traces of bran end to polish the
kernel*

The final product is the clean white rice, with a by-product of

rice polish also resulting from this operation*
often receives a coating of glucose and talc*

As a last step, the rice
The coating material plus

the friction process produces a bright luster on the kernels*
The rice products, after the milling process, include whole ker
nels, broken kernels, bran, polish, and hulls*

Regardless of the care

and efficiency in milling there is always a considerable percentage of
grains broken, particularly the damaged kernels*
separated according to size into three classes.

This broken rice is
The largest of the

broken particles are called second head rice; the next largest particles,
screenings rice; arc! the smallest particles, brewers rice.

All of these

broken rices are completely milled to remove germs and bran, but are con
sidered inferior to head rice because of appearance, small particles,
and numerous damaged kernels*

At regular stages in the regular milling

process the rice is sifted, screened, and air-washed by fans and aspira-
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tors to separate the various products.
Hice can he prepared for human consumption with less complicated
machinery by simple hulling devices which do not clean the grain
thoroughly and break more kernels in the process.

These "huller" mills

clean the rough rice and run the grain through several "breaks" which
shell the rice and rub off most of the bran.

The rice is not polished

or coated, and more broken rice results from this simple process,

Huller

mills require only a small investment, and operate in the rice area in a
fashion similar to the familiar country grist mill, Rice is hulled on a
toll basis for use by farm families, or is distributed and sold locally.
Several large huller mills have become relatively efficient and distri
bute their product widely throughout Louisiana.
Although mills differ somewhat in the amount of each of the vari
ous products obtained from rough rice, in general about 68 per cent of
the weight of rough rice is recovered in whole and broken rice, about JO
per cent as by-products, and the remainder disappears as debris and in
visible waste.

According to figures prepared by W. M, Held, former

Chairman of the Millers Committee of the Southern Rice Industry, the pro
portion of each of the various products for the industry as a whole is
approximately that shown in Table XXII*
In weight, milled rice products are only 68,5 per cent of the
rough rice processed, but these products are 94.5 per cent of the total
value.

Head rice alone generally contributes about 83 per cent of the

total value of the rice products, although the proportion may vary
slightly according to fluctuations in the demand and price of by-products.
Screenings are the second most important m i U e d rice product, with almost
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6 per cent of the total value.
Hy-products, with 30*5 per cent of the weight of rough rice,
yield only 5*5 per cent of the value.

Bran la the most important by*

product, with 2.6 per cent of the total value*

Hulls comprise 20 per

cent of the volume of rough rice, but only 2.1 per cent of the value.
This value ie derived chiefly from their use as fuel in the rice mill,
although they are sometimes sold as a source of cellulose or used for
packing and filling material.

The bran and polish are sold chiefly as

stock feed, and poorer grades of brewers rice are frequently sold as
chicken feed.

Marketing Clean Rio.

Most of the rice milled in the South is packed in 100 pound bags
termed "pockets", and is distributed as bulk rice*

The usual method of

selling clean rice is through brokers direct to wholesalers in the con
suming markets.

A mill establishes its brokerage connections, and sends

the broker a line of type samples designated by numbers or names.

These

types represent various qualities or mixtures available at the mill.
The broker canvasses the tr de in his area, submitting the list price
per pocket and forwarding counter offers to the mill.

The list prices

are seldcrc obtained, since competitive bargaining dominates the whole
sale market,

ihen a sale is established and confirmed, the rice Is

shipped on the delivery date under uniform sales terms, with a bank draft
and bill of lading attached.

According to testimony in rice hearings be

fore the Interstate Comnerce Commission, between 70 and 80 per cent of
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Table XXII.

Proportion of various products out-turned from rough rlc©
in the milling process, by weight and value.

Percentage of
total weight

Percentage of
market value

Milled rice:
Head
Second head
Screenings
Brewers
Total milled rice

57.0
3.5
6.0
2.0
&S.5

82.8
4.0
5.9
1.8
9475

Ey-products:
Polish
Bran
Bulls
Total by-products

2.0
8.5
20.0
30.5

0.8
2.6
2.1
5.5

1.0

0.0

100.0

100.0

Rice products

Tfaste (trash, debris)
Total

Source:

From data furnished by the Rice Millers Association.
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the southern crop is distributed in this fashion*

2

Export sales are like-

else handled through brokers, except that deliveries are commonly made on
a sight draft with the ocean bill of lading, or shipment may be made only
after receipt of a letter of credit certifying the funds available for
payment in the importer's bank*
Two large rice milling companies controlling large outputs of
clean rice maintain their own selling offices in large markets such as
New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia*

3

These companies, the Louisiana

State Rice Milling Company and the Standard Rice Milling Company, have
representatives canvassing the trade, and place their packaged brands of
rice on the market*

Consignment stocks are also shipped to principal

markets by these large operators.

The majority of Louisiana mills, how

ever, rely altogether on brokerage connections*

Generally the brokers

are exclusive agents for one mill*
The type samples submitted are packed in blue boxes in order to
emphasise the color of the rice, since whiteness is highly important*
The samples are assembled in a blue and white grading room at the mill*
Varying proportions of head and broken rices are sometimes mixed to make
the various samples*

This practice of mixing rice has frequently led to

charges that the mills put inferior rices on the market, and therefore
depress rice prices*

The practice, however, represents the attempt of

the mills to make rice available at prices consuming markets will pay.
Sens markets demand high quality head rice, other markets demand any

Interstate Commerce Commission Docket Ho. 26430, at al., op.
eit.. p. 1374.
3Ibid.. p. 1374 and pp. 211 ff.
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rlo* that has a low price*

The preparation of various sample types by

glaring ia an effort of the mills to satisfy the demand for various
types, qualities, and prices*
During the 1940*41 season, 34 fully equipped plants ware engaged
in milling riee in Louisiana*^*

In addition, three large huller mills

doing business on a broad scale were in operation*

Five mills which were

fully equipped for operations were idle, either shut down temporarily for
repairs or out of business because of financial difficulties*

Small

huller mills also operated in most of the towns scattered throughout the
rice area, numbering probably 20, but their operations and output are not
significant except in producing d e a n riee for local use*
The location of the rice mills active in 1940*41 in Louisiana is
shown on the accompanying map*

Of the 34 mills, 26 were located within

the southwest Louisiana rice producing area*

Two mills were operating

at New Iberia in the Teehe rice area, one at Baton Rouge and five at New
Orleans*

The Baton Rouge mill is closest to the Mississippi river rice

area, although the New Orleans mills are also favorably situated in re*
gard to this region*
Crowley is the principal rice milling point in the state, and in
the nation as a whole*

Ten mills were operating there in 1940*41, and

another large mill wae temporarily Idle*

The total capacity of the 10

active mills, measured in barrels of rough rice milled per hour, was
900 barrels, or 28*5 per cent of the total active capacity of 3,160

^Two additional large mills, one newly constructed, began oper*
ations during the 1941-42 season*

Each
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Table XXXII*

Number of active mills and their milling capacity by milling
points in Louisiana, 1940-41, 34 mills*

Number of
mills
Crowley
Sew Orleans
Kaplan
Lake Charles
Rayne
Abbeville
Jennings
Mermentau
Gueydan
Mew Iberia
Baton Rouge
Lake Arthur
Sunice
Sstherwood
Hayes

10
5
3
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1

All mills

34

Total barrels
oer hour
900
550
340
320
250
150
125
120
90
85
80
50
40
30

.SSL.
3,160

Per cent of
total capacity
23.5
17.4
10.8
10.1
7.9
4.7
4*0
3*8
2*9
2.7
2.5
1.6
1.3
0.9
0.9
100.0

*&eludes three large holler mills processing and distributing rice in
intranstate trade* Three important mills did not operate during 1940-41,
and one new mill was constructed during the summer of 1941*
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barrels per hour in Louisiana*

New Orleans is the second most important

milling center, with live mills and a capacity in 1940-41 of 550 barrels
per hour, or 17*4 per cent of the total capacity.

Together these two

oities had 45*9 per cent of the milling capacity active in 1940-41,
The most important of the other milling points and their capaci
ties in 1940-41 were Kaplan, 340 barrels per hour, Lake Charles, 320
barrels; and Bayne, 250 barrels.

The total of these capacities added to

Crowley and New Orleans centered 75 per cent of the milling capacity of
the state in five cities, of which four are in the rice area and one out
side at New Orleans,

The remaining 25 per cent of capacity was scattered

among ten different milling points, eight witliin the southwest area and
two at farther removed towns.
The total of 3,160 barrels per hour in the 34 large mills, which
excludes large huller mills, small huller mills, and idle mills, demon
strates a large excess capacity existing in the rice milling industry.
The 34 mills, operating only 3 hours a day, could mill a 5,000,000 barrel
Louisiana rice crop in 198 days, or about seven months.

Since the mills

ordinarily work longer hours or double shifts during the harvest season
and whenever the rice market is active, the effective capacity greatly
reduces this period during which all mills can operate on the Louisiana
crop.

5
This condition of excess capacity is highly important in studying

5

This excess capacity is not peculiar to Louisiana, but is found
also in Texas and Arkansas, Hall and Douglas, in Arkansas Bulletin No,
355, Storage and Transportation of Arkansas Rice, estimate that the
Arkansas mills could process the Arkansas crop in less than 100 24-hour
days. Louisiana mills, on the 24-hour basis, could mill the Louisiana
crop in less than 100 days.
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the economic situation surrounding rough rice marketing.

Most mills at

tempt to milX as large a volume as possible in order to reduce overhead
costs, and competition In securing rough rice and in selling d e a n riee
is very bitter.

Louisiana mills also are anxious to secure rough rice

from Arkansas, Texas, and California, and to distribute clean rice in
territories dominated by other mills.

This struggle for utilization of

excess capacity tends to assure Louisiana farmers a competitive market
for rough rice, and also leads to continuous litigation by Louisiana rice
mills to secure more favorable rough and clean rice freight rates to en
able them to utilise their capacities more effectively.
According to data compiled by the Agricultural Marketing Service,
the large Louisiana rice mills receive and mill approximately 90 per cent
of all rice grown in the state.

During 1940-41, an even distribution of

the statefs 5,900,000 barrel rice crop among the 34 mills would have meant
that scc&ewh&t less than 3 per cent, or about 150,000 barrels of the avail
able rough rice, would have passed through each mill.

In practice, of

course, the large mills secure a much larger proportion of the total rice
silled.

In some seasons a single large mill may process between five and

ten per cent of the Louisiana crop.
An additional one per cent of the Louisiana rice crop is processed
by "huller" mills, of which there were three large units and numerous
small units operating in Louisiana in 1940-41*

Only about two per cent of

the Louisiana crop is received by Texas mills, and a very small quantity
by Tennessee mills.
Total receipts of rough rice by all mills and hullers account for
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about 9 3 p a r cent o f the Louisiana rice crop, with the remaining seven
per cent u s e d for feed and seed on the farm, or carried over for sals in
the following crop years.

Physical Characteristica of Louisiana Rice Mills

The first rice mills in Louisiana were built in New Orleans during
and shortly after the Civil War, when the river rice area was becoming im^*
portent in rice production.^

Until the decade of 1900-1910, New Orleans

was the principal rice milling center of the nation.

3/ 1900, a rice

boom in southwest Louisiana caused rapid investment In rice mills as the
profit to be realised from rice production on the prairies became evident.
During this boom period, numerous rice mills wer« constructed, many of
them developed by promoters inexperienced in the rice business.

By 1910

there were 35 to 40 mills in southwest Louisiana, most of them poorly financed and managed.

7

Many went into bankruptcy soon after construction,

creating considerable trouble among faimers who had subscribed to much of
the stock.

Large nurabera of these early mills have by now been dismantled,

and practically every mill has gom. through frequent reorganisation.
For the United States as a whole, the construction of rice mills

followed in this chronological orders

first, in the Carolinati and Georgia;

second, in New Orleans; third, at Lake Charles and Beaumont; fourth, in
interior southwest Louisiana; fifth, in Texas and Arkansas; sixth, in

^Interstate Commerce Commission Docket Mo. 26430, et al,, og. cit.,
pp. 752 ff.

7im -
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Table HIV.

Capacity in
barrels
nor hoar
20- 40
41- 60
61- 00
81-100
101-120
121-140
1U-160
161-180
181-200
201-over
All milla

Milling capacities of 34 wills operating in Louisiana
during 1940-41.

Number
of mills
9
6
2
6
0
4
3
0
2
a
34

total
capacity

Per cent of
total
capacity

310
325
150
560

9.8
10.3
4.7
17.7

505
450

16.0
14.2

400

12.?
14.6
100.0

AjO
3,1^0
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Memphis| and finally, in California.8
eighteen of the 34 large active rice mills in Louisiana have been
established or reorganized in the past ten years.
■Ills have been built.

In that period, 11 new

The remaining mills were built principally be*

tween 1910 and 1923# except for several mills whose plants date back to
1396,

Since 1930# only small mills have been built# with 30 to 30 barrels

capacity.

In addition# the expansion of small huller mills d.th capaci

ties near 10 barrels an hour has been notable.

These small mills have

all been located within the southwest Louisiana producing area*

The nuro-

ber of active large mills and the number of mills at dew Orleans has been
steadily diminishing.
The distribution of the capacities of 34 idee mills operating in
1940-41 is shown in the table.

Only a third of the mills had capacities

greater than 100 barrels of rough rice per hour.

About half of the total

number fall between 20 and 60 barrels capacity# especially if the three
large huller mills are included.

The fact that small mills are most

numerous# and that units built in the past 10 years have been generally
«nan mills# indicates a decided trend toward smaller operating units in
the rice milling industry.
the same time

Several large mills have been dismantled at

mills were beginning operations.

In spite ofthis trend, however, a few large mills ar*> the domi
nant influence in the Louisiana rice industry.
have

27 per cent of

The four largest mills

the hourly capacity in the

state, andthe 11 largest

®Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No* 26430#

et al.. p, 756.
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■ill* have 57 par cent of the total.

The Louisiana State Rice Milling

Company has five mills in Louisiana ranging in capacity from 125 to 250
barrels an hour*

The 825 barrel an hour combined capacity of these mills

gave this single company control over 26 per cent of the active milling
capacity in 1940-41.

Buying Rouffh Rice

The rice mills in Louisiana purchase rice from the growers through
both salaried buyers and commission buyers,

i&oh mill usually has one or

mere salaried buyers paid on a year round salary basis.

These salaried

buyers make a practice of keeping in close touch with the rice growers and
with rough rice stocks in their territory.

During the fall and winter

monthsj the buyers are active in purchasing riee.

In late spring and

summer, their duties are confined largely to keeping in touch with the new
riee crop*
Most of the mills also purchase rough rice through commission
buyers in order to reach rice outside the territory covered by the sala
ried buyer or buyers.

This is particularly true of mills located in the

growing area, which depend principally on salaried buyers.

Commission

buyers are used only when rice is bought at a distance, and the buyers
have no d o s e attachment to one individual mill.

The New Orleans mills

are exceptions, as four of the five mills there buy exclusively through
commission buyers who are attached to the particular rill and buy very
little for other mills• The fifth mill in Hew Orleans, however, buys
through salaried buyers in Louisiana.
Commission buyers are generally paid six cents per barrel for
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rice bought for mills located in the rios growing area.
mills, however, pay eight cents per barrel commission.

The Now Orleans
As mentioned,

commission buyers for New Orleans mills depend principally on one mill
for a livelihood, while the commission buyers for the southwestern
Louisiana mills may buy for four or more mills.
In some of the small mills, the operator or manager may buy rough
rice on occasion,

Also, a buyer may use assistants to get in touch with

a farmer and take samples for the buyer to cheek.

This makes it diffi

cult to establish any definite figures concerning the number of rough
rice buyers operating in Louisiana for Louisiana rice mills.

However,

there are likely about eighty salaried buyers operating in the rice area,
as a general estimate.

9

In addition, from thirty to forty commission

buyers also buy rice in Louisiana for Louisiana mills.

Finally, there

are outlets for small lots of rough rice to local huller mills which
maintain no regular buying connections.
The Louisiana State Rice Milling Company, operating five mills
in Louisiana, combines its buying staff in Louisiana with its buying
staff in Texas,

Rice is bought and shipped where needed.

As a result,

its buying operations cover both states, and it is difficult to segre
gate the number of buyers according to Louisiana.
Only the large mills with capacities of 150 barrels or more per
hour buy in a wide enough territory to assign buyers to definite areas.
For many buy***s, the Meraentau river forms a boundary dividing the

^The results of the survey are verified by testimony of Mr.
Riekert In Interstate Commerce Commission Docket 26430, ©t* al. >
pp. 807 ff.

>
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general areas of activity,

Rico buyers in general do not buy in widely

diverse areas, since they become familiar with certain regions and rice
end are most proficient In buying within these areas.

In fact, a buyer

experiences difficulty in making an accurate yield estimate for rice
from a growing area with which he Is not familiar.
All of the millers stated that they would buy rice in any size
lot offered.

However, the large operators with 150 barrel or more ca

pacity per hour preferred large lots, and would ordinarily be willing to
pay slightly higher prices to obtain large lots.

This is only natural,

since small lots require relatively more labor in buying and handling
and also require mixing with other lots in order to satisfy sales re
quirements*

Ordinarily, the size of lots bought by mills in Louisiana

appears to average 300 to $00 bags*

Small mills uniformly reported

that they would pay as much for small as large lots*
In purchasing local rice, Louisiana mills do not face serious
competition from out-of-state mills.

The freight-rate structure tends

to keep Arkansas and Texas mills in their own locality.

In addition,

the milling quality of the Texas crop is considered higher than the
Louisiana crop and Texas mills buy in Louisiana only if purchases are
more difficult to make in Texas.
Rice «rn«» in southwest Louisiana receive practically all of
their rough riee by truck.

As a general rule, the millers contract

with truckers for drayage from the warehouse, although several millers
operate their own trucks.

Hail receipts in the growing area are not

great, except for mills operated by the Louisiana State Rice Milling
Company, which often receive rice bought at a distance, as in Texas,
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by rail.

Occasionally one of the other mills may receive a rail ship

ment from a distant point, but most purchases are local and rail re
ceipts for interior mills have become comparatively rare,
hills at New Orleans receive moat of their rough rice by rail,
with also some barge movement for Arkansas rice.

The relatively minor

receipts of rioe by truck are principally for Mississippi river rice.
The Baton Rouge mill receives river rice by truck, but all other river
riee moves to mills by rail.

Areas in Which Mills Buy

Louisiana rice mills located within the growing areas generally
buy the bulk of their rough rice requirements in the area immediately
surrounding the milling point.

However, in order to secure desirable

riee they may purchase at distances of 60 to 7 0 miles, which for most
mills means that they will buy if necessary anywhere in the growing area.
Rice mills east of the Mennentau river rarely buy at points west
of Welsh and Elton,

Apparently Lake Charles and Texas mill buyers have

seme advantage in buying rice west of these points.

The mills concen

trated about Crowley and Kaplan buy principally in the immediate vi
cinity,

Of course, when rice supplies are unusually low in certain

areas, as in 1940-41 as a consequence of the August, 1940 flood, mills
may buy at greater distances than usual.
Normally, however, Louisiana rioe mills depend on local growers*
This is not altogether true for such large organizations as the Louisiana
State Rioe Milling Company and the New Orleans mills.

The Louisiana
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State has a far-flung buying and milling organization, which operate®
throughout Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas*

Rioe is purchased in all

states, and shipped to mills which are in the best position to handle
it*

Ordinarily the nearest mill processes the rice, but frequently cir

cumstances may cause Texas rice to be shipped to a Louisiana mill*
The Baton Rouge mill and the five New Orleans mills buy rough
rice In both Texas and Arkansas as well as in Louisiana*

These mills are

located outside the growing areas, and except for the small supplies of
hiseissippi river rice nearby, oust purchase all rice at a distance*

As

a result, substantial quantities of Texas and Arkansas rice are milled
in Sew Orleans*

Rice moves from Arkansas partly by barge and must be

sacked, but much of it moves in bulk in freight cars*

Examination of Rough Ripe

Buyers for all mills in Louisiana follow the practice of obtain
ing a cup weight and rubbing the sample of rough lice in order to esti
mate its value.

In addition, seven mills use moisture testing devices,

and three mills use the Smith shelling device in order to estimate the
milling yield.

An additional ten mills reported that their buyers oc

casionally checked their estimates of moisture, grade, and milling yields
by taking a sample to the federal-state rice grading office for a mois
ture test and yield test on the Smith shelling device.

Certificates are

not given on these tests, most frequently made at the beginning of a new
crop harvest, since the grading offices consider these checks as a ser
vice to the industry and no charges are made.
The mills using the Smith shelling device reported great satis-
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faction from its use, saying that it enabled them to estimate a lot of
rough rice more accurately.

However, all mill operators, even those

whose buyers never checked their estimates with government grades, stated
that their buyers1 estimates of milling yields and moisture were very ac
curate, and that estimated yields were seldom more than two pounds off
actual milling results.

Occasionally lots of unusual rice, from a strange

growing area or resulting from unusual growing conditions, may confuse a
buyer, and in these cases a standardized government grade check is most
useful.
The smaller a mill, the more It tends to buy on an unchecked
buyer's sample of rice, with a great amount of personal judgment entering
into the evaluation.

All mills trust the buyer's estimates to a great

extent, although some ndlls require that a head buyer inspect all samples
at the mill before a lot is purchased.

Naturally, the larger mills and

buying organizations lack personal relationship, and find that government
grades and grading devices are more essential in order to judge the buyer's
accuracy.

Making Payment for Rice

Rough rice is customarily bought on a cash basis, f.o.b. ware
house or storage point.

If rice is purchased direct from a farmer, the

buyer draws a draft on the rice mill immediately after the rice is
graded and weighed.

This draft is payable to the farmer, or, if there

is a lien on the crop, jointly to the farmer and the lien holder.

For

rice purchased at a bonded warehouse in which bids are made through
the warehouseman, the draft is usually made payable to the warehouseman,
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who deducts storage charges and distributes the proceeds to the fanner
and lien holder.
Most mills report that they are always able to take up rice irrtmediately after purchase and seldom leave rice in country warehouses and
pay storage.

However, a few mills reported occasional storage charges at

country warehouses because of lack of storage capacity at the mill.
In the early part of the season a considerable volume of rough
riee is purchased with delivery at the mill by the farmer.

Several mills

reported they made an allowance to the farmer for drayagc when buying the
lice on this basis, but other mills reported that competition forced them
to buy rioe according to quality on the same basis regardless of delivery
point.

Since mill delivery of rice is most prevalent at isolated milling

points where there is only one mill, it is difficult to evaluate this
situation.

It appears that any price bid on rice must ordinarily consider

drayage cost to the mill.

mi'll delivery.

As a result, drayage allowances may be made for

A few mills reported that they occasionally bought a lot

of rice at the farm and allowed the farmer to earn the drayage they ordi
narily would pay to commercial truck operators *
Several mills with large storage capacities store rice for the
farmers and waive storage and insurance charges when the mill purchases
the rice.

The Louisiana State Milling Company, with federal bonded ware

houses at its five milling points and at three other centers in Louisiana,
stores a large volume of rough rice.
follow this practice.

Mills at Kaplan and Crowley also

The farmer has the privilege of withdrawing his

rioe from these warehouses upon payment of the storage charges if he wishes
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to a*ll to another mill*
sold to the storing mill.

In practice, however, the rice is invariably
To what extent the storage charges are de

ducted when a lot of rice is bought is impossible to say.

The mills re

port that they will pay just as much for a lot of rice in their ware
house as in another, maintaining that they ignore the fact that they waive
storage.

To some extent this is doubtless true, since the mill noist pay

drayage on distant rice which partially replaces the waived storage charge
in its own warehouse, and idle warehouse space may as well be utilized,
nevertheless, it appears that the practice of mill storage, and the
waiving of storage charges, puts a mill in a position where it can fre
quently use its strong bargaining power to good advantage.
About a third of the mills operating in Louisiana store large
quantities of rough riee for farmers.

The remaining mills object to the

practice, since it ordinarily ties up a considerable volume of rice on
which they cannot bid successfully.

In fact, mills rarely will attempt

to place a bid on rice stored in the warehouse of a competing mill.

Distribution of Bice Billing Costs

Data concerning the costs of rice milling are difficult to se
cure.

The industry is highly competitive, and the millers have had un

pleasant experiences with cost investigations under the government
marketing agreement which collapsed in 1935.

As a result, a comparison

of cost data between various mills is impossible to present.
When questioned as to their usual cost of milling a barrel of
rice, practically all large millers replied that it bordered on 60 cents
plus the value of by-products, for each barrel of rough rioe processed.
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Swill will* tended to give lower cost estimates, principally because
costs of supervision and labor were lower*

Huller mills usually had

very low costs, estimated at around 40 cents a barrel.

These small

sills do not mill the rice thoroughly, have little investment in ma
chinery, and overhead costs are low since the huller mill is usually a
side line to another business enterprise.
In order to analyse the normal distribution of milling costs,
complete cost

data were secured from one mill which in capacity, lo

cation, efficiency, and age Is rather typical of mills in southwest
Louisiana*

This mill has a capacity of 60 barrels of rough rice per

hour, has efficient management, and has been operating since 1915*

Its

cost distribution, compared with confidential reports from other mills,
appeared typical, except for the absence of depreciation*

The mill in

vestment had been fully depreciated and repairs were the only capital
costs shown on the books*

This situation is frequently found in the

older rice mills*
This pdll processed 125,363 barrels of rough rice between August
1# 1939 and July 31, 1940*

Its total direct and indirect costs for that

year were £73,997.12, or 59 cents per barrel.

Direct milling costs ac

counted for 41*4 per cent of the 59 cents, and overhead and selling costs
for 58.6 per cent*

The importance of the indirect coats is particularly

significant in evaluating the situation regarding excess capacity and
small huller «dll competition in the rioe milling industry.
Labor, with 20*9 per cent of the total costs, was the most impor

tant, of *11 direct and indirect costs*

dacks and twine for clean rioe

was the second most important direct cost, with an average of seven cents
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a barrel, or 11.7 per cent of the total cost*

All other direct costs

were vexy small, particularly those for operating the plant*
The principal indirect costs were for selling, since brokerage
and aamissions were 19*1 per cent of all costs*

10

Other important in

direct costs were salaries, with 12*3 per cent of the total, and inter
est and discount, with 10*6 per cent of the total*

Altogether, direct

costs for labor and sacks, and indirect costs for brokerage, salaries,
and interest, accounted for 44 cents of the $9 cents in total costs*
For mill s charging depreciation, the value of by-products is
estimated to cover depreciation charges, so that the usual cost estimate
of 60 cents plus the value of by-products appears well described by the
cost data of this mill.
The 125,363 barrels of rough rice produced a total value of riee
products of *4 6 4 ,4 3 7 .7 1 , or $3.70 a barrel.

Clean rioe sales, including

head rice, second heads, screenings, and brewers rice, accounted for 94
per cent of this amount, and bran sales made up most of the remainder*
Total costs per barrel vrere only 16 per cent of the total value of the
rice products sold, leaving 84 per cent, or $3*11 per barrel, available
to the mill for the purchase of rough rice and for profits.^The value of the rough rice is so large a proportion of the
value of the final rice products that the success of the mill in obtaih-

^°Members of the Rice Jlillers Association pay uniform brokerage
fees of 8 cents per 100 pounds of head rice, 5 cents per 100 pounds for
screenings and brewer1s rice, and 50 cents per ton for bran and polish.
^ T h i s estimate is remarkably close to the rough and clean rice
price relationship on the Hew Orleans wholesale market, as described in
Chapter II*
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Table XXV.

D is tr ib u tio n o f Income and costs for milling 12$, 363 barrels
o f rough r ic e in a medium capacity mill In Louisiana, year

ending July 31# 1940.

Dollars
Income:
Sales of clean rice
Sales of bran
Sales of chicken feed
Sales of polish
Total income
Direct milling costs:
Labor
Mill supplies
Fuel-engine
light ft fuel-mill
Car ft travel expense
Repairs (power plant)
Sacks ft twine (net)
Glucose ft talc (net)
Total direct afg. costs
Overhead ft selling costs:
Rice Millers Association
Salaries
Office supplies
Audit ft attorney fees
Insurance
Old age ft Unemployment In.
Advertising
Taxes ft licenses
Uhse. supplies ft repairs
Feed stamps
Telephone ft telegraph
Interest ft discount
Stamps
Bad debts
Brokerage ft commissions

Total costs
Available for rough rice ft
profits

Dollars
per barrel

Per cent of
total costs ft Income

436,449.70
24,549.17
15.30
,3,423.54
464,437.71

3.48149
.19582

94.0
5.3

.03424
3.70474

0.7
J6 0 .O

15,430.22
2,443.94
324.19

.1 2 3 0 8

20.9
3.3
0.4

1 8 4 .0 1

283.37
563.96
8,651.65
?4 2 L U L
30,605.49

1,806.05
9,075.00
608.91
2 7 1 .0 0

.01949
.00259
.00147

0 .2

.0 0 2 2 6

0.4
0 .6

.00450
.06901
. *921,73.
.24413

11.7
M
41.4

•01441
.07239

2.4
12.3

.0 0 4 8 6
.0 0 2 1 6

0 .8

3,063.93
1,324.14

.02444

1 0 0 .5 0

1,865.92
444.16

.00080
.01489
.00354

0.4
4.1

.0 1 0 5 6

1 9 2 .2 2

.0 0 1 5 3

1,890.52
7,892.99
657.90
83.44
14.114,95
43,391.63

.01508
.06296
.00525
.00067
.. .11259
346 x3

73.997.12

.59026

390,440.59

3.1144S

1 .8
0 .1

2.5
o .6
0 .3
2 .6
1 0 .6
0 .9
0 .1

.

19.1
58.6
100.0

..

-

34.1 of clean
..-gfilflff

la g a p r o f it u s u a lly r e s ts on i t s p u rch asin g and s e llin g e ffic ie n c y
r a th e r th a n on i t s K i l li n g e ffic ie n c y .

S in ce a s lig h t d e c lin e in r ic e

p r ic e q u ic k ly w ipes o u t any p r o f it m argin a v a ila b le on rough r ic e in
s to c k , th e accu m u latio n o f an in v e n to ry o f e ith e r rough o r c le a n r ic e is

a h ig h ly s p e c u la tiv e o p e ra tio n .

When th e r e i s a r is in g tre n d in th e

m a rk e t, most m ills b u ild up as la r g e an in v e n to ry o f rough r ic e as p o ssi
b le , b ein g lim ite d o n ly by s to ra g e space and fin a n c ia l c a p a c ity .

On a

d e c lin in g m a rk e t, th e m ills o p e ra te on a hand-to-m outh b a s is and a v o id
th e accu m u latio n o f r ic e s to c k s , buying ahead o n ly a t a s u b s ta n tia l d is 
count und er norm al c le a n ric e -ro u g h r ic e p r ic e r e la tio n s h ip s .
The un u su al im portance o f buying and s e llin g o p e ra tio n s in th e
r ic e m illin g in d u s try p ro b a b ly accounts to a c o n s id e ra b le e x te n t f o r
th e absence o f te c h n o lo g ic a l improvem ent in th e processing and h an d lin g
o f r ic e .

M ille r s a re p r im a r ily occupied w ith m arketin g problem s, and

p rocessing problem s re c e iv e secondary c o n s id e ra tio n .
has changed l i t t l e
m ents.

M illin g m achinery

i n a q u a rte r o f a c e n tu ry , excep t f o r m in o r im prove

J u s t r e c e n tly a f i r s t m ajo r change was made in th e s u b s titu tio n

o f a s m a ll r o l l e r d e v ic e f o r th e t r a d it io n a l stone in s h e llin g rough
r ic e , w hich i s re p o rte d to y ie ld a s u b s ta n tia lly g re a te r o u ttu rn o f
w hole head r ic e p e r b a r r e l*

12

A lthough th e m illin g process is n o t un

d u ly com plex, a d d itio n a l improvements cou ld undoubtedly In c re a s e m illin g
e ffic ie n c y and reduce c o s ts .

new mill built at &inice, Louisiana, in th e summer of 1941,
w ith a l l modern machinery available, has only this machine as a signi

ficant change from machinery used in the old mills.
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Inventory Problems of Rice Kills

Of 25 mill operators expressing an opinion on inventory policy,
15 stated that under normal market conditions they would try to keep be
tween seven to fifteen days /Billing requirement on hand in rough rice
stocks.

On a declining market, however, mills may shut down completely

and there may be practically no market at all for a farmer wishing to
sell rough rice.
the market trend.

The mill operators are constantly trying to outguess
As a result, the rough rice market goes through peri

ods of extreme activity and extreme dullness.
Bice mills occasionally sell rice "short,” that is, they make
s a le s of clean rice for future delivery before they have purchased rough

rice to cover the sale.

This highly speculative practice is avoided by

conservative operators, but is nevertheless an important factor in mill
operation,

Naturally, short sales are most prevalent when the rough

rice market is declining.

Humors of short sales at low prices are a

depressing influence in the rice market, and the farmers generally feel
that millers use this device intentionally to force prices down.

As a

matter of fact, there is nothing inherently damaging to fanners if a
mill takes a short position in the rice market, since similar inventory
speculation is involved when a mill is long on rice stocks.

The associ

ation of short sales with a declining market, however, has earned a bad
reputation for such operations in the rice trade.
The difficult

inventory problems lead to frequent charges of

collusion between mills in buying policies, to frequent disputes between
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farmers and millers when mills try to escape inventory losses on a de
clining market, and to attempts to eliminate inventory losses by stabi
lisation operations in the rice market.

In recant years, two court

eases have risen which illustrate some of the difficulties faced by rough
rice growers in the unstable market resulting from intermittent attempts
at monopoly and from the hazardous nature of mill rice inventories.
These cases, one in Texas and one in Louisiana, have been decided in
favor of the rice growers.
In July, 1940, the state of Texas filed suit against eleven Texas
rice mills, alleging that the mills were guilty of violations of the law
of Texas against trusts, monopolies and restraints of trade.

The state

charged that the rough rice buyers of the various mills met regularly to
determine the prices they would bid on lots of rice at the various ware
house sales, that they determined which buyer was to submit the highest
bid, that they would boycott and refuse to buy certain lots of rice, and
that they indulged in various similar practices in order to restrain com
petition,

These practices included, in general, the allocation of rice

to various

and control of the price in the interests of the mills.

A group known as the Rough Rice Buyers Club was alleged to meet regular
ly in Houston for purposes of restraining competition.
This case did not cane to trial, but was settled by a judgment
rendered by the court without admission by the defendants of the vio
lations charged in the petition of the state of Texas.

In the judgment,

the state recovered penalties and costs of $15,000 from the mills, and
the mills were permanently enjoined from all practices tending to re-
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• t r a i n c o m p e titio n I n th e purohase of rough r ic e , including such activi
t ie s as th e Rough R ic e Buyers Club • ^
A nother oase o f p a r t ic u la r s ig n ific a n c e concerns & p r a c tic e f r e 
q u e n tly condemned by r ic e g ro w ers.

A t tim es a m il l purchases a l o t o f

r ic e and p re v io u s to d e liv e r y o f a l l th e s ic e th e m arket p ric e d e c lin e s
s h a rp ly .

I n such eases, a m i l l fin d s i t

advantageous to in vo ke i t s r ig h t

to r e je c t r ic e a t th e agreed p r ic e i f th e r ic e f a i l s to e q u a l th e sample
on w hich th e r ic e was purchased.

S in ce th e re is no d e f in it e system o f

g rad in g rough r ic e in g e n e ra l u s e , a m il l can ta k e advantage o f th e
grow er in case o f a m arket d e c lin e and r e je c t a la rg e p o rtio n o f th e r ic e
as f a ilin g to m eet th e sam ple.

O r d in a rily t h is re je c te d r ic e i s th en

purchased a t a d is c o u n t.

On September IB, 193&, the Standard Rice Company mill at Crowley
purchased a lot of rice then being threshed by a member of the American
Rice Growers Cooperative Association.

The agreed price was &4.0& a

barrel, not to exceed 1,100 sacks of rice with an option to limit the
quantity to 1,000 sacks.

After only 375 sacks of rice was threshed and

delivered, the rice market started to decline.

The mill thereupon re

jected the remaining 629 sacks as inferior to the sample, and refused
to accept the rice except at a discount.

In November, the rice was sold

by the cooperative association to another rice mill for $3•10 a barrel,
and the association and the grower brought suit to recover $792.89, the
difference in price plus the additional costs of storage.

^ S t a t e o f Texas v s . Beaumont Rice M ills , et al. No. 62,431, in
th e D is t r ic t C o u rt o f T ra v is County, Texas, 53rd Judicial D is t r ic t .

Agreed judgment on July 26, 1940*
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The argum ent i n t h is case d ir e c t ly in v o lv e d th e problem o f rough
r ic e g ra d in g *

The c o o p e ra tiv e in s is te d th a t th e c e r t if ic a t e g rad e, based

on fe d e r a l s ta n d a rd s , in d ic a te d th a t th e r ic e was eq u al to th e sample and
th a t th e m i l l 's r e je c tio n was sim p ly an avoidance o f th e m arket lo s s *
The m i l l contended t h a t th e eu p -w eig h t and ru b b in g system o f i t s own
buyers should be accep ted above th e c e r t if i c a t e , and th a t th e r ic e was
in f e r io r *
The lo w e r c o u rt decided in fa v o r o f th e grow ers*

An ap p eal c o u rt

re fu s e d t o d e c id e th e case on th e is s u e o f th e c o o p e ra tiv e grade versus
th e s i l l g ra d e , b u t lo o ked in to th e c le a n r ic e y ie ld o f th e m il l buying
th e re je c te d r ic e as compared to th e y ie ld e a r lie r o b ta in e d by th e d e fe n 
d an t m ill*

F in d in g th a t th e y ie ld s were e s s e n tia lly th e same, th e c o u rt

decided in fa v o r o f th e g ro w e r*^
Both o f th ese d e c is io n s have been acclaim ed as m ajo r v ic to r ie s
f o r l i c e grow ers, as th e y e s ta b lis h le g a l precedents f o r th e rem oval o f
v ic io u s p ra c tic e s in th e m arketin g o f rough r ic e *

The p r in c ip a l is s u e

in b o th cases re s u lte d from th e dom inant p o s itio n o f th e m ills in com
p a ra tiv e b a rg a in in g s tre n g th *

On a d e c lin in g o r weak r ic e m a rk e t, th e

fa c t t h a t th e m ills c o n tro l th e grad in g p r a c tic e and th a t th e r ic e
buyers u s u a lly a re in tim a te ly acq u ain te d w ith each o th e r, makes p o s s ib le
a l l s o rts o f d ev ice s to in s u re th e m il l th e b e s t o f any b a rg a in *
When th e r ic e m arket is stro n g o r advancing th e c o n tro l o f th e

^ N e ls o n Thomas and Am erican R ice Growers C o o p erative Associ
a tio n , In c o rp o ra te d , versu s S tand ard R ice Company, In c o rp o ra te d ,
F ifte e n th J u d ic ia l C o urt f o r th e P a ris h o f A c ad ia, S ta te o f L o u is ia n a *

Decided March, 1940,
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mills over buying is relatively insignificant.

At such times, the atti

tude of the growers and their reluctance to sell puts them in a dominant
position.

At the same time, sharp competition among mills assures the

grower the full value of his rice.

In all situations, however, actual or

rumored changes in market trends cause violent, although often temporary,
reversals in the dominant bargaining position of either growers or millers.

Failure of a Rice Futures Market

When rice production was first becoming established along the
Mississippi liver the principal rice market was New Orleans, the central
milling point.

Until the decade after the World War, New Orleans was re

garded as the markst center for rough and clean rice.

Rice was frequent

ly consigned by growers to commission sellers in New Orleans, who dis
posed of the rice to the local mills.

This practice was similar to that

now prevalent in the terminal and mill markets for wheat and other grains.
As the center of rice milling shifted to the southwest producing area,
however, the New Orleans market gradually lost its dominant position.
The rough rice commission men were displaced by mill buyers dealing di
rectly with the farmers.
The value of a central market as a stabilising influences has been
generally recognized in the rice trade, as rice mills always have been
eager to avoid speculation in rice inventories.

Such a central market is

most useful when organized futures dealing is practiced In order to per
mit hedging.

Since the rice trade had experienced violent price fluctu

ations after the i/orld v/ar, the Rice Millers Association began agitation
for the establishment of organized spot and future trading in both rough
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and clean rice at New Orleans,
On November 5, 1923, the New Orleans Rice Clearing Association,
Incorporated, opened a Rice Futures Market under the auspices of the
Louisiana Sugar and Rio© Exchange, where spot trading was already
practiced*^

This market, sponsored by the Rice Millers Association,

had for its avowed purposes the stabilisation of the rice industry, the
provision of hedges for both growers and millers, the provision of a
market for purchase of future rough and clean rice requirements, and the
attraction of speculators to carry the marketing risks*

Considerable

stress was placed on the third purpose, that of providing an organized
market for purchasing future requirements*

In the rice trade, sales of

clean rice are occasionally made for future delivery, but such agree
ments cause considerable litigation when either the buyer or seller
fails to deliver according to commitments*

16

The published rules of the exchange, 47 in number, provided the
usual details regulating future trading on a commodity exchange*

The

alee of rough rice contracts was 1,440 bushels (400 bbls*) of Choice or
Fancy Blue Rose, while clean rice contracts were 40,000 pounds (400
pockets) of Choice or Fancy Blue Rose clean rice*
fied rcij

The contracts speci

muni delivery requirements and discounts for lower grade de

liveries*

Contracts could b© delivered on five days notice in quanti

ties not lese than a half contract at one time.

Trading was conducted

in the 12 calendar months in units of 1/100 cent per pound of rice*

^ K l c e Journal* November, 1923#
^^Rioe Journal* March, 1926.
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Two calls ware oade each trading day, and regulations were prescribed
for brokerage fees, membership requirements, and similar details.17
Cash margins required were 1200 a contract, or 50 cents per pocket of
clean rice or barrel of rough rice.

All deliveries on contracts were

handled through the clearing association.
This market was greeted with enthusiasm, but futures trading
never assumed an important position in the rice trade.

Although there

is no written record of its failure, various weaknesses are generally
recognised by men who were familiar with the market during the time of
its operation.

Trading in rough rice futures was the weakest element.

New Orleans was not a central market for rough rice, mills dealt directly
with the farmers, no objective grades were generally accepted for rough
rice, and rough rice is extremely variable in quality.

Since the of

ficial spot market itself was not important to the trade, there was lit
tle possibility for wide trading in rough rice futures.
In the clean rice market, similar difficulties were encountered.
Deliveries on clean rice could be highly variable in quality, and arbi
tration was difficult and unsatisfactory.

Buying for future delivery

did not appear extensive enough to support any volume of trading.

For

hedging purposes, the volume of trading was too small and the mills too
few to carry the weight of extensive hedging operations.

Finally, specu

lators were not attracted into the rice market, and such trading as occured was altogether among rice millers and clean rice buyers.

17B1q s Journal. November, 1923.
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For several years, an effort was made to maintain daily quotations
on rough and clean rice, both spot and in twelve future months, at the
l^uiaiana Sugar and Rice Exchange.^*

Gradually, since these quotations

would remain nominal for days and even weeks at a time, interest in sup
port of the market lagged.

Trading, never large, dropped to practically

nothing because of the variability in quality of rice delivered, while
uncertainty concerning the liquidity of the market effectively prevented
hedging operations.

Obviously, a mill could not relieve itself of a

speculative risk in a non-liquid market where buyers and sellers might
not be available when necessary.
As a result of this loss of interest, the futures market gradu
ally passed out of existence, and all pretense of operation ceased in
1927.

Its failure, according to T. B. iise, official of the Rice Millers

Association, could be ascribed to the fact that "the industry is too
narrow to maintain a successful future board.
Since that date, the rice industry has made a few attempts to
operate a central market, but factors resulting in the failure of
futures trading in the 1920-1930 decade apparently still exist today.
In 1928, plans were discussed for a rice market at Crowley, where daily
market reports on rough and clean rice might be assembled and distributed.
Apparently the direct nature of trading, and the problem of variability
in both rough and clean rice, however, discouraged this effort for the

l^See financial pages of Times-Picayune, November 1923 to 1927*
^ R i c e Journal. June, 1928.
^QRice Journal. August, 1928.
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collection and dissemination of official market information.

At present

d e a n rice quotations are available at the New Orleans Board of Trade
from brokers and mills in that city, based on actual sales, but when the
market la inactive these quotations are wholely nominal.

Hough lice

quotations are always entirely unofficial, being assembled from scattered
reports as to actual sales taking place in the rice area,

location of Rice Mills

Since efficiency in purchasing rough rice and in selling clean
rise are the two principal factors influencing the successful operation
of a rice mill, location in regard to freight rate structure is of vital
Importance,

With intense competition in marketing clean rice, any dis

advantage in shipping costs must be absorbed by the mill or the high
rate will force the mill out of the markets*

Although d e a n rice is

ordinarily sold in Louisiana f*o*b, mill, a guaranteed freight rate is
quoted in order to give the buyer a definite delivered price*

21

Rice mills are located in the interior Louisiana-Texas producing
area, in the Arkansas area, in California, and outside the producing
area at Memphis, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans*

The latter three milling

points are in Southern territory where rate structures are lower than
those in Arkansas and the Louisiana-Texas interior, which are in South
western territory*

However, the river mills originate their rough ripe

in Southwestern territory, and have the disadvantage of a long rough

2XInt«rstate Commerce Commission Docket No* 26430, si. &!•,
qp* sit •, p* 1463.
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r ic e h a u l*

In a d d itio n , occasional California competition, and the us©

of w a te p -r a il r a te s from Gulf ports, results in a bitter struggle for
s h ip p in g advantages.

At recent hearings on freight rates for rice, the

fact was emphasised that "rice is perhaps one of the most litigated comV

sodities with which the Interstate Commerce Commission has been called

22
upon to deal,w

Bach mill argues that it should receive the benefit of

its location, but that in addition it should be enabled to ship competit iv e ly against other mills to all markets.

23

In this situation, the

mills are not protesting the level of rates as such, but are fighting
each other for preferential treatment in a competitive struggle,2^
The s p e c ific problems brought before the Interstate Commerce
Commission have usually dealt with the efforts of Mew Orleans, Baton
Rouge, and Memphis mills to secure rates on inbound rough rice that would

permit them to reach markets with clean rice on just as advantageous a
b a s is as the through rate on clean rice from mills in the producing area;
w ith the e f f o r t s of Louisiana and Texas mills to secure clean rice rates

that would remove location advantages of Arkansas and Memphis mills in
reaching interior markets in the northern states; vdlth attempts of M m

Orleans mills to secure rough rice rates that would enable them to buy
r ic e in all four producing states, including California; and with com

plex rate situations involving all of the factors plus the effects of

“ ibid., p. 579.
23I b l d . . p. 654.

^♦Testimony of millers was to the effect that the mills were not
fighting the carriers, but each other* Ibid., p, 6*
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truck and water rates.^
Transit arrangements are available on rough rice originating in
Louisiana and Texas, which permits rice to move from the point of origin
of the rough rice to its final destination at the clean rice rate,
stopping in transit for milling*

This enables interior Louisiana mills

to buy rice without suffering disadvantage in location if all movement is
by rail.

Since most rough rice is now hauled to the mill by truck, this

privilege has lost much of its advantage.

Although New Orleans and Baton

Rouge also have transit privileges, the differential rate structure be
tween territories is such that transit is more costly than payment of the
regular rough rice rate inbound and clean rice rate outbound.
In the most important rice rate case of recent years, all the com
plaints of the mills were expressed in an extensive transcript of testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission*

26 The southern mills

attacked the reasonableness of clean rice rates as compared to California

rates, Louisiana mills attacked the rough rice rates from Arkansas into
Louisiana, and milling in transit and rates into principal consuming

^American Rice Milling Company, et al.. versus Abilene Southern
Railway Company, et al., Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 26618;
Memphis Rice Mill versus Aberdeen and Rockfish Railroad Company, ejt al*.
Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 26527$ New Orleans Joint Traffic
Bureau versus Akrapee and Western Railway Company, et al*, Interstate Com
merce Commission Docket No. 2646 O; Beaumont Chamber of Commerce, eb al.,
versus Aberdeen and Rockfish Railroad Company, et al,, Interstate Commerce
Commission Docket No. 2663#> Arkansas Rice Traffic Bureau versus Aberdeen
and Rockfish Railroad Company, at al., Docket No. 26430.
26
Interstate Commerce Commission, Hearings on Dockets No. 26530*
2661 B, 2 6 4 6 0 , 2 6 5 2 7 , and 2 6 4 3 0 , in 1934 and 1935, previously referred to
as Docket No. 26430, et al. An intensive study of rate problems based on
these hearings has been made by T. W. Douglas, Freight rcates on Rice.
University of Pennsylvania, (Privately printed Ph. D. dissertation.)
Philadelphia, 1939*
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territories were attacked and defended according to the interest of each
group of millers,

kills in general wanted rough rice rates that would

keep other milts out of their local producing area but which would enable
then to buy all over the producing belt, and clean rice rates that would
preserve their advantages and yet enable them to compete in all consuming
centers.

Farmer groups were interested in a rough rice rate structure

that would pemit outside mills to buy in their area, but would prevent
local mills from buying outside the area.

The decision settling this

dispute made few changes in the rate structure, and obviously could not
be satisfactory to all groups involved.

27

At the present time, New Orleans mills have a relationship of
rough rice rates to d e a n rice rates expressed by the ratio of 17.5 to
27*5*

This gives a relationship of rough rice rates to clean rice rates

of approximately 6 4 per cent.

Considering that the clean rice yield, by

weight, is approximately 68 per cent of the rough rice, this relation
ship appears to give the millers located nearer the consuming market a
slight advantage.

28

This advantage cannot be altogether offset by the

lower cost of truck receipts at the interior mills, since a great pro
portion of Louisiana rice is sold in the Southeast and thus moves in the
same direction as New Orleans.
At interior points in the United States, the Arkansas mills have
an advantage in marketing clean rice because of the rail rate structure*

^Interstate Commerce Commission, Docket No. 26430* ®t al*.
decided November 9, 1936#
^Douglas, ojo# clt. * pp. 102-103.
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At point* on tho South Atlantic coast, however, Louisiana and Texas mills
have a distinct advantage because of water transportation.

This latter

fact also accounts for the greater Importance of the export market to
port mills,

Hie Interstate Commerce Commission has in general left these

competitive advantages as established,
A recent case in which Louisiana mills attempted to improve their
purchasing advantage for rough rice was brought before the Interstate Com
merce Commission in 1941*

In this case, Louisiana rice mills, particular

ly those at New Orleans, attempted to secure rates on rough rice from
California that would permit them to buy and mill California rough rice.^
This case, obviously, was supported by Louisiana and Texas millers, as
any enlargement of rough rice buying territory would be advantageous to
the millers.

More competition in the California rough rice market would

also be an advantage for the independent growers of California, where
price has long been under rigid control of a grower-stiller organisation*
Principal opposition to the reduction came from the California millers
and the Louisiana-Texas growers, who dislike the prospect of more compe
tition in buying and selling rough rice, respectively.
The Louisiana rice mills supported their case on the grounds
that the existing rough rice rates from California were unjust and un
reasonable because they prohibited rice millers located at New Orleans
and other southern milling point® from drawing on California rough rice,

^Rickert Rice kills, Incorporated, ©t al*, versus Abilene and
Southern Railway Company, et al. Interstate Commerce Commission Docket
No, 28,572, briefs for complainants and defendants, karch, 1941.
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In order to offset this disadvantage, the southern mills requested lower
rates and milling-in-transit privileges on California rice*
In this case, Mr* Rickert of New Orleans also contended that
lower rates on rough rice were justified because rough rice is less sus
ceptible to damage in transit*

Hough rice is more easily salvaged if

wet or damaged in sacks, while clean rice is damaged by odors, dust,
sails in car, insects, and all the hazards which render a food less at
tractive for human consumption*

As reasons for the maintenance of rice

■ills at New Orleans, Mr* Rickert stated that ’’the outstanding reason for
the early and late construction of rice mills in New Orleans is not alone
because of the production of rice cm the Mississippi River but particular
ly because New Orleans is the largest rice consuming market in North
America.”

Also, terminal facilities for land and ocean transportation

were said to make New Orleans a logical nation-wide distribut ing point,
drawing rice from all producing states*

For example, Mr. Rickert stated

that his mill in 1941 had from two to three buyers each in the states of
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.*^
The interest of Louisiana rice growers in rough rice rate dis
putes was clarified by the remarks of Thomas 5. llunket, representing
the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association*^

Mr. Plunket, in

the course of his testimony, stated ” we are opposed to this issue
(California rough rice case)— for the reason that there has consistently

3$5ee brief for defendants, Interstate Commerce Commission Docket
Bo. 28572, pp. 37-38. This argument was reversed by the defendants to
illustrate the advantages already held by New Orleans mills*
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been a surplus of rough rice in these {southern} states, and t© reduce
the rate from California will only have the offset of causing a greater
loss to the producers whom we represent by permitting the rice mills in
Arkansas, touisiana, and Texas, to secure rough rice from California in
competition with our growers, --— Any further loading of this market by
increased shipments of rough rice from California will not result in an
increased consumption, but merely the lowering of prices of all rioe, re
gardless of origin, —

The production of rough rice in the three Southern

rice states is not only sufficient, but in excess of the requirements of
the natural southern rice market, —

Should there be placed in effect a

lower rate on rough rice from California, the Southern rice grower would
be ianediately confronted with a new and greatly disturbing competitive
situation,”
In dealing with the Louisiana miller's argument that Japan rice
from California would be non-competitive with the varieties grown in the
South, Mr, Plunket pointed out that the Southern states could quickly
meet any demand from southern mills for Japan rice.

If Japan rice could

be purchased cheaper in California, it would displace Japan rice in the
southern states and thereby add to the surplus already on the southern
market,

Mr, Plunket concluded that "the normal markets of Southern and

California growers have been fairly well protected from each other by
geographical considerations, rate structures and taste preferences—

be

cause of these factors, there is little competition between the two
groups in their respective normal markets—

if Southern millers of rough

xioe should get a lower rail rate on rough rioe from California, it
could be used as a competitive sledge hammer to drive down the prices of
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Southern varieties, not only of our Japan variety, but of all others."^
These bearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission indi

cate, in particular, that the location of rioe mill® is materially in
flu e n c e d by the freight rate differential® between rough rice and clean

rice products,

With the great increase in truck transportation of rough

rise in recent years, mills located within the producing areas are not
directly concerned with the rough rioe rate.

However, if clean rioe from

mills in the producing area moves to the consuming centers at rates equal
to the rough rice rate to mills in the consuming centers, the interior
m ills lose their transportation advantage over mills in the consuming

center, particularly those in New Orleans,

These facts explain the con-

t imed operation of rice mills at Memphis, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans,
Bcidently the rough rioe and clean rice rate structure has not been unduly disadvantageous to these mills.

33

The continuing struggle of Louisiana mills to secure favorable
rough rice rates from Arkansas and California is baaed on their desire
to secure fuller utilization of their milling capacity throughout the
year, and to relieve themselves of their dependence on Louisiana and
Texas rough rice.

Obviously, there are occasions when only one of these

tire motives is dominant.

Freight rates that would permit Southern mills

to draw on rough rice supplies anywhere in the United States would tend
to create more competition between mills and between growers by removing

^ A n article in the New Orleans Times-Plcayune ■ June 4, 1941,
states that the Interstate Commerce Commission examiner recommended
that the case on California rice rates be dismissed.
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the rat© tariff barrier which now limits th® market In the California
and Southern areas*
Whether or not this increased competition would be In the public
interest is questionable.

Ultimately It would tend toward centralisation

of mills In the consuming area, and the longer hauls on rough rice, since
they require more freight space than clean rice, might be considered de
trimental to the public interest.
merce Commission has commented:

In this connection the Interstate Com
"As the milling of rice appears to re

quire only a small capital outlay and as one-fifth of the weight and
probably one-third of the bulk of rough rice consists of hulls and chaff,
it is questionable whether under any defensible relation between the
rates for rough rice and those for clean rice it would be profitable to
move rough rioe any considerable distance or whether it would be in pub34
lie interest that It should so move."

And further, ''because of its

high content of chaff and hulls, any lengthening of the hauls of the
rough rice represents a transportation waste, the cost of which will ul
timately fall upon the public."

The Commission recognized that "the

most insistent complaints of inability to compete have come from millers
who are obliged to transport their rough rice considerable distances,"
and that rates established must consider that "clean rice is approximate
ly four times as valuable per unit of weight as rough rice, and on the
average a carload of rough rice weighs about 40 per cent more than a
35

carload of clean rioe."

2^219 Interstate Commerce Commission. Decision on Interstate Com
merce Commission Docket No. 26430, November 9, 1936.
35Ib ld .
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Concerning this attitude of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which in effect controls the location of rice mills, Douglas says:^
"With the shift in emphasis to distance as a rate-making factor and with
the threat of disruption of established relationships due to inter-carri
er competition, it became evident that expansion in the industry for es
tablished companies would be brought about only by an increase in the
number of plants rather than by an increase in individual plant size,

A

company with a number of plants sca ttered through the rice-producing
areas is enabled to fill its requirements from local fields at low trans
portation costs, and, further, can ship more economically to certain
territories than could a company with one large centralized plant*
Freight rates, therefore, partly explain the organization characteris
tics of such companies as Louisiana State Rice Milling Company, and
Standard Rice Mill Company. "37
Millers who are unfavorably affected by these factors continue
to present their cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
accounts for the extensive litigation.

In general, it appears that

cost advantages or disadvantages in large scale milling are relatively
unimportant as compared to the necessary requirement for an efficient
purchasing and selling organization.
chase most efficiently.

Small units apparently can pur

The organization of small units in one company

permits the company to combine the benefits of a large scale selling
organization with the efficiency of small scale location advantages In
buying and in freight rates.

3^Souglas, oj>. cit., p. 84-

37These two companies have plants widely scattered through the
rice producing areas of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.

CHAPTER V
MARKET OUTLETS FOR RICE

Since the expansion of rice production during World Car I, the
United States has had an annual production of rioe greater than annual
consumption.

Although most of the clean rice, and all of the by-pro

ducts, are consumed within the United States, the annual surplus for
export links the price structure with all the haaards of foreign affairs.
Rice production in the United States is protected by a duty of
2-1/2 cents per pound on clean rice, 1-1/2 cents per pound on brown
rice, 1-1/4 cents on rough rice, and 5/® cents on broken rice and flour,
meal, polish, and bran.

To what extent the American rice industry is

dependent on this tariff protection it is difficult to say, for the
domestic market preference for the quality of iunerican rice would sup
port a considerable portion of the industry without tariff protection.
On the other hand, preferences of certain Japanese groups on the Pacific
coast bring Asiatic rice into the United States regardless of the tariff
wall.

The tariff is of principal value to United States growers in

keeping out foreign broken rices and rice products which sell on a price
basis for manufacturing purposes in the continental market and In pro
tecting the price market existing in the insular possessions of the
United States.

Without tariff protection, American production would be

restricted largely to a limited acreage of rice which would sell above
177
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imported rices because of the quality price differential*
The consumption of rioe in the United States and its possessions
during recent years is shown in the accompanying table*
Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska, are

The possessions,

ithin the United States tariff

wall and account for more than a fourth of the total consumption of
American rice*

These countries purchase rice on a price basis rather

than on a quality basis, so that Asiatic rice would gain the larger part
of these markets were it not for the tariff barrier*

Although populations

in the territories are small, the per capita consumption is very high, and
the outlets are extremely important to American rice growers*
The Hawaiian and the Puerto Rican market absorb most of the
California rice consumed within the United States tariff boundaries*
In 1939-40, about 1,380,000 barrels, or 57 per cent of 2,420,745 barrels
of California rice consumed domestically went to these possessions*

On

the other hand, of 10,221,255 barrels of Southern rice used in the United
States and territories in 1939-40, only 2,194,773 barrels, or 21 per cent,
were shipped to insular possessions*

California rioe is of the Japan

variety, more closely related to the quality of Asiatic rice, and is
preferred by the Oriental residents of the Pacific coast and Hawaii*
In the past five years, an average of only 6*5 per cent of the
annual disappe&rance of California rough rice was accounted for by ex
ports, while an average of 17*4 per cent of Southern rioe moved outside
the United States tariff boundaries*

In recent years, this average for

the southern states has been closer to 25 per cent of the annual disap
pearance*

Because of their location near Gulf ports, the importance of

the export market is greatest of all to Louisiana and Texas producers,
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1.556.335
5.697
2,11+2,273

1.3*10.957
5,1+88
2.373.89*1

1.318.592
6 2 ,6 8 5

l.*+33.982
3 7 .0 3 1
1 ,9 8 8 ,1+01

1 7 ,0 0 0
1 7 1 ,0 0 0

1*8,000

11,162,509

21,000

1,7*11,628
9,153.108

1 7 1 ,0 0 0

12,657,000

1 5 ,0 0 0

2.191.773
10,221,255

7,229.182
579.000
5 6 8 ,0 0 0

6,921,1+80

2,120,71+5

893.5 H
101,975
37.037
6,912

1939-10

379.73*1
103,701+
21, 691
9.259

1938-39

19^>*

Converted from bags allied rice to barrels rough rioe on basis of ratio of rough rice to allied rice
turnout each year.
2 Bags rough rice converted to barrels on basis of 16? t)ounds per b rrel.
Source: Compiled from government market data by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern
Division,

1

Total

Hawaiian consumption

Southern rice:
U. S. disappearance
Seed
Tor food on farms
Tor feed on farms
Shipped to insular
possessions
Total Southern states

317.895
108,025
15*1.381

19P-38

398.511
128,765
*+3 2 ,0 9 9
7*+,07*+

i^b-17

Consumption (barrels of rough rioe^

Annual consumption of rlo® in the United States and territorial possessions, 1935

California rioe:
U. S. disappearance^
2*$,10T
Seed^
U9.859
Teed and waste^
18,518
Shipped to Southern *11ls^
3.701
Shipped to Hawaii and
1,362,108
Puerto Hice^
Shipped to Hawaii (unmilled)
$2$
Total California
1.793.813

Table XXfl.
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who in some /ears export as much as $0 per cent of rioe that moves from
these two states into distribution channels,1

Rioe Growers end the Export Market

As has already been mad© evident, the domestic market for rioe
is relatively inelastic.

Each year the United States uses about the

same quantity of rice, regardless of price.

The insular market within

the United States tariff wall is somewhat more elastic, since rice, al
though a staple food, is bought on a price basis and is subject to some
competition from foreign rice.
The total amount of rice products imported into the United States
and its possessions has usually been equivalent to one million bushels,
except under unusual conditions.

In 1925, and again in 1936, imports

of rice produets increased sharply while exports decreased, so that the
United States was actually on an Import basis during those two years,
this reversal was caused largely by unusually high domestic prioes of
rioe in the United States relative to Asiatic prices*

Foreign countries

did not purchase American rice at these high prices, and large quanti
ties of Asiatic rice, particularly cheap broken rioe, were profitably
shipped into the United States over the tariff wall.

The 1925 high

price was caused by an actual shortage of American rice and consequent
high prioes, but the 1936 drop in exports was caused largely by the
government price maintenance programs which had been operating since 1933*

1Interstate Commerce Commission Docket Mo, 26430, ££>,• Qit«. pp.
885 ff.

1,585.**

13.192.9
I 2 .5 U0 .7

S,27^.8

MlS.l

3 7 .2

1937-38

1938-39

6.U22.6

2 ,1 0 2 .8

517.*

U .3 U5 .2
6.597.**

2.757.2

3.833,6

u,6 7 6 .3

barrels

~i,odo

2,26**.7

lt0 2 7 .U

1,730.1

1,822.0

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

Total

Snorts
and
shipments^

585.^

H3O.6

589.3

1.391.^

1.751.1

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

California*
Domesti0
utilisation3

1 ,0 0 0

1**.6**3.5

15,**57.6

8,860.2
8 ,2 2 0 .9

1 3 ,3 1 2 .6

1 1 ,0 9 6 .0

1 2 ,3**0 . 2

barrels

8 ,9 6 7 .*+

7 ,2 6 2 .*!

7 .6 6 3 .9

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

United States
Domestic
utiliza
Total
tion^

1 Milled rioe for California converted to rough basis by considering 66 bags milled equal to 100 bags rough.
2 Includes rough rice exported, milled rice exported and milled rioe shipped insular possessions,
3 Includes rice for se?d, feed and waste and milled rice disappearance in United States.
Source: Compiled from government market data by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division.

7.703.5

10.555-1

7.9^0.0

2,615.1

1936-37

M

1 .6 7 9 .3

9.27**.0

6 ,831.8

2.UU2.?

1935-36

9 .9 9 9 .8

7.0 7 ^ .6

193**-35

2,925.2

1 .0 0 0

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

Total

barrels

Sxnort*
and
.. ahl75»er>t,2

1 ,0 0 0

Southern
Domesti c
utilisa
tion^

Ix n o r ts and dom estic u t ilis a t io n o f Am erican r ic e In to rn * o f rough r i c e , 193**“1939.

barrels

Tear

Exports
and
shipments
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United States foreign trade in rice has always been very ir
regular,

Before the Givil War, when rice production was confined to

the south Atlantic states, the United States was a net exporter.

Pro

duction and trade were practically wiped out during the Civil War, and
did not become of importance until production began its rapid expansion
in Louisiana and the Gulf states.

By 1910, the United States was pro

ducing sufficient rice for domestic food requirements, but still im
ported broken rice for brewing purposes.

In 1916 the nation became

again a net exporter of rice and held this position until the present
time.

In 1933* 1934, and 1936, however, the net exports dropped so low

that the nation almost changed into an importer again, although huge sur
pluses of rice were at the time piling up in this countxy.

The reason

for the low net export i>osition was principally the artificial mainte
nance of a high price, and the consequent inflow over the tariff wall
of cheap foreign zlce for brewing purposes.

2

The pronounced fluctuation in exports depends partly on the
characteristics of an elastic foreign demand for rice.

When United

State8 prices are low, large quantities can be exportedj when prices
are high, exports are drastically reduced.

The situation is not alto

gether the result of price elasticity, however, but also one of change
in demand from foreign markets.

If any disturbance in international

trade, such as nationalistic policies or shipping shortages, causes a
change in foreign demand or competitive supplies, the foreign outlet

2The best recent discussion of rice in international trade is
an article by Fred J. Rossiter, 0World Rice Production and Trade,”
Foreign Agriculture. 2s455-4B2, October, 1938.

Million
bushels

1917

20

Figure 20.

1919

1921

1923

1925

1927

1929

1931

Imports

1933

1935

1937

1939

1941

Exports and imports of all rice products expressed as equivalent bushels of
rough rice, United States, 1917 to date.

184

Table XXVIII.

United states exports of rice In terms of rough rice,
1935 to 19AO.1

Tear

Gouthorn
states^
(barrels)

California
Milled^
Roup:h4
(barrels)
(barrels)

Total
(barrels)

1935-1936

751,499

3,112

20,627

780,238

1936-1937

619,228

374,281

9,385

1,002,894

1937-1938

2,814,550

101,939

15,363

2,931,852

1938-1939

3,106,570

77,407

36,955

3,220,932

1939-1940

2,950,928

69,556

29,097

3,049,581

5-year (1935-1939)
average

2,048,555

22,285

2,197,099

Normal exports (estimated)

126,259

3,000,000

ifcn table 3 °f Annual Market Summary of Southern Kioe, Agricultural
Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, and table 4
of Annual Market Summary of California Rice, Agriculture*! Marketing Ser
vice, United States Department of Agriculture, cooperating with California
Department of Agriculture Market News Service, and for California rough
rice from unpublished records of the Agricultural Marketing Service, United
States Department of Agriculture.
^Assuming 100 pounds milled rice equals one barrel of 162 pounds rough
rice.
o

Converted from ba s milled rice to barrels rough rice on basis of ratio
of rough rice to milled rice turnout each year.
^Converted from 100-pound bags rough rice to bar^ls of 162 pounds.
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for American rice may decrease or increase regardless of price elas
ticity*
American rice, because of its quality and high price in the
domestic market, is ordinarily priced substantially higher than Asiatic
rice*

In 1937-3®# the average London quotation (c.i.f. basis) was 13*37

a hundred pounds for American rice as compared to &1.95 end 11*99 for
Buima and for Saigon rices, respectively.

This margin of more than one

dollar a hundred pounds was relatively low, since the London price for

American rice has frequently been two dollars or more above Asiatic
rice*

In years when American exports have been lowest, this price differ

ential has generally been the greatest.

Evidently, American rice is

priced far out of a competitive range with Asiatic rice, and can main
tain export sales only on a quality basis or through decided tariff preferentials*
Compared with the large rice exporting countries of the world,
the United States contribution of rice to world trade is very small.

In

1937# the United States exported 204 million pounds of rice out of a
total of 8,143 million pounds exported from the nine principal exporting
3
countries of the world, or less than three per cent.
The bulk of the
rice entering importing countries comes from Burma, Indo-China, and Siam.
In addition to the United States, countries

ith minor exports include

Italy, Spain, Egypt, Brazil, and Madagascar.
These exporting countries contend for markets available in

3lbld.
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T ab le XXIX.

United States exports of rice^ to specified countries, 1926*
3 0 average, and 1935-38*

Country

Belgium
France
Germany
Greece
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Canada
Cuba
Argentina
Chile
Japan
Others
Total

5-yr. av.
1926-30

1935

1916 . 2932 _
1,,000 pounds

14,275
11,366
33,981
4,290
16,762
33,453
13,238
11,510
20,402
13,693
16,851
36,956

11,485
14,945
5,500
13,085
3,956
11,334
10,502
65,396
23
15,865

226,777

164,347

12,256

1,592
1,690
585
1,750
311

3,447
7,282
2,621
20
2
2,428

1938

1939

1940

1,400
7,893 13,342 11,922
4
6
541
5,527
5,393
180
444
1,353
2,930
9,625 10,829 11,154
6,916
8,492
767
7,453
6,300
8,123 13,120
4,195
7,872 16,783 18,792 17,813
135,587 204,724 209,753 289,690
11,510
4,007
•?*
3,642 18,821
254
7,414 19,716 29,212 18,660
* T t *t

21,728 203,639 310,674 301,632 336,250

^ftough rice converted and included.
4.

Lees than 1,000 pounds.

Sources

F o re ig n Agriculture, October, 1938, and data of the Foreign Service
Division, Bureau o f Agricultural Hfconooics.

187

practically every other nation of the world, as the consumption of rice
as a foodstuff is general.

The principal importers of rice are China,

India, British K&laya, the Netherland Indies, and Japan.

These Asiatic

markets, of course, are held by the large Asiatic exporters.

Principal

markets for the rice of the other exporting countries are the nations of
Europe and Latin America.
It is easy to see what this situation means for the United States
rice industry.

The export surplus of rice available each year in the

United States must find its market in deficit countries where the price
is principally dependent on the supplies of rice available from the prin
cipal exporting countries.

This means that the export market for United

States rice is certain to be extremely variable.

Whether the quantity

available for export from the United States in any given year is small or
large has no significant influence on rice price in any importing country,
under normal conditions, for the United States contribution is too small
to have an appreciable effect on world price.
In an export market of this type the volume of exports from the
United States cannot escape abrupt and violent fluctuations.
true even under normal peace time conditions.

This is

The slightest increase in

United States price relative to prices in the major rice exporting coun
tries can wipe out the foreign market for American rice, except in
European countries where quality is preferred.

Conversely, a shift- in

price relationship8 in favor of American rice permits all available ex
port stocks to be sold readily without any further effeot on rice prices.
These conditions are particularly true in regard to the Cuban
market, which buys rice largely on a price basis, although with some

h

3

1
2

i - ^ .....

.

l.HU

1.28

1 .2 6

2 5 ......

.... .£*.

3.78
3.72
h .2 2
3.91

1.15

3.92
3-58
3.75
h .2 1
3.57

2 .6 2

7.29
6.08
U.S9
h .6 8
**•95
h.09
3 .0 H

1 .9 8
2 .2 2
2 .2 0

1.9*

1 M
1 .6 2

Slam
Cleaned
Super

of Agriculture.
London Bice Brokers Association Weekly Circular.
Delivery current month alongship ship, not including taxes hut including hags.

1936 Statistics and Eice Market Review Hay Peed and Seed Division, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department

i s M L - ..

1.98

1 .6 0

2.75
1.87
1.51
1.18
1.3*
1*59
1.6U
I.U7
l.lU
1.37
1.67
1.69
1.91
1.95

3 .6 8
2 .6 U
2 .2 1

2.18
2 .2U
2 .3 0
1 .U2

5.19
U .1 7
4.07
4 .3 U

International Institute of Agriculture, Home Monthly Crop Eeport,

1 9 3 7 - 3 3 ....

1 9 3 5 -3 6
1 9 3 6 -3 7

1 .3 6
1 .3 7
1 .5^

1928-29
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-3^
193^35

3.30
3 .2 0
2 .8 3
2 .SU

3.35
3 .2 U
3 .0 6
2 .8 8
2 .6 8

6 .9 8

2 .6 1

2

American
T&noy
Blue Hose
at Hew
Orleans

2.71

k

.86
.9 2
1 .1 7
1 .2 7
1 .U0

2 .2 1
2 .1 U
1 .3 6
1 .0 6

1 9 2 7 -2 8

1

.78
.91
1.19
1 .2 h

2.39

1926-27

1 9 2 5 -2 6

2 .7 0
2 .6 2

Crop year
beginning
August 1

Average Thursday quotations
prioe in London c.i.f. basis
India
IndoAmerican
Burma
Chlna
Extra
Ho. 2
Saigon
Fancy
Blue Hose
3
3
3

Wholesale price of milled rioe at Important world markets, 1925-37*

Season average wholesale prices
_ in.uroduoina countries
Inile
Indo
Slam
Ho, 1
Burma
china
Bo.2 at
Ho; l
white
Rangoon
round
rioe at
1
Bangkok
white at
Saigon
5 $ broken

Table XXX.
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re g a rd to quality*

Raxoro and Early Prolific varieties approach closest

of all American rice in quality to preferred Asiatic rice varieties, and
th e Cuban market prefers these varieties in the American market when

price relationships are favorable*

The American market in Cuba, there

fore, is principally dependent on price relationships for similar varie
ties with the rice crop of Burma, Indo-China, and Siam.

If price

relationships are favorable to United States rice, the entire export sur
plus can be disposed of in this market without risking further price de
clines; if price relationsh ps are unfavorable, no rice at all can be
so ld in Cuba.

ihen quality influences the demand for any product, demand tends
to become m ore inelastic „

This principle is clearly illustrated in

European markets for American rice.

During the past twenty years fluctu

a tio n s in purchases of American rice by European countries have been
somewhat less than in Cuba, largely because there is a preference for
th e higher quality American rice regardless of price*

Europe is there

fo re a m ore preferred market, and a more dependable outlet for rice*

Tfhen used as an outlet for large quantities, however, this market becomes
more elastic, since European consumers in the lower Income classes also
buy principally on price.

International Politics and Rico

In the current situation there are factors which complicate the

simple economic analysis of export price relationships.

These factors

are the growth of economic nationalism and i.iilitary us© of consumption
goods for political purposes.

Under such conditions, economic analysis
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is of little value since the actual course of events is based on politi
cal motives, not on the economic welfare of men*

European nations during

the past ten years have attempted to reduce their dependence on imported
supplies of rice, regardless of the cost in quality or in price*

Spires

have given preferential treatment to rice from their own colonies, and
encouraged the production and use of their own rice*

At the same time,

European nations without colonies, of which the best example is Germany,
have discouraged the consumption of rice in favor of substitute foodstuffs
available within the country.

Both of these arrangements had a distinctly

unfavorable effect on United States rice exports during the decade pre
ceding World war II,

The establishment of price advantages by government

subsidy is relatively ineffective in gaining an export market under such
conditions.

In theoretical terms, nationalistic trade restriction causes

the foreign market to become rigidly inelastic, removing the normal price
elasticity and variable demand for United States rice in foreign markets*
In South America, nearly all countries have adopted programs to
increase rice production and decrease imports*
ports for

From 1926 to 1930 net im

South American countries averaged 320 million pounds annual

ly, but by 1935, exports exceeded imports by nearly 30 million pounds*^
As a whole, the continent of South America has become approximately selfsufficient in rice production, vdth the surplus of exporting countries
being disposed of largely in the neighboring deficit countries.

The lat

ter relationship is particularly important in the case of Brazil, the

^I b l d .
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largest exporter of rice in South America, and Argentina, the largest
importer.
The situation in Europe and South America, then, is badly com
plicated by factors that cannot be remedied by manipulations of American
export prices on rice.
Asia.

But additional complications have also risen in

Rice production in the great importing countries of China, Japan,

and the Netherlands Indies has been greatly increased in the past decade.
At the same time, the great surplus production of the rice exporting
countries has beer, maintained.

This has made available more abundant

supplies from Asia for the export markets in Europe and South America.
The net result has been that the price differential against American rice
has been growing steadily larger in the markets where the surplus from
Asia is offered.

As a result, the price relationship necessary to obtain

the markets for American rice has became steadily more difficult to secure.
Canada imports rice in fairly steady quantities of about 45 million
pounds annually.

The principal sources of Canadian imports have been Burma

and the United States.

Under the British empire preference established in

the Ottawa agreements, Burma rice obtained about 75 per cent of the
Canadian market before World War II,

About two-thirds of Canadian imports

consist of rough rice, since such rice is imported free of duty as against
a rate of one dollar per 100 pounds for cleaned rice.

Clean rice from

Snplre countries enters Canada at a 50$ rate, however, while United States
rice pays a duty of 72$ under the reciprocal trade agreement.

Under nor

mal conditions, the Canadian market is an important but not a major outlet
for United 3tatee rice.
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Tariff Preferences in the Cuban Market

Cuba is the last remaining market for United States rice which
is open to any great degree*

With the inception of the World War II

shipping shortage, this market became unusually favorable because of the
automatic restriction on the movement of Asiatic rice*

Per capita con

sumption is unusually high in Cuba, exceeding 100 pounds annually, and
total consumption for the island is estimated between 350 million and 500
all!ion pounds annually*

This quantity is greater than the usual amount

of American rice available for export*

Domestic production supplies less

than 10 per cent of the requirements, and th© bulk of the imports ordina
rily cones from Siam, Burma, and French Indo-China.
in this market is normally a marginal source*

United States rice

If price relationships

are favorable, large quantities will be purchased— if not, very little
rice will move to Cuba*
From 1904 to 1934 the United States enjoyed a tariff preference
of 40 per cent in the Cuban duty on rice as compared to other countries.
This preference was increased to 50 per cent in the trade agreement of
1934.

However, this marked preference was not sufficient to give th©

price advantage necessary to move American rice in th© Cuban market*
During the last five months of 1935# the Cuban government made further
drastic changes in duties to give preference to American rice*

These

changes were sufficient to increase exports greatly to Cuba at that time.
The former duties were in substance restored in 1933# removing the price
advantage temporarily enjoyed by American rice which permitted the large
export movement*

In the years immediately preceding World War II,
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Table XXXI.

Change in Cuban import duties on clean rice, 1937 bo date.

Pesos
uer 100 kilos

Equivalent U. S. dollars
per 100 lbs.

Prior to Anril 2. 1937
From United States
From other countries

1.85
3.70

10.84
1.68

1.8$
3.70
7.40

0.84
1.68
3.36

Anril 2. 1937 to Aucust 9. 1937
From United States
From Saigon-Burma
From Siam

August 10. 1937 to December 31. 1937*
From United States
From other countries

.92^
4.70

0.42
2.13

1.8$
3.70
4.70

0.84
1.68
2.13

From January 1. 1938
From United States
From Saigon-Burma
From Slam

^Presidential Decree No. 2438.
Sources

Customs Tariff Item 253-B
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American rice was not favorably situated in the Cuban market*
Since the Cuban market is largely a price market, American ex
porters have attempted to offset price differentials by adding large
percentages of broken rice to the export product*
of broken idee were utilized in this way*

In 1938, large stocks

This action leads to some mis

understanding among growers in the United States.

Deliberate action to

lower the grade of clean rice by including broken rice results in lower
prices on rice sold abroad*

Growers assume that these lower prices are

prejudicial to them through lower prices for rough rice.

However, the

inferior rice is necessary to enable the movement of rice at any price.
Growers areJaatter off when rice is sold at some price than not sold at
all*

If United States rice must sell on the basis of price, not quality,

it becomes necessary to meet the demands of the foreign market*
The present war situation has intensified the difficulties of
two conflicting agricultural groups in Cuba and the United States*

Cuban

sugar finds its most profitable market in the United States, and the eco
nomy of the island is dependent largely on United States attitude toward
the entry of Cuban sugar*

Since the outbreak of World War II, about 85

per cent of American rice exports have gone to Cuba*

5

Louisiana sugar

interests h; ve long waged a strong battle to restrict the entry of Cuban
sugar into the United States,

It has now become imperative that as strong

a battle be waged to retain the Cuban market for exports of Louisiana
rice*

Geographically, the rice and sugar growers are closely related and

to some extent overlapping*

The conflict of interests In southern Louisiana

^Riee Journal* Uarch, 1941-

31*4.171

9,976

38*4
3 6 8 ,6 0 9

3.567
2 7 8 ,9 6 6

307.990

58*4

2*49

6 ,*480

229

790

567

3.077

3.556

118,891

2 1 2 ,2 6 8

*493 ,9 *7

2,3*4*4

879

132

670

221

2 2 0 ,6 1 9

16,17*4

1.513

17*4.399

17, *432

*4*4*4,087

3.785

8*47

625

1938

72,6*46

6

6 6 ,0 9 0

172

*493.867

1,018

535

3.298

*411,736

2.559

169,117

30.397

10,371

11*4

11*4, *49*4 199.278

1937

356,879 2 3 3 ,8 0 6

2 2 ,*408

*4

*46,568

3*42

1 0 ,6 3 1

1936

1 Preliminary.
Source; Compiled hy Division of Foreign Service from official sources.

Total

Others

Italy

22

3.257

3 ,0 0 0

Germany

Netherlands

3*4

3.398

75.129

160

53,923

9.309

1,16*4

920

1.852

37,231

1.9*4*4

166,39*4

1 8 7 ,3 8 2

17.37*4

20,8*47

59,76*4

*432

37.96*4

1935

193*4

5,*491

1933

1 7 ,8 0 1

1932 _

Japan

Bgypt

Siam

2.730

French Indo-ohina

198,692

British India

1.597

*49,708

United Kingdom

China

9.5^3

1931

United States

Country of source
1939

1

650

129,*409

35,838

6 ,8 2 6

1,027

255,*4*19

19*40X

*4*4*4,137 *429,200

78

600

1 5 2 ,6 9 0

8 0 ,*491

7 ,6 1 8

2 2 2 ,6 6 0

Tehle XXXII. Import* of milled rice Into Cuba, 1931 to 19*40 •
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in regard to Cuban trade relations with the United States, consequently,
is a very difficult one.**
Because of the necessity for favorable tariff treatment to main
tain exports to the Cuban market, and because of th© fact that a tariff
sufficiently low to give American rice the necessary preference over
Asiatic rice in a peace-time market would deprive the Cuban government of
essential revenue, leaders in the American rice industry have recently
proposed that United States negotiations viith Cuba should attempt to se
cure a preferential quota of 300 million pounds for American rice.^
Through use of the quota system, Cuban tariff revenues could be main
tained at a high level but American rice could dominate the Cuban market*
The fact that price could be maintained at any desired level under the
quota system could be used to encourage domestic rice production, which
the Cuban government apparently desires*

In regard to this conflict, Homer L. Brinkley, manager of the
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, nays: "The entire matter
is greatly complicated by the United States-Cuban relations with respect
to sugar production and sugar quotas* Many attempts have been made in
various places to play off the two commodities against each other, but
we have so far been able to resist such efforts* We have looked with
grave concern on attempts on the part of domestic sugar interests to cur
tail Cuban sugar quotas feeling* and with reason, that if Cuba's nugar
quota were further reduced retaliatory measures would be attempted aga3.nct
Increased importations of American rice to Cuba. The continuation of this
market on its present, or an expanded basis, is a matter of economic life
or death to the rice industry, and extreme vigilance is required to Insure
its retention*n Annual Report of the American Hice Growers Cooperative
Association* 1939*40, June, 1940, p* 13*
^Brief of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association and the
Rice Killers' Association with respect to consideration of rice as an ex
port commodity in sup. lemental trade agreement negotiations with Cuba,
submitted to Committee for Reciprocity Information, United States Tariff
Commission, August 21, 1941*
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Although a preferential quota and a high tariff on American
rice would be a hardship for Cuban consumers, the United States may
be in a position to bring sufficient pressure on Cuba to secure this
advantage for the American rice industry.

International trade rela

tione in recent years have been established more and more on quota
regulations and political alliances*

The Cuban rice market may per

haps be secured for American producers by international political moves
rather than by price competition with Asiatic rice.

The sugar situation,

however, must always be considered in negotiations concerning the welfare
of the xlce industry.

R e c ip ro c a l Trade Agreements

The reciprocal trade agreement program established in 1934
o ffe re d distinct benefits to Louisiana rice growers*

Since American

rice was admittedly losing its markets abroad because of the price dif
ferential, any effort to lower the tariff walls against American rice
was a move toward decreasing the unfavorable price differential
s tra n g lin g export outlets.
Im p o rta n t concessions for rice were secured in trade agreements
w ith Cuba, Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

In the latter

case, a reduction from the former duty of 1.95 cents per pound was
achieved, the new rate being established at 1.30 cents a pound.

Slight

reductions or "bound” low rates were also secured from Belgium, Netherland, Sweden, and France.

The fact that exports were reduced even after

th e s e reductions took place indicates only that the reductions were not
s u ffic ie n t to offset other unfavorable factors.

Without the concessions
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In th e tra d e agreem ents the rice export situation would probably have be
come s t i l l w orse*

The principal barriers preventing more general and material con
cessions on r ic e with other countries are associated with the facts that
independent importing nations already admit rice free of duty, are estab
lis h in g domestic rice production, or are establishing systems of empire
p re fe re n c e .

As has already been mentioned, in one trade agreement the

U n ite d States itself made a concession on rice when it reduced the duty on
im p o rts of broken rice from the Netherlands from 5/3 cents to 5/16 cents.

For the duration of World War II, the reciprocal trade program
can affect the rice export situation only through further negotiations
with Cuba.

The United States already has a decided tariff preferential,

but more direct action appears necessary if the Cuban market is to be
made permanently secure.

Whether additional tariff negotiations can be

used to achieve this result depends largely on the course of the war in
the next few years.

In the meantime, shipments of xiae to Europe will be

concerned not with trade agreements, but with government policy regarding
r ic e as a food available for shipment under the ”lend-lease” program of
a id to the Allies,

O u tlo o k fo r R ic e E xports

In summ&zy, assuming the restoration of European markets to some
degree, Cuba and Canada must be considered as the only potential markets
for increased quantities of American rice.
only on a price basis.

Both markets can be held

Past experience lias indicated that Asiatic rice

can obtain these markets even when American rice obtains a marked tariff
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p re fe re n c e , for Birope, on a quality basis, has in the past been the
U n ite d States best foreign customer for rice*

The problem of future

e x p o rts of rice, then, is largely the maintenance of a low price in the

Canadian and Cuban markets after the war is over*

Cuba has already em

b arked on a program to expand domestic production,® while the possibility
o f priee competition from Asiatic rice in both Cuba and Canada holds a

constant threat to unericon exports in a peace-time world.
According to Leonhardy^ the causes for future reduced demand
for United States rice may be summed up in the following remarks:
1.

Countries which produce quality rice and compete with the United
States are increasing their production - Italy, Spain, Brazil,
Ecuador, and Uruguay.

2.

Countries which import quality rice but can produce some of their
own, are expanding production - Argentina, Columbia, and Japan.

3*

Countries importing quality rice are decreasing their consumption
by substitution of other foodstuffs - Chile, and Gemany,

4.

Countries buying inferior rice on a price basis but able to grow
their own are increasing production - China, Japan, Ceylon, Malaya,
and Netherlands Indies.

5.

Countries importing quality rice have established empire preference United Kingdom and France.

®The United States government is considering a loan to Cuba for
the purpose of building facilities to establish a rice industry* Such
action, of course, will meet with violent opposition from United States
rice producers.
^T. G. Leonhardy. Louisiana Rice in World Trade.
U* S. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1939*

Unpublished
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6*

Countries exporting poor quality rioe are being forced to improve
their quality and compete with American rice on both quality and
price basis - Burma, Indo-Chlna, Siam, and British Guiana*
Under such conditions, the measures adopted to facilitate ex

ports of United States rice have been relatively ineffective*

Several

of the reciprocal trade agreements have provided reductions in cJutiea
against American rice, but, except in Cuba, these reductions have not
provided any great encouragement to exports*

With the curtailment of

the European market after the outbreak of war in 1939s the export sur
plus problem would have been great except for the occurrence of shipping
spaoe shortages, high shipping rates, and crop shortages in Asia*

These

factors threw the Cuban market to United States rice, and, as previously
discussed, if United States rice can get into the Cuban market on a
price basis at all, it can find an outlet for all export stocks.
The United States still imports considerable quantities of
brewer's rice*

Several reasons are advanced for this situation other

than that the tariff is not sufficiently high to keep it out*

quality

is not an objective in brewer's rice, hence price, and not quality, is
the only factor governing sales in the domestic market*

Ocean freight

rates are low by water, and brewer's rice can be shipped very cheaply
to the Atlantic seaboard from long distances*

Xn addition, brewers

often place orders six to twelve months in advance in their business*
Domestic rice mills are unwilling to accept orders for deliveries that
far ahead, since they operate closer to the current market *

As a re

sult, the rice is purchased from importers who secure it at th© more
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constant markets in foreign countries

Development of Rice Markets

The markets for United States rice have been demonstrated to
be, in order of price advantage, the domestic continental market, the
Insular market, the mropean market, and the Latin American market.^*
these various markets have distinct characteristics which require dif
ferent industry and government policies in regard to the maintenance of
rice sales and rice prices.
Rice growers will secure the greatest benefit if they take ad
vantage of the inelastic domestic demand by placing a relatively limited
supply of rice on the domestic market, and if they take advantage of the
low per capita consumption by using methods designed to increase do
mestic consumption.

The first objective is accomplished to some extent

by quality preferences within the United States.

Long grain varieties

and Extra Fancy rice find their principal outlet in the American market,
and since quality rice has been only a small portion of the total sup
ply, it brings a higher price to the producer©.

In order to preserve

this segregation of the American market, rice producers should not
greatly expand production of high quality rices, since price would drop
rapidly to a point inhere the superior quality would have little advan
tage in price over ordinary qualities.

The demand for a product which

^Lsonhardy, o£. cit.. p. 119*
^■For extensive proof of this proposition by persons actively
engaged in the rice trade, see testimony of millers, Interstate Commerce
Commission Docket No. 26430, op. cit.
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sails by virtue of its quality is more inelastic than for a product
which sells in prioe competition*

Only if consumers can be educated

to demand more high quality rice, and costs of production of this
better rice are no greater than those for ordinary rice, can farmers
benefit by increasing the supply of high quality rice placed on the do
mestic market*
A second method of improvement in th© domestic market involves
an increase in the rice consumption per capita in the United States*
dver since the price decline of 1921, proposals for advertising rice
have been suggested in the rice trade*

12

These proposals have most

frequently attempted to enlist the cooperation of all mills in contri
buting to a fund for industry advertising*

Wore ambitious plans have

attempted to obtain farmer contributions toward advertising funde.

The

pressure for rice advertising culminated in the establishment of a fund
for such purposes under the government-sponsored marketing agreement in
1933 end 1934*

13

The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has

also sponsored industry advertising programs*

14

12

Few issues of the monthly Rice Journal after 1920 omit refer
ence to proposed plans for national advertising for increasing the con
sumption of rice*

13

See Chapter 71. The marketing agreement was too short-lived
to put this fund into practical use. In addition, the legality of use
of the funds for advertising was challenged*
^*The American Rice Growers* Cooperative Association developed
a radio advertising plan in 1939-40, sponsoring a branded rice packed

by cooperating mills and advertised by the association* little of
this branded rice was sold, since mills preferred to push their own
s a le s * Regarding all schemes of industry advertising by cooperation, Mr*
Brinkley said in June, 1940: ”A’e have abandoned all hope of ever being
a b le to handle this matter on a voluntary or cooperative basis— — repeated
effort to develop voluntary programs has resulted in complete failure* It
gees without saying that no component part of the industry would be justi
fied in engaging in Industry advertising alone.” Annual Report, p. 16.
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All this effort of the past twenty years resulted in no more
than sporadic advertising campaigns.

Since complete cooperation of all

wills and fanners was impossible to obtain under any plan, the sponsors
of most plans have not felt justified in maintaining their own expendi
tures for the good of the entire industry.

Direct benefits of an adver

tising program are so ftifficult to observe that complete cooperation will
probably never be obtained, except under legislative pressure in all rice
producing states.

At best, rice advertising can result only in a slow in

crease in per capita consumption, and temporary fluctuations in demand
will wake short-run effects scarcely discernible.
In 1940 the Louisiana legislature passed a hill placing a tax of
two cents per 100 pounds of clean ilce products to be paid by the mills,
the proceeds to be used for an industry program to stimulate rice con
sumption in the United States,

The tax was contingent upon the passage of

similar legislation in Arkansas and Texas,

Both of these states acted

favorably in 1941, and on August 1, 1941, the tax went into effect in the
three states.

Expenditure of the funds is vested in joint commissions of

rice farmers and rice millsrs, with farmer representatives in the majority.
The two—cent tax is expected to provide an annual fund of $250,000 to be
expended largely in national advertising, but which can also be used in
any program to promote domestic rice consumption.
From the fanner*s point of view, rice advertising should be di
rected simply toward increasing the consumption of rice in general, not
toward any particular brand.

Advertising of specific mill brands, which

is done by two large milling organizations, tends mainly toward pushing
sales of the advertised brand in place of other rice,

Education of con-
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sumcra on varieties, grades, and cooking qualities, however, can stimu
la te quality preference and permit higher prices for th© quality products
s o ld on the domestic market.

In all industry-wide advertising plans, however conducted, the
r ic e growers take the burden of the risk involved, and it is therefore

proper that farmer representatives control the present tax fund advertis
in g program .

If an extensive advertising campaign fails to promote in

creased demand for rice, the farmers pay the costs through lower prices
fo r rough rice; if it is successful, they gain through higher prices for
t h e ir product*

Considering the present iov; consumption and the ignorance

of most American housewives concerning the quality and preparation of
r ic e , a well-conducted advertising campaign offers possibilities for en

larging the preferred domestic market*

But, since the rice farmers and

nillers are competitive and the industry is too large to. insure complete
cooperation, the benefits from advertising a staple commodity will be
obscure in the short run and will be offset by increased production and

increased elasticity of demand in the long run*

It is therefore doubt

f u l whether any sustained advertising campaign will b© successfully main

tained, although benefits to the industry can undoubtedly be achieved*
Other means of improving the domestic market include the sale of
canned rice and brovm rice on the basis of their pec’Hiar advantages as

health foods,

lore effective utilization of by-products in feed find in

dustrial uses is also advisable.

Th© Rice fillers Association has con

ducted a research program and holds several patents on processes designed

for the above purposes.

The speculative nature of the milling industry,

however, has not been conducive to development of these minor sources of
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p r o f it *

Second in preference is the insular market, in which Puerto Rico
is the most important outlet for Louisiana rice growers.

Here consumption

is already large, and the low Income of the people makes price the chief
issue*

The retention of this market involves a careful maintenance of

tariff barriers against cheap Asiatic rice, and adaptation of quality to
the requirements of the population.

The stimulation of high quality de

mand is ineffective here, and advertising to increase consumption is un
necessary •

Policy should be directed toward making a cheap rice available

which suits consumer taste preference, as is now done through large sales
of mixed and broken rice.
If European markets are to be regained after the war, the chief
need will be a governmental policy favoring the restoration of free trade,

particularly the elimination of empire preference and self-sufficiency
programs.

The quality market in Europe offers a £table and profitable

outlet for American rice at a premium above world prices, and will be
particularly essential when American rice is pushed out of price markets
by Asiatic rice following the close of the present war.
Hie last market for American rice, perhaps the least desirable
but now the most essential, is Cuba.

Since Cuba is a price market,

American rice cannot be sold in great quantities at a premium above
Asiatic rice.

When Asiatic rice is available, it is doubtful if United

States rice could be sold in Cuba at all without a decided preferential
in tariff rates to create a competitive price situation.

Policy toward

Cuba, then, should be directed first of all toward the retention of
tariff preferential3 or the establishment of quotas favoring rice from
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the United States*

Second, efforts should be made in the United States

to produce rice for export to this price market of a variety appealing
to established taste preference, which means that most attention should
be given to the export of high-yielding, low-cost rice varieties.
ly, government aid in the establishment of a two—price system

Final
permit

ting the "dum] ing” of surplus stocks in Cuba may be essential if this
market is to be retained*

Separating Foreign and Domestic Demand

Rice production, an industry flourishing under tariff protection,
has peculiar problems in the disposal of its export, surplus*

The fact

that domestic demand is peculiarly inelastic, and. that an eager price
market for the export surplus lies immediately adjacent, affords an un
usual opportunity for the establishment of a "two-price11 system*

An al

lotment scheme which would limit th© quantity of rice placed on the
domestic market could effectively maintain desired prices on that portion
of the crop consumed in the United States*

i&cport surpluses could be dis

posed of at the best prices available, as far as possible in the quality
market of Burope, with the remainder in Cuba.

If total returns from, the

two-price system were considered incompatible with accepted standards
for the rice industry, returns could be increased readily by means of ex
port subsidies*

Since American production is too small to have an ap

preciable effect on world price, and since "dumping" will not invite
retaliation as Cuba is eager to obtain low-priced rice imports, the usual
hazards associated 'with "dumping" are not involved*
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The two-price system for rice is receiving wide support from
leaders in the southern rice industry,

A limited experience with a

form of export subsidy in 1935 led to gener 1 acceptance of the plan
throughout the industry.

Sxcept for the recent acquisition of the

Cuban market because of shipping difficulties on Asiatic rice, this
plan would probably be receiving increased attention at present.

Dis

cussion of this means of improvement of the export market, however, is
mar# properly included in the description anti analysis of government
programs contained in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI
GOViENkENT PROGRAMS IN THE RICE IiMDUSTRX

There have been a long series of crises in the production of
the great staple crops of the United States, during which farmers
throughout the country have united In efforts to secure government legis
lation favorable to raising farm product prices.

Agitation for cheap

money, for tariff protection, for marketing legislation., for export sub
sidies, and finally for outright treasury subsidies, has resulted from
this desire of fanners to improve their price and income situation by
legislative means.
Government price-raising measures designed to aid rice producers
have been among the most recent developments in American farm legislation.
Rice, through all the years until the decade of the 1920's, was a crop ex
panding into new and more profitable areas of production.

Production was

principally for the domestic market, and tariff protection was considered
as the principal requirement of the industry.

Even after an export sur

plus slowly accumulated from the pressure of increasing production, the
economic situation was such that price conditions remained relatively
favorable.
When various programs relative to wheat and cotton were debated
in Congress and throughout the country from 1921 to 1929, discussion con
cern in g rice was almost completely neglected.
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Although rice was an export
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cro p during th e s e years, such plans as the Mc^&ry-Haugen bills made no
re fe re n c e to raising the price of rice*

The culminating feature of

farm relief in the decade was the Marketing Act of 1929 establishing
th e Federal Farm Board*

This board engaged principally in stabilization

operations with the objective of improving grain and cotton prices by
more orderly marketing.

sharp decline*

By this time, th© price of rice had gone into a

Considerable effort and funds were expended by the Feder

al Farm Board in the establishment and promotion of cooperative marketing
among rice growers, since rice was included in th© general grain program*

In the disastrous price declines which followed the crash of 1929,
r ic e fa n n e rs suffered as severely as any other agricultural group*

The

December 1 l a m price of rice fell frora an average of £1.16 in the sevenyear period 1919-26 and 78 cents in 1930, to 42 cents a bushel in 1932,
w h ile the carryover rose from a normal of about ICO million pounds to

220 million pounds in 1932.^

The inability of the Federal Farm Board to

cope w ith such price fluctuations was soon demonstrated, since the causes
wsre f a r mors deep-seated than the inefficient marketing which the Board

was designed to remedy*

As the demoralized price structure created more

and more serious disturbance in the national economy, the pressure for
farm r e lie f culminated in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933*

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1^33

On May 12, 1933, the President approved the Agricultural Adjust-

^Edwin G* Nourse, Marketing Agreements Under the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration. Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1935, Chapter VI.
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sent Act*

This act was passed to relieve the economic emergency result

ing in the "severe and increasing disparity between the prices of agri
cultural and other commodities*11 The federal government was granted five
general powers under Section 8 in order to effectuate the policy of
Congress in establishing and maintaining a balance in the production and
an equality in the purchasing power of farm products*
These five powers of Section 8 included*

(1) a provision for re

duction in acreage or production of any basis agricultural commodity
through agreements between the Secretary of Agriculture and producers,
with rental and benefit payments made to the producers, (2) the Secretary
of Agriculture was empowered to enter into marketing agreements with pro
cessors, producers, and others engaged in handling agricultural commodi
ties in interstate or foreign commerce, (3) the issue of licenses was
permitted to enforce the marketing agreements provided above, (4) reports
on quantities and movements of agricultural products were made compulsory
on handlers, and (5) storage legislation was adopted to regulate the movemeat of agricultural produota.2
Rice was named in the original Agricultural Adjustment Act as one
of the basic farm commodities to which the provisions of the act were to
apply.

Since the number of growers Involved was relatively small, the

rice industry, although included in the legislation, did not appear
prominently in discussion on the measure, as did wheat, com, cotton, and
tobacco*

Discussion on rice was characterized by brief, effective argu-

5
H.
R* 3835, Agricultural Adjustment Act, No. 10, 73rd Congress,
approved May 12, 1933*
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menis, and by lack of opposition to the speakers, which was in sharp
contrast to the rambling testimony generally given In hearings on farm
l e gi s l a t i o n .

^

The inclusion of rice as a basic commodity was almost

wholly the result of organised pressure from the American Rice Growers
Cooperative Association*
In the hearing on the original Agricultural Adjustment Act, repre
sentatives of both the rice millers and the rice growers urged acreage re4
duction.
In testimony on other commodities, such as wheat, processors
were generally opposed to acreage reduction, in contrast to the attitude
of the rice millers*

Evidently the close relation of the rice milling and

rice growing industries In the South was responsible for this attitude,
since many millers were also Interestedin production*

In addition, the

millers recognized that profitable disposal of their large inventory
stocks required acreage restriction if prices were to be raised to a
profitable level*
After the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed, the immediate
problem in the rice industry appeared to be one of providing some means
for liquidating the abnormal carryover on as favorable terms as possible,
meanwhile making sure that acreage would not increase along with higher
prices.^

Acreage reductions had already proceeded so far by voluntary

reductions of the farmers between 1929 and 1933, that future aoreage re-

**See Hearings on H. R* 3635 before the Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry, United States Senate, 73**d Congress, 1st Session*
4
Ur* W. M. Reid represented therice millers and Mr* James
Broussard spoke for the rice growers.
5
Wourse, op. cit** p. 100.
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duotion was generally regarded as unnecessary.

Adoption of Marketing Agreement

Rioe, as one of the basic commodities in th© original Agricul
tural Adjustment Act, was eligible for the processing tax and production
control provisions as well as for the marketing agreement provisions.
For various reasons, however, the marketing agreement method was chosen
as the sole means of dealing with the commodity.

Among the reasons

given for the adoption of the marketing agreement plan were theses
1.

6

The California rice industry had considerable experience in volun
tary regulation and control between both growers and processors, and
the success of this control encouraged a wider attempt throughout
the industry.

2.

The Southern rice industry and the California industry are geographi
cally compact, the number of processors small, and the growers well
localized.

Therefore, like a specialty crop, it was thought that

all members of the industry could act together.
3.

Rice mil 1era and growers in California were already experimenting
with prioe-stabilization by subsidizing exports and their experience
indicated considerable success for the marketing agreement method of
raising price.

4.

Rice prices in 1933 were already rising toward parity as a result of
a short-crop prospect, together with the speculative enthusiasm an-

^Agricultural Adjustment in 1934. United States Department of
Agriculture. Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1935, p* 10.
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gendered by the inclusion of rice ao a basic camaodity.

Any proces

sing tax named would have to be small in amount, whereas conditions
pointed to a large crop in 1934 which would require heavy benefit
payments*
5*

Southern rice interests, particularly the growers, thought that prices
to the farmers could be increased by eradicating certain marketing
practices regarded as hamful to the producer*

A government agreement

to regulate the sale of rough rice was considered a means of eliminat
ing these practices*
6*

A marketing agreement as a means of adjustment was extremely attractive
to the government as it apparently avoided the levy of new taxes and
the administrative detail of compulsory control of production*
A marketing agreement for the Southern rice milling industry was

approved on October 16, 1933 wldch was thereafter effective, with amend
ments, to larch 6, 1934*

This agreement, No. 17* was superseded on March

6, 1934, by No. 39, which controlled the industry to April 1, 1935.

7

At

this time, the entire marketing agreement and licensing program was dis
carded in favor of the processing tax program.

Nature of the Southern Iiice Marketing Agreement

The first rice marketing agreement for the Southern rice industry

7
Mimeographed copies of No. 17 and No. 39 in the Marketing Agree
ment Series issued by the Agricultural Adjustment Adndnist ration are
available in the library of Louisiana State University* Much of the dis
cussion in this chapter is based on personal analysis of the application
of the provisions of the agreements to growers and millers in the Louisiana
rice industry*
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in 1933 w&s a voluntary plan in which the millers agreed to fix both
rough rice prices and clean rice prices at levels profitable to both
the farmers and the Killers.

Hie

farmers could be raised ©imply by

assumption was thatprice to the
getting the millers to agree to pay a

higher price for rough rice and to quote higher prices on clean rice.
In other words, the establishment

of a monopoly among the millers was

assumed to be a means whereby the growers could receive benefits. Bene-*
fits were not to be limited to growers, however, since th© monopoly
powers granted to millers were also to be used for their own benefit.
Obviously, the mills were interested in monopoly benefits for themselves
more than in improvement of the farm price of rough rice.

This fatal

flaw apparently escaped attention in the initial hearings concerning
the marketing agreement program, and the scheme was accepted by rice
farmers without much argument.
Informal conferences and hearings were held in Washington and in
i/sailfliAHA throughout the summer of 1933*

Although the Agricultural Ad

justment Act had been passed on fay 12, 1933* end regulation of several
crops began immediately, no attempt was made to adjust rice production
during the current crop year.

Finally, a fomul hearing was held on

September 5 and 6, 1933, et which substantial agreement concerning a
program was secured.

These hearings were largely controlled and attended

by the millers, who naturally engaged in a battle to seoure the largest
possible milllng allowance between th© prioes of rough and clean rice.
In order to settle this Issue, the government made an audit of several
Southern rice mills and secured data considered relevant to reasonable
milling charges.
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The marketing agreement was readily accepted by the miller1s
committee.

On September 29 all but three of the (southern rice millers

signed the agreement.

Two of these were the largest millers in the in

dustry who objected to some of the powers conferred on the tentative
miller's control committee.

These two millers later signed the agree

ment, however, so that all Southern iuills but one were registered in
accord with the agreement.
After approval by the Secretary of Agriculture, the agreement
became effective on October 16, 1933•

In order to enforce the regu

lations on all mills, a license essentially i d e n t i c i n its terms to
the marketing agreement became effective on October 17*

In addition,

under the National Industrial Recovery Administration, the Southern mil
lers also completed a code of fair competition which was approved by
the President on Itovember 21, 1933*

Besides covering hours, wages, and

general labor provisions, the National Recovery Administration code de
fined unfair methods of competition as including false advertising,
misbranding, producer standards, milling of rice not purchased by the
miller, rebates, and similar matters.

Under government sponsorship,

the rice milling industry was thus organized in a rigidly monopolistic
manner.
Neither grower representation nor crop regulation was provided
in the 1933 marketing agreement.

The object of this plan was to raise

rice prices sheerly by the establishment of monopoly in the milling in
dustry, with government sanction and even a government license to en
force monopoly regulations on non-cooperative millers.

A control com

mittee of seven members was to be elected by th® millers, with three
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members from Louisiana, two from Arkansas, and two from Texas •

The

method of voting was weighted by the volume of rough rice milled by
each mill.

The duties of the committee were to supervise th© perfor

mance of the agreement, to administer the marketing fund to be estate
lished, and to dispose of all disputes arising from th© agreement.
On rough rice purchases, the agreement provided that all pur*
chases should be in units of barrels or bushels, with purchase of rice
"round" being prohibited.

Linimum prices were to be fixed for rough

rice by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the miller's committee com
puting iiinifflnm price discounts and premiums for the various grades as
related to the fixed price for each variety.

All controversies con

cerning variety or grade of rough rice were to be settled by a FederalState Grading Office, vlth the Qxpense of sampling and grading to be
borne by the loser to the controversy.
No miller wxs to sell clean rice for domestic consumption at a
price less than the replacement cost of the rough rice plus the cost of
conversion, the actual cost of the container, and a marketing fund
charge.
rice.

Cost of conversion was set at 70 cents per barrel of rough
All terms for domestic sales were outlined and specified.

Brokerage charges for selling were to be uniform for all mills at eight
cents per 100 pounds of clean rice.

The marketing fund assessment was

ten cents for each barrel of rough rice, which was to be used by the
control co^imittee in administering the agreement and in the general inter
ests of the rice industry.

Since all these various processing costs were

specified, the net effeot was the fixing of a clean rice price.

The fact

that inbound rough rice transportation costs were ignored later caused
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serious difficulties in maintaining these prices.
Broad powers were granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and to
the Control Committee in investigating the accounts and affairs of any
mill.

Violations could be punished by damages and fines, and a licensing

plan was agreed upon.
This agreement, after being signed by 35 millers in th© southern
states, controlled the industry during the winter of 1933-34.

By the

time it went into effect, the heavy marketing season for rice was already
in progress.

The 70 cent conversion charge for rice was immediately de

clared along with a complete system of premiums and discounts for rough
rice of the various grades and varieties.

In order to enforce the agree

ment, the license was immediately established covering the same provisions
as the marketing agreement.
Minimum prices established by the Secret&xy of Agriculture ef

fective October 16, 1933, in accordance with the marketing agreement,
represented substantial increases in the price of rough rice in the South.
These prices, based on a barrel of 162 pounds of grade one prime milling
quality rough rice, were as follows:

Early Prolific $2.751 Japan 02*85>

Blue Rose $3.15; Lady bright $3.15; Edith $3.40; Fortune 13.45; and
Rexoro $3*50.

Elaborate systems of premiums and discounts according to

grading factors were provided.
This schedule of prices raised average rough prices for most of
the 1933 crop.

Extra fancy Blue Rose clean rice at New Orleans averaged

$2.25 in 1932-33 while in 1933-34 the average price was 03.85 per 100
pounds.

The average farm price for all grades and varieties of the

1933-34 crop was 78 cents a bushel, or nearly twice as much as the 1932-33

2X6

farm price«

Although other factors, particularly previous acreage re

ductions, encouraged the price rise in 1933-34, the agreement evidently
had a marked short-run effect in increasing the price to farmers*

To

the extent that the high conversion charge plus the high rough price de
creased clean rioe sales, however, the actual benefits of the program
cannot be ascertained, from the price data*

iiicport sales declined pre

cipitously, and a large carryover accentuated the surpluses from former
crops*

The Revised Marketing Agreement

As soon as the marketing agreement creating monopolistic control
in the milling industry was completed and fixed prices were established
for the 1933 crop? attention was directed to a production control plan
for 1934*

It was evident that the 1933 marketing agreement did nothing

toward disposal of the surplus, and some provision was necessary to con
trol acreage near the 1933 level in order to restrain expansion resulting
from the higher prices.

Local meetings of growers were held throughout

the southern rice area, and it was agreed that an acreage cut of 20 per
cant should be sought*

Individual grower allotments were to be made on

the basis of production during the preceding five-year period*

This

plan was discussed in hearings at Shreveport on January 22, 1934, and was
approved by the millers*
The original design was to add this crop control provision as an
amendment to the existing marketing agreement.

Through an administrative

slip, however, the old agreement was terminated and the amended form be
came a new agreement, Humber 39, when it was approved by the Secretary of
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Agriculture to become effective on March 6, 1934*

According to Nourse,

this created new difficulties, since several jolliers took this oppor
tunity to escape from the agreement by refusing to sign th© new agree*ment.

Already, after five months under the marketing agreement, indi

vidual mills were becoming dissatisfied with high prices but no sales,
and the competitive aspects of the milling industry were breaking through
the surface.

In addition, widespread dissatisfaction with the control

committee's administration of the terms on which the mills were forced to
purchase rough rice was becoming prevalent.
The minimum prices for number one grade prime A milling quality
rough rice were continued as in the previous agreement.

However, more

stringent provisions were enunciated to enforce these minimum prices.
The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to prescribe compulsory
grading Of rough rice and to prohibit s les of rough rice except on the
basis of certificates, and to require that all rough rice be weighed by
a licensed or bonded weigher.
pulation

Still further, in order to prevent mani

of the minimum prices through successive sellers, stringent

regulations were adopted to enforce direct dealing between the mills and
the growers.

These stipulations were necessary in order to sustain the

minimi™ price regulations, which could easily be evaded if grades or
weights were handled loosely.
More specific regulations concerning the minimum sale prices
for clean rice also were necessary to enforce the spirit of the marketing

®Nourse, op, cit,. p. 111.
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agreement.

The minimum domestic sale price was to be not less than the

sum of the minimum rough rioe price, the conversion charge, the published
car lot rail rate for rough rice from the customary farm delivery point,
and the administrative assessment on the volume of rice milled.

A maxi**

mum discount of 20 per cent was permitted on sales of rice for export to
foreign countries.

The conversion charge was expressly defined as (a)

70 cents per barrel of rough rice, (b) 9 cents per barrel of rough rice
if standard one-hundred pound single packages are used for the clean rice,
and (c) if cotton or paper inner linings or regular burlap outer slips
are used for the clean rice, an additional 5 cents per barrel of rough
rice, or (d) if any other type of container is used for the clean rice,
the actual invoice price for the container used.
Since the use of the marketing assessment for purposes other
than administration of the agreement had been previously attacked, the
administrative assessment in the new agreement was reduced to 5 cents
per barrel of rough rice milled, and was separated from any connection
with marketing funds.

In addition, a marketing assessment could be es

tablished by the Killers Committee of 5 cents a barrel of rough rice, and
this fund could be used for industry purposes.
It will be noted that the total milling spread under the conversion
charge provisions would be 84 cents, not including the marketing assess
ment and freight on inbound rough rice.

The fact that this charge was

far above the usual 60 cent per barrel total milling spread found in the
clean rice market under competitive conditions clearly indicates the tre
mendous difficulty of sustaining the monopolistic agreement in the face of
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Idle capacity, surplus stocks, and competitive buying and selling policies.
The most significant feature of this second marketing agreement,
however, was the provision for cro

control.

In order to provide funds

to be paid to producers who cooperated in any crop control program, the
contracting millers agreed to establish a trust fund.

This was to be

done by making two payments on rough rice purchased from the 1934 crop—
first, a payment of 60 per cent of the price to the owner of the rice,
and second, a payment of the remaining 10 per cent to the Secretary of
Agriculture.
The Secretary was then to determine the total quantity of rice
which should be produced in each of the states, and to fix acreage allot
ments and production quotas for all farmers submitting applications.
Each producer who limited his planted acreage to his allotment was to
receive payments from the Secretary from the trust fund for rough rice
sold within his production quota.

Total payments could not exceed the

total sum paid to the Secretary during the crop year, less the expense
of administration.

That is, a producer furnishing satisfactory evidence

that he had limited his planted acreage to the allotment assigned him,
would receive a payment at the end of the crop year equivalent to the
40 per cent of the price withheld by the mill, less a share of the ex
penses incurred in carrying out the program.
In carrying out the provisions of the new marketing agreement,
the former Control Committee was continued as the Miller Committee.
addition, a Millers Advisory Council was established.
mittee of seven members was likewise established.

In

A Producers Com

Provision was made

that al 1 questions, disputes, and complaints concerning the interest of
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both producers and millers were to be decided by the Producers Committee
and the Millers Committee, acting jointly by majority vote of each com
mittee.
Most of these latter provisions were inserted in the agreement as
an amendment on July 21, 1934, when the agreement was revised into a much
more detailed and orderly document.

Although the entire agreement was

largely rewritten, it was substituted as an amendment and new signatures
were not necessary.

The accompanying license was also revised, providing

for the same actions as the marketing agreement, but with one vital differ

ence,

The provision for crop control could not be included in the license,

since it was accepted only voluntarily by the mills signing the marketing
agreement.

This fact was of vital importance in contributing toward the

breakdown of the crop control scheme.
By the time the 1934 crop began to be marketed heavily, the high
conversion charge was breaking down the minimum price established for
both rough and clean rice.

Two important amendments to the marketing

agreements and license were therefore made effective on October 15, 1934*
The first amendment decreased the conversion charge sharply, with the
provision that "the conversion charge per barrel of rough rice shall--be an amount equal to fifty (50 ) cents per barrel of rough rice and shall
not be increased by adding to such amount any cost or other amount on ac
count of containers of any description."

This decrease of 29 cents in the

conversion charge wrs a confession of grave error in the establishment of
the original conversion allowance.
The benefits of the decreased conversion allowance were to be
passed to the growers, since it was desired to continue clean rice prices
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at approximately the same levels*

The prices of the different varieties

of rough rice were therefore raised from 15 cents to 20 cents per barrel.
Minimum rough rice prices after the amendment were:

Early Prolific $2.90;

Shoemed $2.90; Japan $3*00; Blue Bose Type Prolific $3.10; Louisiana Pearl
$3.15; Blue Rose $3.30; Lady Wright $3*30; Early Wright $3.30; Edith $3.60;
Stormproof $3*60; Fortuna $3.65; Nira $3.65; and Rexoro $3.70.
Difficulties were numerous in maintaining this marketing agreement.
Repeated amendments were made, but finally the provisions broke down so
completely that on December 21, 1934, enforcement was practically abandoned
and the government and the industry gave up their experimentation with the
marketing agreement method of securing benefits for rice farmers.

Factors Causing Abandonment of Marketing Agreements

Although the price-maintenance clauses of the first marketing
agreement operating in the winter of 1933-34 had already led to diffi
culties, these troubles were only minor as compared to those experienced
when the crop control provision was included after the spring of 1 9 3 4 .
The provision for withholding 40 per cent of the purchase price of rough
rice was virtually impossible to maintain.

Only the mills which signed

the second agreement were bound by the plan, leaving several of the es
tablished important mills free to pay the full price upon buying rice
fro® the grower.

The license could be used to enforce minimum price

schedules and trade practices on all mills, but coild not legally be ap
plied to the crop control provision.
As a result, the mills which could pay the full price immediately
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upon delivery had an advantage in buying rice and expanded their opera
tions at the expense of other mills*

In addition, a large number of new

will* sprang up to take advantage of this situation, some of them spon
sored by farmers*

These were principally small huller mills not capable

of producing a polished white rice as attractive as the product of the
large mills*

However, their rice co ld be sold readily in local terri

tory, where consumption is high, and on a price discount basis, began to
reach into more distant territories*

Since the investment in most of

these mills was considerably less than #5,000, they were able to multiply
rapidly within one year*

Many small enterprises, such as feed mills and

grocery stores, added simple huller equipment to their business at a
cost of only a few hundred dollars and began competing for local clean
rice sales*
In addition, growing conditions in the area had been favorable
and growers did not comply altogether with the production allotments*
Over-quota rice was available which the growers were anxious to sell
below the

nim^m schedules*

Pressure on both the mills and the growers

led them to violate the marketing agreement provisions in order to pro
tect their own operations.
The most obvious means of evading the minimum price regulations
was by designating the rice as a lower grade than justified by its true
character*

Trds situation was met by an administrative order requiring

ccopulsory grading of el3 rough rice under the inspection service of the
United States Bureau of Agricultural Economics, effective August 20,
1934*

However, the compulsory grading by no means solved the problem,

but instead became one of the greatest sources of irritation in the
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entire program.

The Inspection service was hastily set up, and inexperi

enced men were necessarily hired as graders.

Rough rice grades had never

been commonly used, and were by no means generally accepted as measures
of rough rice quality with either growers or millers.

Probably most

serious was the fact that the mills were required to pay the grading fee,
and therefore directed their rice to graders who they believed might give
them favorable treatment.

Finally, a grade depends on the sample drawn,

and all sorts of manipulation were possible in drawing a sample that would
permit evasion of the minimum price regulation.
Faraers frequently combined with millers to defeat the minimum
price regulations.

This was particularly true in the latter part of the

1934 season, when the breakdown of the marketing agreement was becoming

increasingly evident.

Mills hesitated to buy rough rice for fear that

the high price could not be sustained much longer.

As a result, many

farmers could find no market at all for their rice, and a large carryover
was accumulating in fanner’s hands.

In order to dispose of rice at all,

frequently it was essential that the faraor aid a mill to purchase his
rice well below the minimum price prescription.
Pressure from growers who had planted above their allotments
also became so insistent in the summer of 1934 that on July 23, permis
sion was granted growers for a 5 per cent leeway in planting above their
allotments.

This concession being unsatisfactory, a ruling on August 27

permitted growers to harvest all their acreage with only a small penalty
in adjustment payments for acreage more than 5 per cent above their
allotment.

Later, an administrative order on September 17 dispensed with
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th8 check-off method of payment for all rough rice within a grower*a
quota, so that thereafter farmers received the full 100 per cent of th®
has® price on practically all rice sold.

Additional adjustments on

grades and discounts wei^e made on September 26,
The reduction of the conversion charge on October 15 appeared to
be as severe as the previous charge had been liberal.

This factor, com

bined with the competition of huller mills, general acceptance of ille
gitimate buying practices, and breakdown of the restricted payment crop
control plan, brought widespread demand from both millers and growers that
the crop control plan be abandoned.

On December 21, 1934, full payments

were authorised for all rice and the marketing agreement was discontinued.
In less than a year of operation th® plan had proved a hopeless failure as
a means of affording permanent farm relief through higher prices and con
trol of acreage expansion.
Competition with cheap rice also presented a difficult problem
under the marketing agreement.

When the program was instituted rice

could be shipped into the United States from the Philippines duty free,
although practically none had been so shipped up to that time.

The

marketing agreements and licenses raised the prices of rice in this coun
try well above world levels, and as a result the United States became an

9

attractive market for Asiatic rice moving from the Philippines,'

Exports

also decreased considerably because of the high fixed prices, so that the
problem of carryover was aggravated by market losses as well as by increased

9
Agricultural Adjustment, 1933 to 1935, United States Department
of Agriculture, Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1936, p, 239*
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production Tor American producers.
The marketing agreement plan for the rice industry presents one
of the most interesting oases among the attempts to enforce monopolistic
practices in the early days of the New Deal.

The failure of the program

for the rice industry emphasised the difficulty of enforcing monopolistic
practices in an industry with a fairly standardized product and with free
entry* clarified the fallacies of price-fixing without control of supply
or attention to export demand, and made rice grow rs aware that basic
economic difficulties in their industry could not be settled by a simple
piece of price legislation.
An effective marketing agreement would have required that all
mills combined in supporting the agreement, that free entry into th©
milling industry be prohibited, that the fixed price be adjusted to a
level calculated to move all rice into consumption, that export price
concessions be made, that acreage control be rigidly Ktaintained, that
grading standards for both rough and clean rice be generally accepted,
and that each m i n be allotted a definite share of the clean rice sales
quota for each year.

These conditions were far from satisfied in the

1933-34 plan; consequently, failure of the scheme was inevitable.

Amendment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act

When the failure of the marketing agreement became evident in
the fall of 1934* efforts were immediately centered on the formulation
of a processing tax and production control program similar to th© pro
grams previously established for wheat and cotton.

Although the

original Agricultural Adjustment act of 1933 provided such a program for
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rice, new legislation was necessary to provide for certain special phases
of the rice situation*

Accordingly, a bill to amend the Agricultural Ad

justment Act was introduced on February 1, 1935 in the House of Representatives, and was approved by the President on March 13, 193$.

10

This bill directed the Secretary of Agriculture to declare before
April 1, 1935, that rental or benefit payments were to be jaade for rice,
and that a processing tax would be in effect after that date.

From April

1, 1935 to July 31, 1936, the processing tax was established at the rate
of (me cent per pound of rough rice, the weight being taken when delivered
to the processor.
Although the DeRouen rice amendment provided for a processing tax
on rough rice at the rate of one cent per pound, it also provided for the
elimination of the floor-stocks tax on clean rice and the issuance of taxpayaent warrants to be used to pay the rough-rlce tax on rice from the 1933
and 1934 crops which had been purchased in accordance with the marketing
agreements and licenses, or which remained in the hands of growers.

The

special legislation providing for the removal of the floor-stocks processing tax and the issuance of tax payment warrants was necessary to avoid
penalizing millers and growers who had purchased or hold rice under th©
marketing agreement program.

11

As soon as the marketing agreement was

completely abandoned, rice prices were ejected to fr.ll to the disadvan
tage of those millers and farmers who held inventories at values previously

*°H. E. $221, No. 20, 74th Congress, approved March 13, 1935.
Hereafter referred to as the DeRouen rice amendment.

11
See hearings in Congressional Record, house Vol. 79, Part 3#
74th Congress, 1st session, 1935, pp. 2631-2637.
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established.

It is estimated that about four million bags of rice were

held by growers in the southern states because the mills would not buy
under the speculative risk of a change in the program.^
Indirectly the issuance of the tax-payment warrants to holders of
rough rice acted as an export subsidy and promoted a marked rise in exports
during 1935*

Since the federal government refunded the processing tax on

xioe exported, the tax-payment warrants could be cashed

the mills for

rice exported, but not for rice sold in the domestic market.

This tax-

payment warrant provision was effective only until August 1, 1935 , when
new crop rice entered themarket.

Frau April to August these warrants

acted as an export subsidy of one cent per pound of rough rice, or ap
proximately $1*45 per pocket of 100 pounds.^
Under the new program, acreage allotments were assigned to the
states by the Secretary of Agriculture, and distributed to the indivi
dual growers on the basis of the grower's experience during the base
period.

These allotments were about 20 per cent smaller than the aver

age seeded acreage in the

pre-warbase period of

1909-14*Under th©

contracts accepted by th©cooperating growers, a producer who planted
between 85 to 100 per cent of his allotment received a first adjustment
payment of 1/2 cent per pound on 85 per cent of his production quota.
This payment amounted to 81 cents per barrel.

In addition, a second pay

ment was later del ©mined at the rate of A0.5 cents per barrel.

These

^Ibid, p. 2632.
^Brief of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association and
Rice l&llers Association before the Committee for Reciprocity Information,
United States Tariff Coxximission, December 19, 1938*
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peymeiibs w are fin a n c e d b y the processing tax of one cent a pound, or $1*62
a b a r r e l, paid by the millers.

Total first benefit payments distributed

in 1935 to r ic e grow ers in the southern area were estimated at $5,157,OCX),
w ith additional second payments bringing the total to $7,663,357.

Rice

p ric e s dropped sharply from the fixed price of 1934 when the marketing
agreement was abandoned, but rose rapidly in the latter months of 1935
a f t e r the initial effect of the change disappeared*

The average price of

70 cen ts a bushel in December, 1935, was only 8 cents below the average
p ric e in December, 1934, and in addition the growers received substantial
b e n e fit payments*

Incidence of the Processing Tax on Rice

The weight of evidence indicates conclusively that the processing
ta x on the 1935 rice crop was borne almost entirely by the farmers through

lower prices for their rice*^

According to the Bureau of Agricultural

Economics, the average spread between the price of rough rice in the
southern states and the wholesale value of equivalent milled rice products
a t Hew Orleans was $1*16 per barrel from August 1933 to July 1935*^

The

spread during the period, September to December 1935, when the processing
ta x was in effect, was $2*51.

The difference between these two average

spreads was $1*35, compared with the tax of §>1*62 a barrel*

In the six

months following the removal of the tax, the average spread was $1.29.

•^An Analysis of the Effects of the Processing Taxes Levied Under
th e Agricultural Adjustment Act. United States Treasury Department, 1937,

pp. 54-59.
Ibid. p. 56.
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M oreover, if data ware available making it possible to allow for

the fact that not all of the rice milled during the period of the tax was
purchased concurrently, it is estimated that the figures would demonstrate
th a t none of the tax was absorbed by the processors*^

A comparison of

retail and wholesale prices of rice does not suggest that any appreciable
portion of the processing tax was passed on to the consumers, since the
retail price at New York increased only from 8*7 to 8*9 cents per pound
in 1935.

It follows that the processing tax was in effect a deduction

from the price which would have been received by producers if the tax had

17

not been in effect. '
Bice farmers therefore did not gain from benefit payments financed
by the processing tax*

They did gain, however, from the use of the pro

cessing tax to achieve acreage control and to finance an export subsidy
which relieved the pressure of accumulated rice stocks*

Largely because

of these latter reasons, the processing tax program was widely acclaimed
as a success by both growers and millers*

Little opposition developed,

and plans were under way to continue the same type of program in future
years*

The production adjustment program developed for 1936, however,

was not put into effect, since production adjustment programs involving
processing taxes were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
the Hoosac Mills decision of January 6, 1936*
It has been argued that the incidence of the processing tax on
rice can not be fairly ascertained from this brief experience in 1935*

16

Ibid*

17Ibid* p. 59.
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A la TgB surplus of rice depressed the price at the inception of the tax
program, and unusually low prices on rough rice were necessary to move
the surplus rapidly into export markets#

By the time the tax was de

clared unconstitutional, the surplus h^d been largely eliminated and the
spread between rough rice price and clean rice price was rapidly narrow
ing •

Under conditions when no surplus existed, it is theoretically pro

bable that a considerable portion of a processing tax would be shifted
to consumers, since demand for rice is relatively inelastic.

Agricultural Conservation in 1936

On February 29, 1936, less than two months after the Supreme
Court decision invalidating the processing tax, Congress passed the Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act to replace the invalidated portions
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

IS

After provision of funds, the new

soil-conservatlon program authorized by the law was launched on March 20,
1936.

Marketing agreements were not affected by the court decision, but

the processing tax feature of the successful rice program of 1935 had to
be discarded.
Under the soil conservation program of 1936, payments were made
for practices designed to conserve soil resources.

These practices in

cluded reduction in acreage of soil-depleting crops, of which rice was
declared to be one.

The base acreage for rice as a soil-depleting crop

was established by the methods similar to those used in the previous pro-

^ 3 . 3780, Mo. 461, 74th Congress, approved February 29, 1936.

233

taction control program.

Under the general rules of the soil conservation

program, a farmer could qualify for soil-building payments up to on© dollar
per acre by seeding soil-building crops or adopting soil-building practices.
A second type of soil-conserving payment was also made for acreage diverted

f r o m rice.

To qualify for payment it was required that an acreage not less

than 20 per cent of the base rice acreage be devoted to soil-improving
crops, while not less than 65 per cent of the base must be planted to rice
in order to qualify.

The rate of payment was 20 cents for each 100 pounds

of the producer *s domestic consumption quota.
The base rice acreage for any farmer for 1936 was the annual aver
age rice acreage grown in the years 1929-1933, inclusive, as allocated
among the farmers participating in rice production in 1936.

Contracts were

not employed, payments being disbursed when it was established that the
grower had satisfied prescribed conditions.

All payments were financed

direct from the federal treasury.
A similar program for rice was carried on during 1937, except for
changes designed to increase flexibility and make use of the payments more
effectively.

Payments were made to rice producers in 1937 at the rate of

22 cents per 100 pounds of their domestic consumption quota, provided that
th e y planted between 85 to 100 per cent of their rice base acreage and

provided further that they had an acreage of soil-conserving crops on the
rice land equal to 25 per cent of their rice base acreage.

If a producer

planted less than 35 per cent or more than 100 per cent of his rice base
acreage or if he did not have the 25 per cent soil-conserving acreage,
certain deductions were provided.

In addition, payments were continued
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for carrying out specified soil-building practices, with rates stated
in appropriate units for work done*
This soil-oonserv&tion program was not successful in controlling
the acreage planted to major crops, including rice*

In response to a

general demand for more effective regulation for achieving production
control, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was enacted on February
16, 1938.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 strengthened and con
tinued the agricultural conservation programs of 1936 and 1937, with
payments provided for farmers adopting specified soil conservation
practices*

19

In addition, the act supplemented the conservation program

with provisions for regulating interstate and foreign commerce in the
five commodities listed in the act— cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and
rice.
In general, the act provided acreage control for rice by em
powering the Secretary to declare national acreage allotments and make
payments to cooperating growers.

Marketing quotas backed by penalties

on sales in excess of the quotas could also be used, subject to ap
proval of two-thirds of the producers voting, to obtain general parti
cipation in a program designed to hold surplus supplies off the market.
Commodity loans on the major commodities could also be declared In
order to permit storage and sustain price.

R. 8505, No. 430, 75th Congress, 3d Session, approved
February 16, 1938.
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The act afforded to ric© famers five types of income protections
(X) payments for cooperation in the s 1 1 conservation program, (2 ) "parity"
payments if funds were made available by Congress, (3 ) price rises result
ing from curtailment of acreage, (4 ) marketing quotas, which if adopted
could control the supply placed on the market even after heavy production,
and (5) the authorization of storage loans to maintain price.

The market

ing quotas and commodity loans could become effective only when supplies
exceed normal by amounts definitely specified, and then only when approved
in a producer's referendum.
Under the 1938 act, the Secretary of Agriculture was required to
d e te n d n e each year, before December 31# the national and state acreage

allotments for rice and the allotments to be in effect for the following
crop year*

The national acreage allotment was to be that acreage which,

a t the average yield of th e preceding 3 years, would produce a normal
y e a r* 8 domestic consumption and exports of rice, plus 10 per cent as a
c a rry o v e r.

The national allotment was distributed by the Secretary among
the rice-producing states on the basis of their previous acreages.

In

each state, the state allotment was distributed through local and county
committees among rice growers, 3 per cent of each state allotment being
reserved to be distributed among new producers*

The distribution of al

lotments among producers was based upon production, crop-rotation practices,
soil fertility, and other physical factors affecting the production of the
crop.
In addition to the acreage allotment the act required the Secretary
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to establish and proclaim the total amount of rice which would he needed
during the next marketing year to meet the requirements of consumers in
the United States*

This domestic allotment was then apportioned among

states in proportion to the average production of a five-year period, and
the state allotments among growers on the basis of the yields of their
acreage allotments.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193® prohibited the application
of marketing quotas to rice in the marketing year beginning August 1, 193®.
It provided that in later years, if the total available supply of rice ex
ceeded by more than 10 per cent the normal supply, which was a normal
year’s domestic consumption and exports plus 10 per cent, that fact should
be proclaimed and a national marketing quota, subject to a referendum of
growers, would be in effect during the following marketing year.

This

national quota would be apportioned among producers on the same basis of
production on which the domestic allotment of rice would be apportioned
among them.

Rice producers marketing rice in excess of their quotas

would be subject to a penalty of 0*25 cent for each pound so marketed.
The only portions of this program which have been applied to rice
growers are the acreage allotments, conservation payments, and parity
payments*
and

Referendums on marketing quotas were held on both the 1939

1940 crops, but were refused by the growers both times*

Ho referendum

was necessary on the 1941 crop, since supply was below the normal supply
plus

10 per cent as specified in the act*

Up to the fall of 1941* the

loan program has not yet been utilized for rice.

Ho loans could b© of

fered unless supplies reach levels at which, the application of marketing
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quotas is authorized, and only if the marketing quota had been accepted
by a favorable vote of the producers*20

Recapitulation

The experience of rice growers in the southern area under federal
farm legislation may now be briefly summarized*

Previous to 1933* rice

as a crop received little attention in specific farm legislation*

Although

it was Included in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933* no attempt was
made at a program to control the crop of that year*

However* from October*

1933 to March* 1934 a marketing agreement fixed prices of both rough and
clean rice*

This agreement was modified and continued in March* 1934 with

the addition of crop control provisions*

During the summer and fall the

plan broke down* and enforcement was abandoned on December 21* 1934*
In April, 1935 a crop control plan embodying a processing tax on
rice went into operation*

This plan operated with considerable success

until the supreme court decision in January* 1936 outlawed

all proces

sing tax plans as unconstitutional*
For the crop years 1936 and 1937 the rice growers received pay
ments for participation in the soil conservation program* which* however*
did not afford effective crop control*

In 1938* this act was revised by

the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 affording more effective crop
control and permitting the establishment of marketing quotas*

Marketing

quotas were rejected in referendums by the growers* and the Agricultural

In May* 1941* the President approved & bill making loans at 85
per cent of the 1910-14 parity mandatory on basic agricultural commodities*
including rice. At the time of passage* rice was selling above the parity
price* On October 3, 1941, the loan program for rice was declared and
provisions were made for its operation.
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Adjustment Act program in 1938 * 1939> and 1940 has functioned on practi
cally the same plan throughout*
t

Kffect of the Rice Programs

The avowed objective of agricultural adjustment legislation for
the rice industry has been to raise the price of rough rice to “parity, *
which was defined as a purchasing power equivalent to that enjoyed in
the base period 1910-14*

To achieve this, it was necessary to raise

actual prices by reducing supplies either through acreage control or
through elimination of abnormal annual carryovers*

The only other method

of raising price would be to increase the demand for rice, but the Agri
cultural Adjustment Act was designed to attack the problem only from the
supply side*

Since both production and annual carryover increased after

1933, when government restrictions were first established, it is at
once evident that the only long time force which has raised the price of
rice must be the improvement in demand conditions, a factor independent
of government policies affecting the supply of rice*
In the 1932-33 crop year, the average price received by rice
fazmers in the United States bordered on 40 per cent of the parity price*
The marketing agreement in 1933 was effective in raising the farm price
from less than 40 cents to 79 cents a bushel, or to 78 per cent of the
parity price at that time.

However, as previously described, raising

the price of rice by price fixing did little toward eliminating the de

pressing influence of large crops and surplus supplies*

Carryover from

the 1932 crop in the southern states was equivalent to 1,613,000 barrels
of rough rice, and 1,468,000 barrels of the 1933 crop was still on the
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market when the 193A crop was harvested.

Obviously this maintenance of

a large carryover aggravated the price problem from the aspect of supply.
Grower cooperation restrained rice acreage expansion to some extent under
the marketing agre ment, since the 1934 crop was the smallest in a decade.
The net result of the marketing agreement program of adjustment, however,
was that it gave growers a temporarily high price, but did nothing toward
permanent price adjustment.
Most of the 1935 crop was marketed under the processing tax pro
vision which replaced the marketing agreement.

The average price re

c e iv e d by Louisiana farmers for this crop fell below 70 per cent of the

parity price, but payments approaching
ceipts close to the parity level.

ne cent per pound brought net re

The stimulation to exports resulting

from the issuance of tax payment warrants on carryover rice resulted in a
great reduction in the carryover, from 1,46# million barrels in the summer
of 1934 to 423 million barrels in the summer of 1935*

This vast reduction

in carryover resulted in a small total supply of rice in 1936.

As a result,

average price for the 1936 crop rose to as high as 86 per cent of parity,
the highest level attained until the war boom of 1940-41*
Because of the expansion in production, the total purchasing power
value of the United States rice crop has been greater since 1936 than the
average for the decade 1921-1930.

Government payments ranging from 1-1/2

to 2-1/2 million dollars have increased this purchasing power still further,
as i s evident in Table X X X III.

Since the number of rice growers has not

increased materially, the increased cro;. value created a relatively favor
a b le income position for rice growers in the past few years, which has been
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Tibi* XXXIII.Prices received by farmers for rice expressed as a percentage of
the 1910-14 parity price, by months, United States, 1930-41*

Crop y e a r

beairniina
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935

Aug.
If

Sep.

If

Oct.

Nov.

15

15

72

67

64

63

52
43

46

46
39

52

66
73
70

73
72

75

62

67

1936

82

86

1937
1938
1939
1940
1941.

67
61

59
58

58
72

79
60

75
67
62
72
61

Sourcet

43

77

39
78
75
70
74
70
64

73
70

Dec.
15

Jan.

Feb.

if

lif

61
53
40
75
72
73
71
63
65
69
73

63
53
40
78

66
50
40
78
73
79
83

77
78
78
63
65
70
84

62
64

67
93

Mar.
15

Apr.
15

May
1?

June 'July

if

if

66
49
44
78
75
80
83
58
62
61
93

67
45
49
78

66
45
59
75
78
83
79
53
61
68
109

66
45
63
74
81
84
75
57
60
70
107

65
43
63
72
80
83
72
60
59
73
102

76
80
83
53
60

61
106

Hidmonth Local Market Price Report, Agricultural Marketing Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, mimeographed release, June
3 0 , 1941, p. 17.

9U.S

Average
price
per bu.
to
farmer
Cent*

9.653
2,592
2.771
1,909
1.536

U0.132
i*i*,159

1,000

51,826

39.583
50,691
1*3.915
1*3,781*

38.568

127

107
107

9U
97
12U

68
61
9U

97
96
98
96

107
116
11U

**3.651*
>*7.589
>*6,581
39.621
39.167
39.873
39.127
27.71*6
2U.880
38,**gl*

36.615

91
96
90

52,119
53.852
U7.379
U6 .26U
53.795

dollar*

182

132
116
113

128

Index of purchasing power of:
Crop value plus
Crop value*
payment*

37.239
39.077

dollar*

1,000

Purchasing power of i
Crop value
Orop value plus payment*

2 Preliminary*
Source: Compiled from government data by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division.

37.903
35.623
1*1,960

100
103
103
102
102
102

36.615
*5.93*
1*9,017
**7.513
1*0 ,1*13
39.950
39,**7**
35.21**
21,61*2
17,1*16
29.2U8
30.851*
30,1*79
**1.567
35.132
33.71**
1*0,1*21*
99
90
78
70
76
80
77
82
80
77
78

99

100

Index of
prioee
farmer*
pay*

38.686

37.239

1,000
dollar*

1,000
dollar*

1,000

Payments

Value
plue
payment*

Price, farm value, payments, and purohasing power of value of rough rloe In the
United State*, 1921-22 to date.

dollars

Pam
value

1 1921- 1930* * 00•

92.9
1923 110.2
192U 13U.6
1925 lUs.U
1926 113*1
1927 90.8
192S 91.1
1929 99*s
1930 78.U
US.5
1931
*932 Ul.S
1933 77*7
193U 79*0
1935 77*3
1936 S3-U
1937 65.8
193S 6U.2
1939P 77*3
19U0

1922

1921

Crop
yoar

fable XXXIV.

1 8 ,3 2 2 .6

1 1 ,1*8 8 .7

10,633.4
9 .8 7 8 .8
1 0 ,9 2 6 .2
11,018.0
1 1 ,0 0 7 .5
9,631.7
10,021.4
9.326.1
U. 7 1 0
13.724.6
13,316.5
1 U.12 U.P
1 U.02 S .2

3 6 1 .0

6 1 5 .6
6 OO .3

286.3
118.9
314.6
174.8
4l6.2

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

2,400.4

2,606.7
2 ,5 3 0 .0
2,326.4
2 ,5 0 0 .0
2,491.1

2 ,0 5 5 .6

2,293.3

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

California
Carry-over,
Crop
rough and
milled*

2 .7 6 1 .U

2 .5 7 9 .6
2,171*.5
2,921.3
2,704.8
2,742.6
3.115.6
3.091.4

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

Total
-suppixr

1.565.3

1.754.7
541.7
800.7
1 ,6 0 3 .8
1,1*74.1
2 ,3 1 6 .0
2.465.7

barrel■

1 ,0 0 0

Oarrjr-or.r

13.51S.7

10,846.3
10,958.9
1 3 .8 3 8 .9
14,825.6
14,5 8 5 .0
14,922.8
lU.6 5 3 .9

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

Crop

Unit.A State*

15,084.0

14.639.7
16,429.4
16,059.1
1 7 ,2 3 8 .8
17,119.6

1 2 ,6 0 1 .0
1 1 ,5 0 0 .6

barrel•

1 ,0 0 0

Supply

Milled rice converted to rough on basis that one packed milled equals one barrel rough for Southern rloe and
6b bags milled equal 100 bags rough for Oallfornla, Cslifornia rice converted from 100 pound bags to barrels
by dividing by 162 pounds per barrel,
2 Preliminary.
Source: Annual Market Summary Southern Bice, Sept, 16, 1939. and Annual Market Summary of California Bice, Hovember 7, 1939. Agricultural Marketing Service, as adapted by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration,
Southern Division.

11,118.3

1,204.3

7 -yr. av.,
I93 I4-UO

1

10,423.8

9.795*2
9.393.0
10,460.5
1 0 ,1 0 0 ,8
9,394.1
8.538.6
8,553.0
8,903.3
1 1 ,2 3 2 .2
12,295.6
1 2 ,2 5 8 .6
12,422.8
1 2 ,1 6 2 .8

064.9

485*8
465.7
917*2
1,613.4
I.0 9 3 .I
1,468.4
422.8
4g6.1
1,429.0
1.057.9
1,700.4
1,865.4

8 3 8 .2

1 ,0 0 0

1 ,0 0 0

barrels

1 ,0 0 0

barrels
barrels

Total
supply

13 -yr. av.
1928-40

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
193^
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
194o2

1928

Tear

Southern
Carry-over,
Crop
rough and
milled!

Table XXXV.
Carry-over, arop, and supply of Southern, Oallfornla, and United
States rough rloe during years of government programs, 1928 to date*
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a continued spur toward larger production and non-cooperation in govern
ment programs in areas where new rice land was available*
th e 1936 and 1937 rice programs were unable to control the forces
c re a tin g acreage and production expansion*

The 1937 crop year began w ith

another large carryover of 1,429*000 barrels of southern rice and the
crop th a t year rose almost 3“ 1/2 million barrels above the low level o f

1933*

Coupled with a general collapse in farm product prices, this re

s u lte d in a drastic decline in rice prices and an accentuated accumu

of carryover*

la tio n

In 1939, total supplies of southern rice were the

greatest since the World War, and the 1940 crop year began with a record
carryover equivalent to 1,865,000 barrels of rough rice, almost a sixth
o f th e expanded annual production of recent years*

Until the outbreak of

th e European war in 1939, prices drifted between 50 and 60 per cent of
th e p a r ity level*

The experiments of the past seven years with the various adjust
ment programs in the rice industry have thus resulted in a large expansion
in

acreage, an all-time record for production of rice in the southern

s ta te s ,

been

and the accumulation of enormous carryovers of rice*

Price has

raised twice by government action, the first time by price fixing

devices which could not be maintained, the second time through the effect
of

an

indirect export subsidy by the issue of tax-payment warrants on

carryover stocks*

The value of the annual crop, even vdLthout government

payments, has been larger than the 1923-1930 average, so that the pay
ments have been simply an additional subsidy*
No basic adjustment in rice acreage or production has been
achieved.

The fact that the large expanded acreage by 1940 appeared

m
justified

because of high price is the result of a drastically changed ex

port demand condition, not in any way to be credited to the adjustment
programs# The conclusion is inescapable that the four different types of
rice programs so far attempted have contributed nothing toward the correction
of basic supply maladjustments in the rice industry which depress price,
and, in fact, have greatly accentuated these maladjustments*

The economic

welfare of the rice farmers has been improved only through outright federal
subsidy payments and through change in demand resulting from current war
conditions*

Geographical Effects

As was described in Chapter I, the percentage increase in rice

acreage since 1933 has been greatest in Texas.

In

1934 and 1935, growers

cooperated in all four producing states to restrict increases in acreage,

but the relaxation of acreage control in 193& brought an increase which
has been maintained since that time in spite of the annual attempts by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration to reduce national rice acreage by

approximately 20 per cent*

prom 1936 to 1940, Louisiana growers cooper

ated sufficiently to reduce their acreage by 60,000 acres, or about 10
per cent of

1936 plantings.

expanded their acreage
Louisiana reduction.
tively little since

During the same fcur years, Texas growers

by 40,000 acres, offsetting the larger part of the

Arkansas and California acreages have changed rela

1936. The failure of the acreage reduction program,

therefore, is due largely to lack of participation by Texas producers,
since Louisiana growers have evidently made a serious attempt to reduce

acreago*

80.1
71
75.7

96.8

135,000
136,300

133,600
128,200

138,000
160,000
189,000
180,000

61,0

68.0

60.9

87.9
70 .**
61.6

152,500

350.000

85.8
73.9

1h6,800
1^3,500
15H, 000

250,000
250,000

517,000
515,000

353,500
353.800
315.000

167.000
20^,000

Texas

Hi2,000
H79,000

Louisiana

H6.1
2/

88.7
62.2

J/

u
H
ii
it

if
ii

1/
2/

2H0

135,000

88,700
85,000
66,900

215
230
230

Missouri

100,000
138,000
1^5,000

California

2/ Hot available.
Jj/ Estimated.
Source: Compiled by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Southern Division,

Per cent of planted
acreage under
participation
1935
1936
1937
193®

19 * 3/

1935
1936

Acreage of
T>articipante

1936
1937
1938

Planted
acreage
1935

Arkansas

United
State.

88.1*
72.5
60.9
2/

670,900
i/

711.300

722,600

817,2X5
981,230
1 ,101,230
1.080.2UO

Table XXXVI. Acreage of rloe planted and acreage of partiolpante in Agricultural Adjustment
Admlnletration programs in the United States, 1935-3®*
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Although a majority of the rioe growers have cooperated in the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration programs since their inception,
sufficient growers have continually remained outside the programs to pro
hibit effective acreage control*

The degree of participation between

1935 end 1938 is shown in the table*

In 1935* acreage was effectively

controlled, since farmers operating more than 85 per cent of the acreage
in all states cooperated in the rice program.

In 1936, participation

declined to an average of 72*5 per cent of the acreage In the nationj In
1937* only 61 per cent of the national acreage was in the program.
Louisiana growers, up through 1937* cooperated to no greater extent than
Texas growers*

After the price declines in 1937 and 1938* however, par

ticipation increased sharply in Louisiana and acreage control in the
state become more effective.

Texas participation, however, declined still

further after 1937 and reduced the effectiveness of total acreage control*
Acreage figures on participation for 1939 and 1940 were not computed by
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, but the trend of total acre
age Indicates that less than 60 per cent of the Texas planted acreage
has been participating, while about 80 per cent of Louisiana acreage has
been controlled under the rice program.
The absence of acreage control in Texas is demonstrated by the
following tables.

In 1938, 62 per cent more Texas acreage was planted

in rice than the 157,741 acres allotted to Texas growers.

In 1939* al-

through the state allotment was sharply increased, 42 per cent more
acreage was planted; in 1939, after another increase in allotment, 46
per cent more acreage was in rice.

The growers in Louisiana, on the

other hand, planted 29 per cent above the state allotment in 1938, and

Source:

Total

Wharton

Orange
Haller

157.741
161.7

115.0

183.6
126.4
186.1
182.0
121.2
142.0

189.614

168.9
129.0
136.5
174.2
116.0
133.4

140.6

5.784
3,461
36,513
10,398
24,358
6,481
3.651
24,232

11,096

28.177
80,818
15.151

Dianted

—

isw":...—
% of allottaent

Allotted
aoreaco

Agricultural Adjustment Admlni strati on v College Station, Texas

Katasorda

Liberty

166.3
146.8
236.3
398.6
196.8

109.0

188.6
195.0
138.9
90 .2
175.7

17.760
17.850
15.333
18,063
4,668
2.75?
27,546
8.513
13.245
3.236
2.854
25.919

Irasorla

Chamber
Colorado
fort Bend
Harris
Jackson
Jefferson

JIOroMO... . *l«»tOd

County

..Allotted
. — m t *of aWottaont

199.006

31.138
20,484
16 ,1%
7.636
6.583
3.797
36.471
16,7?3
25.289
7.681
4,280
22,805
146.1

125.3
141.3
182.6
186.9
112.3

113.8
152.6

146.8
188.7

127.2

148.2
176.4

ulnatod

1940____
of allottaent

Allotted
aortaae

Table XXXTII. Riot tortafi allotted by the A|rlmltirtl Adjustment Administration la Texas
and aotual planted acres, by counties, 195d-19^«
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wdjr 13 per cent and 11 par oant above in 1939 and 1940, respectively.21
Although many parishes in Louisiana planted less rice than was
allotted under the program, every rice-producing county in Texas has
consistently planted far above ita respective allotment.

This was true

between 1938 and 1940 in spite of a more than 40,000 aore increase in
total Texas allotments.

The most important rice producing area in Texas,

Jefferson county, planted 53 per cent above ita 1940 allotment of 36,471
acres.

Acreage has expanded sharply in Chambers county, which planted

76 per cent above its 1940 allotment of 20,454 acres} in Brazoria county,
which planted 33,500 acres in 1938 and 46,157 acres in 1940} and gener
ally in all producing counties of the state.

The greatest percentages

for planting above allotments have been in the counties planting only a

few thousand acres of rice.

Although the allotments in these counties

have been steadily increased, they continue to plant 80 per cent or more
in excess of their allotments.
In Louisiana, Cameron parish, near the Texas border, has been
the principal area consistently planting rice far in excess of Its al
lotment,

In 1940, 54 per cent more acreage was planted than its allotted

11,117 acres, which compared

to an allotment of

42 per cent more acreage was

planted.

7,051 aoresin 1938, when

Other principal riceproducing

parishes and the percentage of acreage in excess of allotments In 1940

21

In 1938 rice allotments were made only to participating farms,
but the 1939 and 1940 allotments were based on the acreage of all lice
farms. This accounts for the sharp increase in acreage allotments be
tween 1938 and 1939* There is no comparable data for the 1935*37 pro
grams, since allotments were made to individuals, not to counties and
faz&s. Before 1938 a grower could apply for an
allotment in one state
and plant his allotment in another state, if he
wished.

132*7
76.9

5.576
520

128.6

38*.2*0

Source:

412.65*

*.512
905
11.619
3.6*0*
3.31*
89
89.993
5*9

560

153

66

*30

116.2
88,700

309

419.109

112.6

110.7

95.4
9*.8
121.3
111.3
107.4
97-4

11,562

3.399
3,121
142
89,326

97.9

4,771
987

109.0

97*9
89.0
84.8
11.1
2*3,2

154.3
102.2
92.3
IO3 .4

11.117
19,213
*.197
1.639
5.955
43s
66
144
220

120.7

123.4
96.0
91.4
93.9

103.1

^ of allottaent
plan t e d

1940

56,666

99.528
13.089
2,462
1.136
922

A l lotted
acreage

90.0

113.1

82.0
9*.l
98.1
95.9
96.3
122.5
62.9

203.3

102.4
74.4
100.0

125.0
119.0

98.9

127.2
131 .*
101.6

104.7
113*2
93.7
96.4
85.9

Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

• 300 aoree planted.

Total

M 72
997
11,69*
3,*05
3,279
3*3
89,182
Vermilion
V. Baton Rouge
703

78.7
96.9
206.8
lUl.g
116.6
122.2
103.2
123 .9

99.718
13.089
2.323
798
8*5
51.583
10,507
19.982
3,9*40
1.707
86 ,3*46
5.982

123.6
110.0
97.1

planted

acreage

planted

2.679
1.1UH
1.135
36.76H
7.051
18,699
3.927
2.035
78,82?

99.516
u ,817

Allotted
acreage

1939
% of allottaent
Allotted

-----------% of allottaent

Rid* &or«a«« allotted by th* Agricultural Adjustment Administration la Louisiana aad
actual planted aoree, by parishes, 1938-19*0.

*
96.5
10c.3
107-7
117-5
128.1
29.2
118.9
85.3

Halides
St. Charles
St. James
St. John
St. Landry
St. M a rtin
St. M a ry
St. Tamm a n y

Plaquemines

Morehouse

A e ad l a
Allen
Aeceneloa
Assumption
Avoyelles
Calcasieu
Cameron
Rvangeline
Iberia
Iberrille
Jefferson Davis
Lafayette
Lafourche

P a ri e h

Table XXXVIXI.
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were Allen, 23 per cent) Calcasieu, 21 per centj and Jefferson Davis,
16 per cent.

These parishes are suitable for few crops except rice,

are highly specialized, and have undeveloped peripheries of land
adapted to rice production.
The two parishes which have the greatest acreages in rice,
Acadia and Vermilion, planted close to their respective allotments of
99,528 acres and 89,326 acres in 1940.

These parishes were long ago

thoroughly developed for rice production, and little acrea e is avail
able for expansion.
Parishes in Louisiana which are on the eastern outskirt of the
specialized producing area, and the river rice parishes, have consis
tently planted less than their rice allotments.

For example, the tfest

Baton Rouge parish allotment has been reduced from 703 acres in 1938
to 309 acres in 1940, but plantings were only 97 P«r cent of the re
duced allotment of 1940.

Similar conditions are evident in all of the

river and minor producing parishes.

Evidently the Agricultural Adjust

ment Administration program has operated to bring expansion in special
ised producing areas, while minor areas have given up rice acreage.
The unusual reduction of acreage on the eastern fringe of the
Louisiana rice belt is due both to the absence of new land and to the
fact that many of the farms in this area grow cotton and sugar cane.
In order to qualify under the cotton program, a farmer must also parti
cipate in the programs for rice and other crops.

Thus, both the avail

ability of new land in western Louisiana and in Texas, and the practice
of specialized rice growing without cotton production, has increased
acreage in these areas at the expense of the older producing regions.

251

Evaluation of Rice Adjustment Programs

Even under the relatively low prices of the past four years,
rice growers, in specialised areas where new land is available, have
evidently found it profitable to expand production*

After large acre

ages have been planted to establish increased allotments, the growers
return to the program and receive benefit payments in addition to their
rice receipts*

In Acadia and Vermilion parishes, where growers do not

have this opportunity, this aspect of the rice adjustment programs is
definitely injurious to established rice farmers*

Growers in this area

have little alternative to participation in the rice program, and they
recognise that expansion in acreage to the west more than offsets any
supply limitation they achieve.
Increasing the Agricultural Adjustment Administration payments
in order to gain more complete participation in acreage control plans
would probably be ineffective, sinoe this action would merely make rice
production in the expanding areas more attractive once a base has been
established.

Freezing of parish and county allotments at present acre

ages would also probably be ineffective when non-cooperation is preva
lent.

Marketing quotas have been rejected by the growers in two years

when large sup; lies justified a referendum, demonstrating the satis
faction of the rice growers in regard to recent prices.
Apparently, the price of rice has been sufficiently high to
make expanded production profitable, and the adjustment program has
not greatly hindered the economic forces shifting acreage toward Texas.
Parity payments and payments for soil conservation practices have been
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a subsidy to growers in the eastern part of the rice belt, and have
added to the attractiveness of rice production in the western areas.
There is little likelihood of acreage reduction under present price
conditions, although the threat of increased supply and curtailed ex
ports after the present war makes the acreage situation appear very
serious.

22

nTwo-PrioeK Proposals

Because of the ineffectiveness of acreage control, and in view
of the nature of the domestic and export markets for rice, leaders in
the industry have for several years advocated the abolition of re
strictions on acreage and the use of a federal tax to separate prices
between domestic and foreign markets.

The most recent version of this

plan was a domestic allotment and certificate scheme proposed in congressional hearings in the summer of 1939.

23

Under this plan, market

ing certificates would be issued to farmers according to their allot
ment in the national domestic marketing quota.

Millers would be

required to buy these certificates, in order to market the equivalent
clean rice in the domestic market, and the proceeds would accrue to
the farmers as an additional payment above the price received for rice.
Rice produced in excess of allotments would receive no payment and

^This raises the always difficult problem of the extent to
which farm relief programs should be used to prevent a shift in acre
age arising from economic advantages.
2^See hearings before committees on agriculture on S. 2573,
June 30, 1939, and H. R. 6654, July 11 and 12, 1939, 76th Congress,
1st Session, Washington, D.C.
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c o u ld h o t be marketed domestically without & severe penalty.

Provision

was made for marketing this excess rice in export markets without a
certificate and the consequent t&x, so that rice could be sold abroad
at a price below domestic prices by the amount of the certificate.

By

this means, the rice industry could take advantage of higher prices in
the domestic market, dump surplus stocks in export markets, establish
a self-financing rice program, and make unnecessary the elaborate but
ineffective acreage control of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.
The general outline of this plan is similar to those proposed In
the schemes for separation of the foreign and domestic market as frequent
ly suggested since the emergence of the export problem for farm commodi
ties after World far I.

As described in the preceding chapter, the na

ture of the export market for rice furnishes an unusual opportunity for
the successful application of a rice export price differential.

From

the 1935 experience with a processing tax on rice, it appears likely
that the farmer might bear such a tax to a considerable extent.

Never

theless, the supply placed in the domestic market could be effectively
limited, and the export outlet could be made secure regardless of the
incidence of the tax.

Total returns to the farmers, even after the tax

was paid, could be increased if supplies were limited in the inelastic
market and expanded in the Elastic market.
The effect of an export subsidy program on domestic consumers
is to raise their price and limit their consumption, which is obviously
against consumer welfare.

The object of recent farm relief programs in

general, however, has been to benefit the farmer at the expense of the
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consumer, 30 that this objection is valid only when applied to all
price-raising legislation*

Although processing taxes have once been

outlawed by the Supreme Court, there is a general feeling that similar
taxes may in the future be regarded more favorably*

After the present

unusual export situation passes, the rice industry vdll very likely
exert pressure for legislation of the type here described,
At present, plans are being made to set a floor under rice
prices of 65 per cent of ’’parity,” by means of the loan program of the
Commodity Credit Corporation.

If the high rice prices of mid-1941 are

maintained, practically no rice will enter this loan.

The collapse of

high prices, however, would make the loan program operative on a large
scale in the rice belt,

With continued low prices, the rice loan would

merely repeat the process of piling up surplus stocks already experi
enced under the cotton loan.

Leaders in the rice industry are not

anxious to repeat the experience of building up large surplus stocks,
and are dubious concerning the value of a loan program unless action

^Since export subsidies under this plan would be financed by
higher prices to domestic consumers, it can be argued that a direct tax
on social funds equivalent to the price increase would be a cheaper way
to pay benefits to farmers. Theoretical analyses show that the injury
to buyers of a good is less if the tax is in the form of a deduction from
their incomes rather than an increase in the price of the good.
’ith the
higher price in effect, individual buyers not only lose the amount of the
tax but also are unable to reach the maximum utility position which they
could have attained if the same sura were paid as a direct tax because with
the increased price they cannot gain as much utility as formerly from sub
stituting this commodity for other goods. For proof of this proposition,
see J. ft. Hicks, Value and Capital. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939.
Politically, it appears more feasible to tax for an export subsidy pro
gram. R. 3. Nelson, "iSxport Subsidies and Agricultural Income,” Journal
of Faro Economics, 23:619-631, August 1941*
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is taken simultaneously for rapid liquidation of rice entering the

loan.^5
Additional difficulties are also ahead for rice loans.

Eice

in loan will have to be graded before valuation, and rice grades as a
basis for price differentials are not generally accepted in the rice
belt.

Perhaps a loan program might result in general acceptance and

use of grades, which would benefit the industry in general*

Loans

based on grades would at least be less difficult to administer than
fixed prices based on grades*

More serious, however, is the condition

of available rice storage apace and the hazard of insect damage*

Ware

houses in the rice belt are too loose for protection against rats and
insects in the summer, and all investigations have demonstrated huge

losses from insect feeding in rice during the hot months of the year.^
This handicap, plus a general prejudice against old crop rice, indicates
that prolonged storage of rough rice will be a costly operation, and
that physical losses alone will more than exceed the 15 per cent margin

^ Annual Report, 1940-41. American Rice Growers Cooperative
Association, p* 14-15•
^Investigation has shown that grain containing 12 per cent or
more of moisture is most favorable for the development of insect infes
tation* Rice, as it enters storage, invariably contains 14 per cent or
more of moisture. An experiment conducted in 1939 showed that rice
harvested in 193d and placed in storage had lost, by May 2, 1939, 4-4
per cent of its weight from insect feeding. On November 21 following,
or 12 months after storage began, this loss had increased to 21 per cent
of its original weight. Owing to the loose construction of most rice
mills and warehouses, fumigation can be conducted only in especially
constructed chambers or vaults. Agriculture Department Appropriation
Hearings» 1942, p. 837.
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betw een the proposed loan rate and parity price*

27

07

Some of the trade considers that old crop rice that has been
s to re d and dried has better consuming qualities than new crop rice

freshly milled and containing more moisture. However, carryover rice
does not have original color or freshness, and under normal conditions
is sold at a sacrifice in prloe. Testimony of millers in Interstate
Commerce Commission Docket No. 26430, eg. cit.. p. 217*

CHAPTER VII
COOPERATIVE MARKETING IN THE RICE INDUSTRY

In the preceding chapters, problems involved in rough rice
marketing have been discussed in regard to market institutions,
market outlets, and governmental action affecting the rice industry.
The most permanent, and perhaps most effective, market improvements
so far achieved, have resulted from cooperative marketing associations
among rice fanners.

The rice industry is localized, with relatively

large production units and progressive farmers, and has therefore af
forded an unusual opportunity for the development of cooperative
marketing.
Shortly alter the development of rice production in the south
western prairies of Louisiana, loosely organized marketing associations
appeared among the farmers.

About 1B94* the Rice Growers Association

of America was organized by Knapp, an early leader in the rice industry. **"
This early association confined its operations largely to offering rice
on sealed bids to mill buyers in order to eliminate competition In
selling among the farmers of a community.

Although this early Informal

association was a significant development in cooperative action, it

^Hosier L. Brinkley, ’’Cooperative Methods of Marketing Rice,”
American Cooperation. 1929. Washingtont American Institute of Co
operation, 1930, p- 97.
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accomplished little toward the establishment of formally organized co
operative enterprise.
The first large formal organization established in the rice industxy was the Southern Rice Growers* Association in 1910-U.

o

This

organisation is reported to have had at one time a membership of from

60 to 73 par cent of the rice growers in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas*

3

For several years its operations were very successful, and a substantial
reserve of 1*50,000 was accumulated*

Local offices and local sales manag

ers were maintained to offer rice samples on auction tables for sealed
bids*

Marketing commissions were ten cents a barrel, which entitled

members to the selling services and to market information distributed
among the districts.
Prices were high or trending upward from 1910 to 1919 > the in
dustry was expanding, and profits for the growers and the association
were large*

The drastic deflation of 1920, however, ended the boom

period and the financial success of the association#

When price de

clined rapidly in 1920, mills refused to buy rice on any basis because
of the serious inventory risks.

In order to find an outlet for rice,

the association sponsored a toll mill arrangement under which rice
millers were to process the rough rice at a charge of one dollar per
barrel.

This arrangement ended in general distrust and dissatisfaction

when it was discovered that special concessions had been made to one
large mill.

Consequent difficulties brought bo&h the association and

^Cooperative Marketing. Senate Document No# 95, 70th Congress,
1st Session, 1928, p. 204#
^Brinkley, American Cooperation. 1929. op. olt#, p. 97#

259

the idea of toll milling into general disrepute
A contributing factor to the failure of the organization was
the fact that its once ample reserves had been dissipated by dividend
5

payments, so that a few months of reduced income forced its dissolution.
In addition, it has been reported that the millers through a policy of
"peaceful penetration” rendered the association innocuous so far as benefits to the growers were concerned.
A similar association was formed by rice growers on the Pacific
7

coast about 1915, known as the Pacific Rice Growers Association.

Its

methods of operation were very similar to those of the Southern Associ
ation, and its experiences were very similar.

Its failure in 1920 was

caused by drastic deflation and problems similar to those of its contemporary organization in the South.

8

The failure of these two associations in 1920, however, did not
discourage the development of cooperative enterprise in the rice industry.
The opportunity for profitable cooperative action in the unsettled market
was more evident than ever before, and the failure of the earlier organi
zations was recognized as being due largely to events beyond the control
of the associations.

In 1921, the American Rice Growers Association was

organized at Lake Charles, Louisiana,

About the same time, the Rice

4lbid., p. 9 a.
^Ibid., p. 9a*
^Cooperative Marketing, o p . clt.. p. 204.
^Ibid.. p. 204.
^Brinkley, Amerioan Cooperation. 1929. 2£* Pit., p. 9S.
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G row ers Association of California, and the Arkansas Rice Growers Co
operative Association at Stuttgart, Arkansas, were organised in the
9

other producing areas.

In 1922 the Farm Bureau sponsored an addi

tional rice association in southwestern Louisiana, and in 1923 the
same organization established a River Farm Bureau Rice Growers Cooperative Association, with headquarters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

10

The Arkansas association, sponsored by the Farm Bureau, and
the two Farm Bureau associations in Louisiana were organized to pool
and mill the rice of their growers.

The California association and the

A m erican Rice Growers Cooperative Association in Louisiana were organ
is e d as marketing agencies representing the growers in bargaining with
in d ep en d en t mills.

The history of all five of the rloe cooperative

associations organized in the early 1920*3 is replete with the mistakes,
fin a n c ia l mismanagement, and economic fallacies prevalent in the cooper

ative movement of that decade.

The three most important associations

organized during that time, however, furnished the basic organization
fo r the three cooperative associations operating successfully at the

present time.
The R ic e Growers Association of California has been consistent
ly the most successful of the cooperative enterpilses in the rice in
dustry.

Hie number of growers in the locality is small and practically

*11 of them are members of the association.

All rough rice is sold

through a central office, with field men scattered through the area to

^C o o p e ra tiv e M a rk e tin g , o p. o i t . , p. 204.

^Brinkley, American Cooperation. 1929. o£. cjjt., p. 99.
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secure samples and maintain contact with the members.

Each member*s

ride is sold as a separate lot, the association acting as a marketing
agent and supplying market information.
The degree of cooperation in California has been so great that
the association has been able to establish export subsidies and other
surplus relief programs on its own initiative, since its control of the
California rice supply has been virtually complete.

The growers associ

ation has acted in close accord with the millers association, so that
monopolistic practice has been approached in the marketing and processing
of California rice.

Monopoly powers, however, are closely limited by

competition of Southern and Asiatic rices, which are close substitutes
for California rice.
The operations of the Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Associ
ation have been conducted on a totally different plan.

Organized through

the efforts of Aaron Sapiro in 1921, its object was to carry the growers*
interest in the rice all through the marketing process into final con
sumption channels as clean rice.

Title to the rice passed to the associ

ation upon delivery by the grower, and an advance payment was made based
on the grade and value of the rice.

The rice was pooled and processed

in mills owned or leased by the association.

After final sale of the

rice in a season's operations, the growers received a final distribution
of the proceeds from the rice.^
The Arkansas association has operated on this plan since 1921,

1^Cooperative Marketing* op. olt., p. 206j Brinkley, American
Cooperation. 1929. op. clt.* p. 9®*
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although it had gone through three drastic reorganizations by 1934*
These reorganizations were caused principally by the accumulation of
large carryovers of milled rice which could not be marketed at profit
able prices to the producers*

Financial difficulties arose from the same

inventory risks inherent in rice milling as described in Chapter IV*

Efy

1941# however, the financial status and operations of the Arkansas associ
ation had become secure*
The two associations organized in Louisiana by the Farm Bureau
modeled their operations on the Arkansas plan*

In southwest Louisiana,

the farm Bureau association milled rice for several years after its or
ganization in 1922, but difficulties in market fluctuations and finances
caused early dissolution*

13

The River Farm Bureau Rice Growers Cooper

ative Association leased mills at New Orleans and Baton Rouge between
1920 and 1930, handling the small volume of production in this area*
After the market decline in 1930, however, this association soon was in
difficulty and ceased operation*

American Rice Growers Association

The American Rice Growers Association began operations in 1921
with headquarters in Lake Charles, Louisiana*

The association followed

the mericeting plan of the California cooperative, with the association
restricting its services to that of a marketing agent for its members*
About 200 members, located in Texas and Louisiana, established seven

Testimony in Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 26430#
£&* cit., p. 775.
13
See Rice Journal. September, 1923*
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local districts which handled the sales of the district members*
Although the association was organised to operate as a marketing
agent, some pooling of rough rice was attempted on a rising market in
1922 and in several latter y e a r s . A s in similar experiences with other
commodities, rice growers made the mistake of assuming that pooling was
the source of increased average returns for their rice, whereas in reali
ty the rising market was responsible for the higher average price*

When

pooling was attempted in later years on a declining market, the cooper
ative became involved in financial difficulties and dissatisfaction among
the

embers increased rapidly.
From 1921 to 1928 the American Rice Growers Association handled

annually between 50G,OOG to 2,000,000 barrels of the southern rice crop.
(Table XXXH)

Its greatest volume was obtained in 1921-22, the first

season of operation.

Thereafter the volume declined steadily to a low

point of less than 300,000 barrels in 1923-26.

Membership in the associ

ation declined each year, dissatisfaction with operations was prevalent,
and management of the financial affairs of the association was poor*
Although the volume of rice handled increased after 1926, the
situation in regard to membership and finances had become so serious
that it was necessary to reorganize the association and obtain a fresh
start.

Accordingly, a complete reorganization was made, and the Ameri

can Rice Growers Cooperative Association began operations on June 4, 1928

^Ri c e Journal. August, 1923, p* 36.
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Table XXXIX.

Number of barrels of rice handled by iunerican Rice Growers
Association, 1921-28*

Tear

Barrels sold
through
Association

Rice production
in
La*. Ark*. Texas

1921-22
1922-23
1923-24
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
1927-28

1,821,636
1,430,639
845,556
576,366
493,720
771,730
925,982

8,322,500
9,258,610
7,626,111
7,986,666
3,075,555
9,158,611
9,927,500

Source:

Per cent sold
through
Association
21*8
15.5
11.0
7*2
6.1
3*4
9.3

Files of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, Lake
Charles, Louisiana.
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under the amended charter and bylaws of the original corporation.*^
this association operates today as the only cooperative rice marketing
organisation in Louisiana and Texas.

Structure of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association

The reorganisation of the Meric on Bice Growers Cooperative
Association was accomplished with the aid of cooperative marketing
specialists from the United States Department of Agriculture, who for
the first time participated in the marketing organisations of the rice
growers.

16

In 1929, the year following its organisation, the Federal

Farm Board began its extensive program of cooperative financing and
cCBSBOdity loans as a means of market improvement, and operations of the
organization were initiated largely in accord with practices suggested
by federal agencies.
In essential principles, the structure of the organization es
tablished in 1928 remains the son* today.
in Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.

It was designed to operate

Local districts were organized,

self-controlled by local boards of directors elected by the growers in
the district, and providing a local sales office, manager, and samplers.
Each local district is represented on a central association board of
directors by directors allocated on the basis of one to each 100,OCX)
barrels handled, or fraction thereof.

This central board of directors

conducts the affairs of the central association, which from a main

^Brinkley, American Cooperation. 1929. o^. oit., p. 99.
16Ibld.
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offloe In Lak® Charles, Louisiana, coordinates the activities of the
districts, conducts operations for unincorporated districts, and main
tains a marieet news service and grading office for all the districts*
The local districts conduct their affairs independently of each other, with
no rigid control over their policies exerted by the central association*
The net result is a loosely federated group of local cooperative market
ing agencies, with the central office providing those market services
which can be more efficiently performed on a large scale*

Present District Organizations

The number of local districts organized under the American Rice
Growers Cooperative Association has varied between six and fifteen
during thirteen years of operation.

In the initial year of 1920-29* two

districts operated in Texas and four in Louisiana.

In later years, ad

ditional districts were organized in both of these states, and one in
Arkansas.

Sew districts were established in new rice areas, large dis

tricts were broken up into smaller districts, and occasionally small
districts ceased operations or combined with neighboring districts.
During the 1940-41 season, fifteen local districts were in
active operation.

Nine of these were in Texas, and six were in Louisiana*

The Arkansas district discontinued operation after the 1938-39 season,
since the majority of Arkansas growers interested in cooperation were
affiliated with the Arkansas Rice Growers Association, and the volume
handled through the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association as a
marketing agency had shrunk to a point where further operation was not

1928-29
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40
1940-41

1,172,362
1,471,826
2,081,616
2,070,678
2,010,518*
1,930,671*
2,075,206
2,091,014
2,335,765
2,565,197**
2,730,046
2,588,542
2,719,437
3
7
7
6
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

363,700
303,688
706,313
528,277
431,777
529,640
840,825
655,359
737,651
644,639
631,252
578,793
540,301

Louisiana
Number
Barrels
sold
districts
3
5
6
6
6
6
5
5
6
7
7
9
9

808,662
968,138
1,336,233
1,520,912
1,315,701
1,009,018
1,185,219
1,406,386
1,578,669
1,523,383
2,017,356
2,009,749
2,179,136

Texas
Number
Barrels
districts
sold
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

49,162
29,269
19,445
160,175
81,438

39,070
21,489
13,040

Arkansas
Barrels
Number
sold
districts

* Includes estimates of unreported sales not included in stale totals.
** Includes 237,000 barrels unsold on June 1, 1938 not included in state totals.
Source: Files of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, Lake Charles, Louisiana.

6
12
14
13
15
13
12
13
13
14
14
15
15

Tear

Total
barrels
sold

Total barrels of rice handled by American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, 1925-1941.

Total
number
districts

Table XL*
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Justified*

In general, the oificers of the cooperative regard 75*000

to 100,OCX) barrels as the minimum volume necessary to support the ex
pense of a local district*
Although Louisiana produces much more rice than Texas, the prin
cipal strength of the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has
always b e n in Texas*

In the first years of operation, about a third of

the total sales through the association were made in Louisiana and twothirds in Texas*
fifth

In recent years, Louisiana has furnished only about a

of the total volume, with Texas volume increasing to 80 per cent

of the total*

Arkansas sales have been a small fraction of total co

operative sales, and have been drawn from only a small portion of the
total Arkansas crop, except in the 1937*3® season*

The importance of

the cooperative to Texas growers is striking when sales are compared to
total production in the various states*

In Louisiana, slightly more

than ten per cent of the state *s crop has ordinarily been marketed, through
the association, while more than half of the Texas crop has been marketed
by the cooperative*
Although many of the district offices were originally organized
under the charter of the central association, the policy of the officers
has been to urge the separate incorporation of each district*

Separate

incorporation removes the liability of the central association for debts
incurred by the districts, and also promotes membership interest in the
local association*

Incorporation is particularly desirable when the

local association owns and operates physical facilities.

In 1941, nine

of the 15 associations were incorporated, including the important Texas

7U.7
6 5 .6

57.1
67.3
6 7 .6
65 .u

1 1 .8

18.1
13.6
1 2 .6
1 1 .2
1 1 .0
1 0 .1

73.9
77.6
80.1

7 3 .^

6.9
9.6
13.3
11.9
9.5

6 9 .O
6 5 .8
6 U .2

57.9
58.3
53.6
H2 .2
53.1
51.7

5 2 .0
H9 . 5

35.9
U9 . 6
H6.7
51.7

Texas
Per oent of Per oent of Tex.
all assooi
crop sold by
association
ation sales

0 .8

5-H
3.0

0 ,8

6.9
3.0

2.7
1.7

0 .8
0 .6
2 .U
l.U

1.7
1.9
1 .1
0 .8

Arkansas
Per cent of Per oent of Ark.
erot> sold by
all associ
assooiation
ation sales

Tiles of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, Lake Charles, Louisiana.

3U.2
33.9
25*5
2H .5
3 H.H
Ho . 5
31*3
tt .6
27*7
P3 .1
2 2 .h
19.9

1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-31*
l93>*-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-U0
19 U0 .U1

Source:

3 1 .0

192 8 -2 9

Tm t

Louisiana
Ter cent of Per cent of La.
crop sold by
all assooiation sales
assooiation

Table XLI. Percentage of total rloo production handled by American Blot Grower# Cooperatire
Assooiation in Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, 1928*19*11•
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districts operating extensive physical facilities*

Two Texas districts

and four Louisiana districts remained unincorporated.

Two of the unin

corporated Louisiana districts were operated as private selling agencies
paying the central association fee in order to secure market news service,
while the remaining two were districts which operated without a separate
charter*
The charters of the incorporated districts permit them to engage
in all types of activity in rice production, marketing, and processing.
All of the associations are organized as non-stock corporations and no
membership fee is charged.

Any excess of commissions over operating ex

penses is used to accumulate such reserves as are desired.

The Texas

districts, by charging a high marketing commission, have been able to
provide excellent offices, unusually competent personnel, diverse member
ship services, and a strong credit standing with lending agencies which
has permitted them to finance warehouses, elevators, credit corporations,
and farm supply enterprises on favorable terns.

The central office does

not participate in any of these local activities except for occasional
loans and general aid in establishing services and physical facilities.
The Louisiana districts have operated on a lower marketing fee
than Texas districts and have not built up membership interests in local
facilities.

Membership support has therefore been more difficult to

maintain since there is nothing tangible about the looal cooperative ex
cept its marketing services at th< time of harvest.

With little liabi

lity involved, incorporation has been a less important matter for
Louisiana districts than for Texas districts.
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Membership Contracts

The only formal requirement for membership in the American Rice
Growers Cooperative Assooiation is signature on a membership contract.
If a district is incorporated, the contract is made between the local
district and the grower; if unincorporated, it is made between the cen
tral association and the grower*

In the agreement the grower appoints

the association as his exclusive selling agent, and agrees to pay the
central association fee of two cents per barrel, plus the specified
charge for local expenses, on all rice sold by him.

The detailed pro

visions concerning the obligations of each party to the contract are
specified in the agreement.

Earnings and assets of the association are

the legal property of individuals marketing through the associations,
with shares based on patronage in each enterprise*
The contract is drawn for a period of ten years.

After the

first two years, the contract may be canceled by either party upon
written notice.

In effect, the contract is a two-year agreement in so

far as it is binding upon the growers.

Although the agreement speci

fies damages collectible by the Association in the event a grower
breaches the agreement, in practice little attempt is made to enforce
the contracts.

Cooperatives generally have found that enforcement of

membership agreements is more costly in disrupting membership relations
than is the loss resulting from occasional failure of a grower in ful
filling his obligations.
Since the volume of rice handled is more important to the
financial success of the association than number of members, efforts to
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MARKETING AGREEMENT
OF
AMERICAN RICE GROWERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION
This agreem ent made and entered into by and between the undersigned hereinafter referred to as Grower, and the Amen
ican Rice Growers Cooperative Association hereinafter called the Association, witnesseth:
1. Grower hereby appoints the Association as his sole and exclusive agent fo r the purpose of selling all rice grown, acquired,
controlled, or produced by him, or in which he has an interest, except such rice as may be used fo r seed or feed personally by
Grower; and the Association hereby agrees to act as such agent on the term s and conditions herein described.
2.

Grower hereby agrees to notify the Association prom ptly a fte r the harvesting of his rice in any year of the place where
rice is stored, and he hereby gives the Association the right to examine said rice, through its representatives, a t any time
for the purpose of taking samples thereof fo r the grading of each lot of rice, and Grower agrees to give complete information
regarding the quantity of rice in each lot in which he has an interest so th a t the Association may determine the am ount of rice
corresponding w ith each sample.

said

3. The Association shall have exclusive charge of the grading o f the rice, and shall provide fo r the grading of said rice in ac
cordance with recognized standards fo r rough rice. In the event Grower is not satisfied with the grading of his rice, a new
sample of each lot shall be obtained and graded as aforesaid.
4. Unless the rice of Grower shall be sold by the Association in some other way, Grower shall specify in w riting to the Associ
ation a minimum price which he is willing to accept fo r each lot thereof, which minimum price shall continue fo r a period of 10
days and th ereafter until Grower shall give the Association 10 days w ritten notice to the contrary; Provided, th at when mutually
agreeable the parties hereto may change the price, which change shall be immediately effective. The Association shall seek to
obtain a b etter price th an the minimum nam ed if possible b u t shall not sell fo r a lower price unless authorized to do so by the
Grower, b u t in the event the Association believes th at the minimum specified is below the m arket price it shall not be required
to sell a t the minimum price. In the event the Board of D irectors of the Association a fte r acquiring the favorable consent in
writing of seventy-five p er cent of the members o f the Association determines th at it would be advisable fo r the Association to
sell any p a rt of the rice of its members on a pool basis or in any other way the Association may then determine the time of sale
and the price of sale and Grower under such circumstances agrees to accept said price and to deliver his rice promptly as and
where directed to do so by the Association in fulfillm ent of such sales.
5. Payments fo r all rice sold shall be made to the Association or fo r its account, and this Association shall deduct from the pro
ceeds derived from the sale of rice a t the rate of two cents per barrel of one hundred sixty-two pounds rough rice fo r the main
tenance of Central and State offices which am ount may be changed by the Board of Directors w ith the w ritten consent of twothirds of the members, and an am ount to be fixed by each local district and approved by the Board of Directors for the costs of
local services. These deductions to provide fo r the maintenance, conduct and operation of the Association and fo r the handling,
grading, preparation fo r m arket and m arketing of said rice. The foregoing deductions shall be promptly made and the balance
of the proceeds from Grower's rice prom ptly rem itted to him.
6. The Association agrees to obtain production, m arket and o th er inform ation with respect to rice and to furnish the same to
Grower from time to tim e fo r the purpose of enabling him to betcer determ ine his production and m arketing plans.
7. Grower agrees to give the Association inform ation concerning the acreage of rice, crop conditions and yields, the am ount of
rice which he has on hand and other like inform ation as requested by the Association. Grower agrees that, in the event he desires
to borrow money upon his rice during the producing period, or a f te r harvesting the same, th a t he will comply w ith the require
ments o f the Association w ith respect thereto.
8. Nothing in this agreem ent shall be construed as requiring Grower to continue the growing of rice. I t is understood that the
Association has a power coupled w ith an interest w ith respect to the sale of the rice of Grower; and th a t the pnnopai object of
Grower in entering into this agreem ent and of other growers signing agreem ents similar hereto is to obtain the advantages accru
ing from the cooperative m arketing of rice.
9. It is m utually understood and agreed th a t it is now and ever will be impracticable and extremely difficult to determine the
damage th at would be suffered by the Association and by other growers signing agreem ents with the Association similar to this
one in the event Grower breaches his contract. Grower hereby agrees th a t should he sell, m arket or dispose of any of his rice
other than in accordance with this agreem ent th a t he will pay the Association twenty-five p er cent of the m arket price of said
rice, per barrel or its equivalent as of the tim e of its sale as liquidated damages fo r breach of this contract.
10. This agreem ent shall be in force fo r a period of te n years, beginning as of the first day of May, 19____ , provided th a t
either party hereto, by w ritten notice delivered to th e other p arty between May 1 and May 10 of any year a fte r two years, may
cancel this agreem ent; otherwise it shall rem ain in full force and effect. Such cancellation shall not affect any uncompleted
sales or transactions between the parties hereto, n o r release either p arty from any indebtedness unpaid th ereafter accruing under
this contract, nor relieve the Grower from his obligation to sell through the Association any rice acquired or produced by him dur
ing the preceding season, nor shall it relieve the Association from selling rice produced during th a t season, nor shall the failure
of Grower to comply w ith this agreem ent or the release of him by the Association or the failure of other growers to comply with
their agreem ents or their release by the Association have any effect upon any other agreement.
11. Grower hereby applies fo r membership in the Association and agrees to abide by the charter and by-laws of the Association.
The parties hereto agree th a t there are no oral or other conditions, promises, covenants, representations, or inducements in addi
tion to or a t variance w ith the term s hereof, and th a t this expresses fully and completely the understanding of the parties hereto.
12. Grower desires to be affiliated with the district a t or near-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The charge fo r local expenses shall be------------------barrel fo r central office expenses, making total charge

cents per barrel of 162 pounds rough rice plus two cents per
.....

cents.

In witness hereof the parties hereto have executed this agreement.

Grower.
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association
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increase the efficiency of operation have centered on increasing the
volume of rice in membership contracts rather than the number of agree
ments themselves*
growers of rice*

In general, members of the association are large
Two Louisiana districts are in reality large corpora

tions which sell rice, received by them as water end land rent, through
the cooperative association*

The assooiation does not stress small

grower membership, since the expense of sampling, grading, and marketing
small lots is much higher per barrel than for large lots, while ability
to pay the marketing fee is lower.
Somewhat less than 500 rice growers are formally affiliated
with the cooperative district associations in Louisiana*

According to

estimates of the managers in 1940-41, the Welsh district was the largest
with approximately 200 growers, Crowley next largest with about 110
growers, and Elton and Iowa had 72 and 40 growers, respectively.

The

Holswood and Kaplan districts are selling agencies maintained by large
irrigation and land companies.

The number of growers formally affili

ated with the associations, however, does not Indicate accurately the
number of fanners whose rice is handled through the associations*

For

example, a large landowner may sell all his tenants' rice through the
cooperative association.

Similarly, rice in which several persons have

interests may be sold as a single lot.

These situations

are frequent

in the Louisiana rice area.
Irrigation and land companies contribute a very large proportion
of the rice marketed through the cooperative association in Louisiana.
The Holnrwood and Kaplan districts, both selling agents for such corporations,
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are the source of more than a third of the total Louisiana volume.

liuoh

of this rice is owned outright by the companies; however, tenants have
an interest in many of the lots.

In addition, canal companies in the

Welsh and Iowa districts sell their rice through the local association®
and are important contributors to total volume in these districts#
Large incorporated irrigation and land companies thus are probably re
sponsible for LQ per cent or more of the total association sales of
Louisiana rice, and their support is an extremely important element in
the maintenance of cooperative rice marketing in Louisiana#
Other than mild campaigns conducted by district managers in
signing up membership contracts, the association makes little direct
effort to increase the number of growers formally affiliated with the
cooperative,

two reasons probably account for this attitude; first, .

small grower membership is not important to success of the organization,
and, second, the high-pressure membership campaigns of preceding organi
sations have left a bitter memory, among both growers and officers, of
the dangers inherent in sudden but unstable membership interest.

Marketing Fees

The principal source of revenue for both the local districts
and the central association is the commission collected on each barrel
of rice marketed, except for a small amount of miscellaneous revenue
from interest and special services.

The fee collected by th© central

associations has been two cents a barrel since the beginning of it®
operations in 1928-29.

Total annual revenues derived from thin source
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Table XIII.

Marketing commissions charged in local districts of the
American Rice Growers Cooperative Association during
1940-41 marketing season*

Local district

Texas:
Orange
Beaumont
Anahuae
D avers
Houston
Katy
Eagle Lake
Garwood
Rosharm
Louisiana:
Holmsrood
Iowa
Welsh
HIton
Crowley

*

Number barrels
sold
during 1940-41

Local
Association
commission
(cents)

Central
Association
commission
(cents)

64,249
384,756
138,325
309,221
364,997
288,495
304,704
191,610
132,779

4
8
6
8
8
6
3
3
4

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

58,329
68,431
147,740
63,551
61,297
140,953

#
4
4
4
4
#

2
2
2
2
2
2

These districts are privately organized and pay only the central
association fee.

Source:

American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, lake Charles,
Louisiana.
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have varied from $40,000 to $50,000 annually.
The fee collected by the district association is dependent upon
the policy of the local organizations.

In 1940-41, local districts in

I/yuisi&na charged a fee of four cents, which apparently was sufficient
to cover minimum operating costs without providing supplementary services
or accumulating a reserve fund.

Total charges in Louisiana districts,

including the central fee, were thus six cents per barrel of rice,

in

ceptions were the two districts which paid only the central association
fee and handled their rice on a private basis.
In Texas, charges made by local districts ranged from three
cents to eight cents per barrel.

The lowest charges of three cents were

made in two districts where rice was handled on a bull: basis in large
lots, with elevator facilities owned by the district association.

The

highest charges of eight cents were made in three districts which pro
vided unusually good offices, personnel, and supplementary services,
and which operated various physical facilities.

In addition, two Texas

associations charged a local fee of six cents, and two charged four
cents.
In a district handling 100,000 barrels of rice, a charge of
four cents provides a local revenue of $4,000.

Most of this is neces

sary to cover the salary of the manager and expenses for office main
tenance, sampling, and incidental costs.

A charge of eight cents

accumulates an annual revenue of $8,000, which can be utilized in addi
tional services and in achieving strong financial standing.
Four of the six Louisiana associations handled less than 100,000
barrels of rice in 1939-40.

With their low charge of four cents, member-
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248,049
10,223

218,884
484,248

349,229

59,560

99,841
61,937
164,515
99,494
42,930

1931-32

2,095,206

49,142

235*86
65*042

128,597
iiMu

377,T82

•9,082
60,4a
826,454
302*909
M9,209
125,964

1194-32
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2,081,614

39,090

84,490

243,442
420,029

349,440

12,352
88.90T

108,3a
96,822
234,040
108,451
99,355

1930-31

93,308

191,144
332,141

293,422

18,912
129,928
U.475
•3,585

20,819
163,692

315,688

a , 255
211,815
28,998

41,131
138,050

1*23-2* - 1929-30

2,08,014

29*269

226*82
93*002
139*699

200,425
396,516

351*794

188,252

852

41*W
« (2 f
195*835

1935-34

2,335*965

19,445

239*664
69*819
253,627

236,234
409,119

38*924

90*511
42,286
199*954
53,141
109,474
05*945

1936-39

Barrel* of rioo handled b* Ideal Alilrlili of l— rlon Rise a f w g i O K f i n H yi
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Total Salas
Unreported
or unsold

Arkuiui
Stuttgart

Ploroo

lagll Lake
Oanreod
Rosharoa

W y

Devers
Houston

lw^hu«^

Orange

tait

Louisiana i
Holnvood
low
Walsh
Site*
Crowley
Kaplan
SulpRnr
Laho Charles
Kindor
Yiatea
Hayne
Sualoe

District

Thfcla XUZX«

81,438

280,450
119,071
195*369

59,194
458,281

59,U4
50,335
159,667
53*360
104,028
204,948

1932-39

2,238,197 2,730,0*6
217.000
2,>»5»197

160*195

292,941
128,206
M3*905

243,105
439*083

56,342
234,001

61,230
54,948
111,325
96,831
89,852
191,241

1939-38

295*313
299*295
142(124
129*102

439*219

132*999

191,610

304*904

138(325
309,221
364,999
222,495

45*22«
324,547

894,293

44,249
324*954

58,329
68,431
M l , 940
63,551
61,297
140,953

194»m

42(044

a ,110
63,508
117,160
48,910
80,215
202,230

1939-40

2TT
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ship interest remaining after operating expenses were paid was practi
cally negligible.

Two districts in Texas charging the high fee of

eight cents had the greatest volume of all di atriot a, providing ample
revenue for the support of cooperative activities.

Subsidiary Organizations

The Texas districts of Beaumont, Houston* Devers, and Orange own
and operate large warehouses for their members.
large and well-maintained.

Storage charges are

These warehouses are
or a total of

25 cents per large bag per year, a standard rate in Texas.

Earnings

have been applied to reducing warehouse debt, since all structures were
financed by loan agencies.

In addition, the Beaumont, Houston, and

Devers districts own the Gulf Coast Agricultural Credit Corporation.
This corporation was organised under the influence of the Federal Farm
Board in order to furnish production credit on a cooperative basis.

In

its earlv years, operations were financed by loans from the Federal
Farm Board and from the central association.

At present, the entire

debt has been repaid from earnings and investment by the districts, and
with independent capital the credit corporation is able to discount the
notes of its members with the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank.

Control

of the local credit situation is thus in the hands of the cooperative
association in this area.
In 1940, the American Rice Growers Exchange was organized to
distribute fertilizer to members of the cooperative association.

This

enterprise was established as a stock corporation, with stockholder

eligibility restricted to the local districts of the American Rice
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Growers Cooperative Association*

The exchange required little invest

ment , since it operated only as a buying pool to obtain a quantity dis
count 011 fertilizer from the principal wholesale distributor in the
rice area,

list prices were paid by the members and patronage dividends

were paid from the rebates received by the exchange*

In Its first year

of operation, the exchange did not handle a volume sufficiently large
to justify its existence, but was effective in forcing fertilizer dis
tributors to cut prices in order to meet the quantity discounts and re
bates offered by the cooperative enterprise*
The central association has also loaned funds to finance the
purchase of a rice elevator by the Stuttgart district in Arkansas.

By

1940 all these central association advances to the various districts
had been repaid.

Miscellaneous activities of district associations

also include a Houston interest in a canal company*

Marketing Services
The local offices usually take a representative sample from each
lot of rice and mail it to one of the two grading offices maintained by
the cer&ral association*

A certificate showing the grade is made out

in triplicate, with the copies distributed to the owner, the local sales
office, and the central office*

The central association stresses the

value of these grade certificates in sales bargaining and in maxket
news service*

Grade certificates are not obtained in all oases, however,

and in recent years the practice has been declining*

In early years the

cooperative shared the cost of maintaining official Federal-State grading
offices at Crowley, Beaumont, and Eagle Lake*

During the period of the

2m

marketing agreement in 1934 and the accompanying difficulties in grading
for price-fixing purposes, this arrangement broke up.

'Hie central associ

ation now maintains its own grading offices at Beaumont and Eagle Lake,
and all grading is under its own supervision.

The United States grades

for rough rice are used by this private grading service.
Samples of the rice offered for sale are available to mill buyers
on the sales tables of the local district offices*

All sales are made on

sealed bids opened by the manager, with the highest bidder getting the
rice,

the manager arranges for delivery to the mill, weighs the rice,

makes adjustments for rice not equalling the grade, and handles collection
of money for the grower.
In local associations which maintain physical facilities, the
manager of the sales office usually manages the other enterprises.

This

pemlts more economical operation for each phase of the activities*
Several districts attempted pooling and milling of rice after 1930 when
the market was dropping and rough rice could not be sold to mills, but
in recent years, they have made no attempt to engage in this type of
operation.
The major activity of the central association other than the
maintenance of the grading offices is a market news service.

Each sales

manager is kept informed by telegraph concerning prices for rice sold
in other districts as rapidly as these prices are reported to the cen
tral office, with sales being designated by grade, variety, and purchas
ing mill.

The central association mimeographs the Weekly Rice Market

Review issued by the Agricultural Marketing Service and distributes it
to all members of the district associations, adding to the government
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release a recapitulation of cooperative sales for the week and notes
concerning the affairs of the cooperative and the rice industry*

Sta

tistics concerning rice movement and stocks are also compiled and dis
tributed to sales managers Mid members when they are useful*
Supplementary activities of the central association in recent
years have included sponsorship of a blanket rice insurance plan for
stored rice of its members, by means of which insurance costs in
Louisiana warehouses were considerably reduced, and establishment of
the fertiliser distributing corporation.

In addition, much of the

personnel and resources of the central association has been employed in
representing the rice growers in legislative activities pertaining to
the various agricultural programs of the past thirteen years*

These

activities have been largely in the nature of services to the rice in
dustry rather than confined to cooperative benefits, and will be dis
cussed as such in the following sections*

Average Annual Prices Received

In most years the average annual price received for all rice
handled by the American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has been
somewhat above the average annual prioe reported by the Agricultural
Marketing Service in Louisiana and Texas.

Whether or not this higher

price can be attributed to' the association is, of course, debatable,
since it may be influenced by differences in quality, variety, and
bulk handling in the Texas districts*

During several seasons, the

average association price has been little different from the average
price reported as received by all farmers.

Without a doubt the

Table XLIV.

1928-29
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40
1940-41

Sources

Average price received for rice sold through the American
Rice Growers Cooperative Association compared to govern
ment estimates of prices received by Louisiana and Texas
farmers, 1928 -1 9 4 1 .

Association average
price, all varieties
and grades
(barrels)

Average price
reported for
Louisiana
farmers

Average price
reported for
Texas farmers

3.43
3.85
2.84
1.91

3.24

3.17
3.71
2.84
1.94

1 .6 2
2 .8 8
3 .0 2

2.57
3.18
2 .5 8

2.44
2.78
3.04

3 .6 0

2,74
1.91
1.55
2.81
2.95
2 .5 6

3.24
2.48
2.34
2.81

1 .5 8

2.92
2.99
2.74
3.49
2.56
2.48
2.99

Files of American Rice Growers Cooperative Association, Lake
Charles, Louisiana, and Agricultural Statistics. United States
Department of Agriculture*
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a s s o c ia tio n grow ers make sales from a bettor bargaining position than
o th e r fa n n e rs j however, price differences are influenced by too many
o th e r fa c to r s to demonstrate price advantages In actual figures*

The

single fact that the association price is an average of actual prices,
while the government-reported price is an estimate based on a small
sample, destroys the effectiveness of price comparison.

S e rv ic e s to th e R ice In d u s try

The American Rice Growers Cooperative Association has served
the rice industry in two ways:

first, through making available a sales

agency which enables the maintenance of a reasonably efficient selling
structure for all rice growers, whether members or non-members 5 and
second, by presenting the rice growers' point of view in industry action
and in the extensive government legislation affecting agriculture during
the past decade.

The first of these services has been rendered primarily

by the local district associations, with limited aid from the centred,
association; the second has been a principal function of the oentral as
sociation, although dependent on the sentiment of the district member
ship.
The operations of the Federal Faxm Board from 1929 to 1933
brought the American ilioe Growers Cooperative Association into immediate
relationship with government agencies.

In fact, Federal Farm Board of

ficials virtually made aid to rice growers dependent upon participation
in the cooperative organisation, being quoted as saying that they could
not aid the rice industry unless growers united in a large cooperative
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Quit* r Stabilisation operations through the cooperative were then
attempted following the drastic market decline after 1929.

During

the 1930-31 season, more than #900,000 in commodity loans were dis
counted through the central association with the Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank, the Federal Farm Board, and acceptance corporations,
these loans were, of course, the responsibility of the individual
growers, but the central association assumed a tremendous contingent
liability in underwriting these loans on its limited resources.
3y May 31, 1931* the new association had an outstanding con
tingent liability of $312,OCX) for commodity loans of this type, with
only $2 1 ,0 0 0 in net membership interest accrued from earnings of the
preceding three seasons.

During the following year, liquidation of

these loans was largely accomplished, but the central association still
carried $8 8 ,5 0 0 in notes underwritten for district associations which
had established physical facilities with Farm Board funds.

Losses from

these operations in 1 9 3 1 *3 2 almost ruined the association, reducing the
net membership interest from almost $2 1 ,0 0 0 to slightly under $1 0 ,0 0 0
during the course of the year, besides absorbing all the revenues of
that year.

In addition, this remaining membership interest was tied

up in accounts receivable from the local districts and in other assets
which could not be promptly liquidated.
In 1933, the drastic new legislation which resulted in the
Agricultural Adjustment Act was proposed in Washington.

2*7see Rice Journal. August, 1929#

Officials of
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the American Bice Growers Cooperative Association claim entire credit
for the inclusion of rice as a basis commodity in the Agricultural Ad*
justment Administration*

The only rice grower representation in

Washington was sent by the cooperative organization and expenses were
paid from the central association funds*
The adoption of the marketing agreement as the instrument of
rice adjustment passed the major control over the entire industry into
the hands of the rice millers*

The central association opposed many

of the provisions, in the original agreements, which were drawn pri
marily for the benefit of the millers, and was successful In eliminating
some of the defects*

To the credit of the cooperative management, many

of the difficulties which finally led to discard of the marketing agree
ments were foreseen by the association officials*

Without grower

pressure through the cooperative, the years of the marketing agreement

19

would have been more distressing than they were* 7
The central association later forced amendment of the marketing
agreement, reduction of the excessive conversion charge, and the final
elimination of this type of agricultural adjustment*

It was largely

responsible for the change to the processing tax and the accompanying
legislation eliminating the 1935 floor stocks tax, which acted as an
export subsidy and relieved the industry of the large carryover which

^Annual Report. American Rice Growers Cooperative Association,
1935, p. 2 (mimeographed).
19

Annual Report, American Rice Growers Cooperative Association,
1934 (mineogiaphed). Apparently no representation would have been given
to growers* interests at all in the rice millers* plftns for industry
action, since even the officials of the association had difficulty in
participating in early hearings.
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had bean depressing price*

20

During the years from 1933 to 1936 the major activity of the
central association officers was concerned with rice legislation and
program administration*

This participation in industry affairs, often

in cooperation with officers of the Rice Millers association, has con
tinued since that date.

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration of

1936# annual administrative changes, suggestions for new programs, ad
vertising tax legislation, and similar industry affairs have absorbed
the time and funds of the central association*

Direct appropriations

have also been made from central association funds to subsidize research and advertising for rice products.

21

It is clear that most of these activities are important to all
rice growers, regardless of their affiliation with the cooperative as
sociation.

However, these activities have been paid for by the cooper

ative members from the two-cent central association fee on each barrel
of rice marketed.

Although the wisdom of much of the Agricultural Ad

justment Administration legislation as applied to the rice industry is
questionable, the fact that millions of dollars in federal funds have
been paid to rice growers under the various programs more than justifies
the cooperative expenditures, from the rice farmers* point of view.
More important, however, is the fact that the cooperative officials have
consistently opposed features in the rice programs which were based on

^Annual Report. 1935# ££•
B. Reid, "These Farmers Know Their Markets," Hews for
Farmer Cooperatives. Farm Credit Administration, June, 1941-
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economic fallacies, and have advocated programs designed to achieve
benefits without continued dependence on government subsidy*

Financial Operations

Since the unprofitable experience with financial entanglements
under the Federal Farm Board, the central association of the American
Rice Growers Cooperative Association has carefully* avoided any opera
tions involving the freezing of its funds in non-liquid assets, and has
followed a policy* of accumulating and retaining a large reserve to care
for any contingency and thereby to insure the permanent solvency of the
association*

Annual revenues in recent years, when two million or more

barrels of rice have been marketed, have exceeded $50,000*

Expenses for

officers* salaries, grading offices, traveling expanses, market news
service, and office maintenance have bordered on $35,000 a year.

In

nine seasons, the excess of revenues over expenses has increased the net
membership interest from a low point of &9,620 in 1932 to $*86,336 in
1941.

Practically

of this latter sum was in cash and accounts re

ceivable, an extremely liquid condition for the assets of any business
concern*
Hot

of the district associations have experienc ed similar

financial success*

Several districts have attempted to charge a fee

sufficient only to cover actual expenses of operation without accumu
lating a reserve*

In other districts, the volume handled has been too

email to establish financial security.

Associations in Texas have

built substantial membership Interests in physical facilities, being
aided by some accumulation of funds from marketing commissions greater
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than annual expenses.

The investments in physical facilities are now

returning an income to the members of these local associations.

Seme

Texas associations h&vo built up net membership interests in excess
of $100,000.22
The accumulation of large idle reserves in the central associ
ation is establishing a difficult problem for the management*

In the

present organisation there is no immediate outlet for these funds,
since the district associations carry on their financial operations
independently.

The reserves could readily be dissipated in patronage

dividends, but the management feels that large reserves are essential
for permanent financial security.

Investment in central facilities

such as a fertilizer mixing plant has been proposed, and it is likely
that such arrangements may be carried out in the future.

Under present

methods of operation, investment in facilities may be necessary, since
the existence of so much idle cash is a constant incentive toward lax
financial methods, pressure for dissipation of reserves, and pressure
toward ill-advised expenditures.

Future Activities

From the point of view of service© rendered and profits earned,
the American P.ice Growers Cooperative Association in recent years has
been extremely successful.

There are several types of cooperative

activity, however, in which the organization has done little work, often
because of failures experienced by previous associations.

22Reid, ££. o l t ,

Perhaps the
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most important of these neglected activities has been the; promotion of
cooperative membership.

Campaigns to sign up members have been infre

quent, and little personnel or funds have been engaged in this work.
The success of the association has made promotional activities unneces
sary, and the existing membersliip has been unusually loyal.

Neverthe

less, a considerable H e l d of service to rice growers v;ould involve a
campaign to break down suspicion and distrust of cooperative methods,
and to obtain more members in the cooperative association.

Iarticularly

valuable to the rice industry, although probably not particularly pro
fitable from a business point of view, would be the enlistment of small
grower sup ort in cooperative marketing.
A membership campaign should stress the service of the associ
ation to the industry, not to the individual.

In fact, services to the

individual are ofter. obscure in cooperative marketing.

The American

Rice Growers Cooperative Association insures competitive rice buying
throughout the industry, disseminates market news which aids all farmers,
aai represent3 the growers in federal legislation.

Farmers who are not

members of the association benefit by these services without paying for
them.

Membership campaigns should stress the ethical nature of this

problem, endeavoring to persuade more Turners to bear their share of
the costs of the services, so that coats for all members may b© reduced
by increased volume of rice marketed through the association.
Increased volume of rice marketed through the cooperative might
eventually mean a considerable reduction in the processing margin re
quired by rice millers.

The present system of buying by mills, in which

each mill supports two or more buyers who comb the countryside, is unduly
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inefficient and expensive.

If all rice were mrketed by means of

samples on a few district sales tables, mill buying costs could be
drastically reduced.

Insistence by farmers on present marketing

methods requires that the mills continue these buying costs, whereas
the producers in general would profit by a more efficient system of
rough rice selling.
another field of potential activity is increased construction
of physical facilities by the central and district associations.

The

most profitable field lies in the ownership of warehouses by district
associations, and. the Texas associations are already extensively en
gaged in such activities.

In Louisiana, present storage conditions

provide an ideal opportunity for purchase of existing storage facili
ties by cooperative associations, although the erection of new ware
houses in face of ample space now available would appear unwise.

How

ever, cooperative warehouse development is retarded by the fact that,
in Louisiana districts where membership is sufficient to support a co
operative warehouse, existing warehouses are owned and privately opera
ted by leading members of the cooperative association.

As a result,

cooperative warehousing in Louisiana will probably experience very
slow development.
Other activities, including farm supply purchasing, have al
ready been sponsored by the central and district associations with a
moderate degree of success.
in Texas.

Credit facilities have also been provided

These developments have been confined to Texas, and the

Louisiana districts have a wide field for expansion of such enterprises.
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Cooperative milling of rice has occasionally been suggested as
a field of activity*

iSxperiences with pooling and milling of rice by

cooperative associations in Louisiana, however, have demonstrated that
milling is likely to b© unsuccessful*

The fundamental reason appears

to be the existing excess capacity and the bitterly competitive nature
of the Louisiana-Texas milling industry*

Conversion charges in this

competitive structure are likely to be frequently below long-time costs,
with intermittent reorganizations and capital losses for the mills*

A

cooperative mill would experience tremendous difficulties in satisfying
its members under such conditions*

Farmers can market more efficiently

simply by taking advantage of the competitive nature of the present
milling industry,

3y holding the constant threat of cooperative milling

over the competitive industry, however, the association can enforce the
retention of competition and make the establishment of monopoly impossi
ble.

This service nay require occasional operation of a mill under a

cooperative lease if monopoly practice can not be curbed by other means*
Past policies of the nmerienn Kice Growers Cooperative Associ
ation have been highly conservative in nature.

Some liberalization of

its policies in regard to membership relations and the promotion of co
operative enterprises related to rice production and storage appear de
sirable*

However, the success of the conservative policies, and the

disappointing experience of farmer*s cooperatives which have attempted
more extensive operations, Indicate that the present policies of the
association require no immediate or drastic revision*

CHAPTER VIII
SUH34ARX A?© CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have been devoted largely to the de
scription of the Louisiana rice industry and its economic problems,
with minor attention to desirable policies in regard to these
problems.

Efficiency in commodity marketing is difficult to secure,

and in many cases efficiency is difficult to define.

Practices which

appear unduly expensive are often based on physical peculiarities of
the commodity or on psychological reactions of the individuals con
cerned.

Inefficient marketing can endure only if efficient competi

tors are eliminated by monopolistic enterprises or by the prejudices
of producers or consumers.

As a result, recommendations for the im

provement of marketing seldom meet with unanimous approval, and are
often resented by those whose vested interests or intangible values
will suffer if the recommendations are adopted.
There are two broad difficulties In the Louisiana rice indus
try which retard the development of improved marketing practices.
First, the highly speculative and competitive nature of the milling
industry, leading both to cut-throat competition and to intermittent
attempts at monopolistic practice, has created an atmosphere of sus
picion under which each mill and each farmer trusts only his personal
attention in bargaining for rice.
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Combined with this factor is the
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extensive control over rice exerted by mills and irrigation companies
through credit, storage, or direct participation in making a rice crop#
Second, the principal advantage of establishing improved marketing
practices in the Louisiana rice area is the assurance of a fair competi
tive value for rice, which means that direct comparative values can
rarely be demonstrated to farmers except in extreme cases.

Direct

profits are especially difficult to demonstrate for the nusnerous small
rice growers in Louisiana, who usually are interested only in the shortrun approach toward immediate gain rather than the improvement of the
economic position of the rice industry.
The first difficulty can never be entirely removed in a free
market, but farmers through intelligent organisation

can frequently

utilize speculation and competition in the milling industry for their
own gain.

Intelligent regulatory laws and standards enforced on the

industry can aid in the elimination of undesirable practices.

The

second type of marketing obstacle can be attacked by a program of edu
cation among rice farmers, based on organized research, that will
teach farmers to appreciate the long—range significance of a wellorganized marketing structure as compared to intermittent individual
gains and losses occurring in the present disorganized system.
The foregoing statistical and descriptive data have described
the present statue of the Louisiana rice industry in regard to the
various phases of these general problems.

The remaining task is to

utilize these data as a basis for specific policies which if adopted
can aid Louisiana rice farmers to increase income from rice production.
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The objective of these specifio policies is primarily that of achieving
benefits for rice farmers with as little injuxy as possible to other
economic groups*

In general* fanners benefit (1) by reducing the ex

pense of moving threshed rice from the farms to the mills* (2) by
decreasing the costs of milling and distributing clean rice, (3) by
influencing market outlets to permit increased sales of rice at high
prices* and (4) by exerting pressure for favorable governmental action
in regard to domestic and foreign policies affecting rice production
and sale*

Marketing Between the Farmers and Millers

If costs incurred in assembling rice at the mills could be re
duced* farmers would gain either from the savings or from the higher
prices paid by the millers*

The marketing costs intervening between

farmers and millers include those for transportation* storage* in
surance* purchase* and assembly of rough rice*

To reduce these costs

to a miniaaim, it is essential that competition among mills and ware
houses be strictly maintained, that fanners retain independent control
over their rice crop* that market news and quality differentials be
generally available* and that farmers and the millers both act to re
duce present costly methods of purchasing rice*
The problem of rice storage for Louisiana farmers is not one
of excessively high rates* but one of control of rice for the purpose
of reducing the bargaining strength of the farmer.

Farmers should

maintain independent control over their rice until they decide to sell*
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Such control is reduced when rice Is stored in mill warehouses or in
warehouses dominated by agencies interested in phases of the rice indus
try other than growing.

This creates a serious marketing problem which

should be met by the stimulation of efficient independent rice ware
houses, even though average storage coats might be increased by such operation.
Jlnce rates are not sufficiently high to encourage private
operators to establish warehouses, it appears that cooperative ware
housing offers the best possibilities for increasing independent storage
in Louisiana.

Cooperative operation of storage facilities is also ideal

ly adapted to combination with other cooperative marketing and buying
ventures, so that

farmer interests could control the rice cropup to

final sale to the mill.

In Texas, cooperative warehousing has been

very successful, but ample storage space has retarded such development
in Louisiana.

Since Independent control of existing storage capacity

Is the prime requisite, cooperative activity in Louisiana should not
endeavor to force out present independent enterprises nor to create un
profitable excess capacity in the area, but rather should take

over

present independent business or furnish warehouses in areas where there
are no independent facilities.
Cooperative warehousing among rice farmers is now limited by
lack of interest, by absence of prospective savings in storage costs,
and by the practice of mills in waiving storage charges.

From a long-

run point of view, indejindent or cooperative warehousing is Important
in maintaining a competitive marketing structure.

An educational
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program to present these facts to farmers is therefor© an essential
stop in improving rice storage in Louisiana.
Insurance and transportation are minor costs in the marketing
structure, and probably are best cared for by individual action*

Data

on insurance costs Indicate, however, that blanket warehouse insurance
on stored rice can be obtained more cheaply than separate insurance
contracts written for individual growers.

For this reason, insurance

on rice should be furnished either in the warehouse fee or by groups
of faraers acting together in cooperative enterprises to obtain blanket
insurance at the lowest possible cost.
The buying practices of mills are vitally important in their
effect on the net receipts of rice farmers.

The present system of

numerous mill buyers scouring the rice area, negotiating personally
with each farmer, ia extremely expensive to the mills.

Those costs

must be covered in the processing margin taken by the mill.

In addi

tion, the mill buyer grades the rice', and in the absence of objective
grades, the fairer often does not know whether lie received the proper
premium or discount for the quality of his rice.

If methods could be

established reducing expenses of assembly and giving farmers an ade
quate knowledge of rice quality, a major improvement would obviously
result in the marketing system.
Both fanners and millers recognize that the maintenance of
numerous buyers is unduly expensive, but th© system is necessary be
cause of the Individual nature of each rice sale.

iSxpenses of buying

could be reduced only if farmers were willing to offer their ric© for
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sal* at a centr&X location on competitive bids, instead of by personal
negotiation. Louisiana farmers prefer to negotiate directly with mill
buyers, and as a result bear the costs of an expensive system of as
sembling rough rice*

Some millers also prefer the present system of

buying, largely because it can be used to reduce competition and to
avoid the pressure exerted by competitive bidders or by shrewd sales
managers*
Centralised sales could be made through an auction or through
a central sales manager acting as agent for the farmer*

The latter

method is embodied in the present selling plan of the American Rice
Growers Cooperative Association, which, however, handles only ten per
cent of Louisiana rice*

Marketing through centralized agents could

also be utilized to place more adequate comparative values on different
qualities of rice*

Under the present method of individual bargains,

price comparisons according to quality are difficult to make since the
farmer at best has intimate knowledge of only a few sales*

The American

Rice Growers Cooperative Association has approached this problem through
use of official grading standards and dissemination of price ne/s on &
grade basis*

General recognition of grades throughout the industry

would aid price establishment and increase competition in rice buying.
Individual advantages are difficult to demonstrate in comparative
profits, but undoubtedly exist for the industry as a whole.
The establishment of a weekly market news service by the Depart
ment of Agriculture in 1928 was one of the most important marketing im

provements so far furnished the rice farmers.

The principal need at
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present is for a daily market news service furnishing reliable current
information as to price and volume of sales*

Such services are per

formed by the /. isrican Rice Growers Cooperative Association for its
members*

More general dissemination of current information by public

agencies through radio broadcasts or releases is a step which should
be encouraged in the interests of the majority of Louisiana farmers
who are not members of the cooperative association, even at the risk
of some injury to the association by reducing the personal value of
its market news service*
the chief value of all improvements in the marketing structure
between the farmer and the mills is the assurance of competitive pur
chase for a farmer's rice*

Consequently, on a long-time basis, it is

difficult to measure objectively the savings of competitive storage
and buying to the farmer*

12ven in the short-run, the introduction of

competition in some portion of the industry tends to enforce compe
tition *11 through the industry, so that price differentials do not
appear.

Such has been the experience of members of the American Rice

Grower's Cooperative Association, many of whom see no comparative price
advantage but recognize the necessity of maintaining the cooperative
association in order to enforce competition for the entire rice growing
industry*
Since the principal requisite of marketing improvement between
the farmers and the mills is the enforcement of competition in order to
establish the competitive market value of a lot of rice, programs for
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marketing improvement should endeavor to acquaint the farmer with market
conditions, quality of rice, and the price situation, and to establish
competitive practices In selling rice.

Competition could conceivably be

enforced by private enterprisej for example, private market services and
sales agents.

Rice growers, however, are suspicious of such private

services, whic ■ often are utilized for private gain or cater to the more
powerful financial interests.

For these reasons the enforcement of com

petitive practices appears to depend largely on the establishment of co
operative enterprise so that the farmers can control the policies of the
individuals and organizations furnishing the market services.

The College

of Agriculture and the state and federal governments are amply justified
in carrying on extension work favoring the maintenance of cooperative rice
associations.

At the same time, the grading of rice and the current

market news service should be adapted by public agencies for use by all
rice farmers.
Not to be neglected, of course, is improved quality of rice
through better seeding, cultivating, and harvesting practices.

These

factors are largely technical problems of production, which are outside
the scope of this marketing analysis.

Efficiency £n Milling and Distribution

The second principal source of marketing improvement in favor of
the farmer is reduction in the processing margin between rough rice and
clean rice.

For the rice milling industry as a whole, the evidence does

not indicate that monopoly power is used to exact a greater than reason
able milling profit.

Indeed, excess capacity and frequent reorganization
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In the milling Industry suggest that profits over a long period are
barely sufficient to maintain operation of th© mills and that capital
losses are frequent.

This situation is not a result of competitive

efficiency in milling, however, but of price competition in buying and
selling rice.
Technological improvements to achieve greater milling efficiency
in terms of output of clean rice froci rough rice, and more profitable
utilisation of by-products, are very likely possible in the industry.
These practices could serve to reduce processing margins -without impair
ing the profit margins of the mills, and the competitive processes would
pexmlt the benefit to be passed back to the farmer or forward to the con
sumer.

However, there is a powerful force discouraging the improvement

of milling efficiency.

This force arises from the fact that speculative

gain and loss on rice inventories, and shrewd buying and selling of rice,
are more important than milling efficiency in affecting profits.

As a

result, the primary attention of millers is focussed on market operations,
and technological aspects draw only secondary consideration.
The ideal solution for this problem would be a futures market
which could absorb the speculative risk and permit millers to concentrate
on milling efficiency to make profit.

The industry Is too small to per

mit a futures market, however, and the attempt of fifteen years ago was

a complete failure.

Present conditions do not offer more cheerful pro

spects for a successful futures market in rice.

As a result, the specu

lative element will tend to remain the primary factor in rice mill
operation.
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Since greater efficiency In milling la obviously desirable,
research toward improvement will have to proceed largely from some im—
pstus other than the profit motive.

Governmental agencies are well

justified in engaging in research toward greater rice milling efficiency,
since & real benefit for farmers can be achieved.

VJhen private profit

is an insufficient spur toward beneficial practices, public research
agencies fulfill a necessary role in the achievement of technological
efficiency.
Other factors involving costs of processing and distributing
rice include the size and location of milling units, and the distribution
of clean rice*

The relation of size to costs would be a difficult pro

blem to analyze in face of substantial excess capacity even if data were
available concerning this problem.

Apparently efficiency in both size

and in location is worked out by competition within the Industry, although

again there is a strong likelihood that both of these factors are in
fluenced by purchasing and selling efficiency, not by technological con
siderations.

Of more direct interest to Louisiana farmers, however, is

the establishment of competitive rail rates permitting Louisiana mills
to reach the interior United States markets now dominated by Arkansas
rice*
Clean rice is distributed in bull: through brokers, which appears
to be the cheapest method available in commodity marketing.

Packaging

of rice for retail distribution at higher prices would probably have
little effect on prices received by farmers.

Increased costs of distri

bution would offset higher retail prices, so that changes in distribution
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methods are a method of market competition between mills, not of getting
higher prices for the faimer.

Influencing Market Outleta

A third improvement possible in rice marketing lies in securing
larger and more stable markets for clean rice, which will result in a
more stable income for rice farmers and will permit a larger volume of
sales.

The problem here must be separated into two distinct phases:

the domestic market and the export market.

In tbs domestic market, ef

forts should be made to increase the consumption of rice as a staple
foodstuff.

This increased consumption can be achieved by a national ad

vertising and educational campaign, and by offering consumers a quality
that will encourage widespread substitution of rice for other foods.
The state-sponsored advertising program of 1941 is furnishing the first
experiment with such an advertising and educational campaign, and should
be supported until its relative effectiveness in affecting consumption
becomes known.
Research in the adaptation of rice to consumer tastes should
be encouraged from two directions.

Variety experiments should be di

rected toward the breeding of rice specifically adapted to both domestic

and foreign consumer preferences, once these preferences have been defi

n i t e l y ascertained through consumption studies in various areas.

At

the same tire, research into the nutritional value of rice and preferred
methods of preparation in various areas should be utilized to develop
an educational program to increase rice sales.
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The recovery and maintenance of the export market Is at present
dependent upon war conditions, and in the future will be affected large
ly by world developments in regard to trade barriers.

In peace-time

European markets, American rice can be eold on a quality basis at a
profitable price if tariff barriers are not unduly discriminatory.
Latin American markets, however, are essential for the disposal of large
stocks, and United States rice requires highly favorable tariff or quota
discrimination against Asiatic rice if a profitable outlet is to exist
in these areas after the present war*

The rice growers of the United

States, therefore, should exert pressure toward gaining free trade in
Ehrope, and toward gaining favorable discrimination toward American
rice in Latin America*

Governmental Policy

During the past eight years, government programs have been an
important factor affecting the total income of rice growers*

The

earliest government programs attempted to secure greater income for
rice growers through marketing agreements, which were essentially at
tempts to establish a paternalistic monopoly for the rice millers*
These programs achieved temporary high prices for growers only at the
cost of demoralizing the entire industry through the accumulation of
surplus stocks and the loss of markets.

Acreage and production rose

to new high levels, and the marketing agreements did not accomplish
acreage or production adjustment, stable price, or improved market
practices*
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The chief reason for failure of the government-sponsored market

ing agreements was the fact that they attempted to force the milling
industry, by nature highly competitive, to operate as a monopolized indus
try#

Only if the federal government took over rigid control of all ele

ments of the southern rice industry could a marketing stablization pro
gram be carried out, since excess capacity and free entry quickly breaks
down monopolistic practices in holding supplies of rice off the market
or in practicing price maintenance#

Such practices are against present

government policy, although the government is tending now to utilize
taxation to enforce desired market and business practices#

A compulsory

tax, similar to a processing tax, can achieve desired market control
ouch more effectively than voluntary marketing agreements#

Since the failure of the marketing agreements in 1935, govern
ment programs in the rice industry have accomplished only the payment
of subsidy to farmers, and have not been effective in regulating pro
duction or price#

Rice acreage in Texas has expanded greatly, and

production In the new areas appears to be prpfit&ble to non-cooperatora
in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration program#

Louisiana rice

growers, since they had little acreage available for expansion, have
cooperated to restrict rice production, but production and price bene
fits from their efforts have been dissipated by non-cooperation in
Texas# Apparently, acreage control can be accomplished onl' if price
is so low as to make non-cooperation in the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration programs definitely unprofitable in all areas.
At present the emphasis in agricultural programs has swung
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fFo r supply to demand*

The war situation has created unusual demand

conditions, and a profitable market exists for all American rice*

It

is certain, however, that there is no permanent market for an expanded
United States rice industry*

American rice cannot compete in open

world markets with Asiatic rice under normal conditions*

The problem

of restricting rice acreage in order to avoid price-depressing surplus
production will undoubtedly arise again within the next decade.
In the case of rice production, a permanent subsidy without
effective acreage restriction is not justified from the national point
of view*

The rice Industry already is partially dependent upon tariff

protection, and direct subsidy to support a still larger industry cer
tainly appears unreasonable*

Therefore, a subsidy program should be

established only when rice prices are so low that sufficient cooperation
can be obtained to secure effective acreage control, whereupon the sub
sidy will not act to maintain uneconomic production*
Federal aid to the rice industry through tax legislation de
signed to establish an export subsidy program for the rice industry
offers a distinct possibility of maintaining a larger rice industry
than otherwise possible*

In the post-war world, export subsidies or

pressure to obtain favorable quotas may conflict with idealistic inter
national policies.

The Latin-American rice market will welcome cheap

rice, however, so that the artificial stimulation of rice exports need
not damage world trade policy directed primarily toward free trade*
The most feasible long-run government program for rice growers
would be one under which the industry would adjust its production to
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the price conditions obtaining in the world, as qualified by tariff
protection and possibly by an export subsidy program under which do
mestic consumers would pay the cost.

This means the elimination of

direct subsidy except as a means of relieving temporary distress among
rice growers until production can be adjusted.

When rice prices are

high, subsidies should be adapted to the existing distress of the growers.
Coincident with this short-run program, a long-run program for acreage
adjustment and for export subsidy should be established.
The fact that such a sound economic program would meet obvious
political difficulties should not prevent education and propaganda
from being directed toward its achievement.

The principal difficulty

with the rice program, as with other farm commodity programs, has been
the confusion of short-run relief with long-run plans for pemanent
adjustment.

There is no apparent reason why the two objectives cannot

be separated, with frank establishment of a short-run subsidy to re
lieve current distress and of a long-range plan to gain a desirable
scale of production.

The long-range plan is particularly easy to es

tablish in the rice industry, since both physical and economic limi
tations make clear that the Industry can never be secure economically
on a domestic market basis without markets for the current large pro
duction.
Finally, government-supported agencies of the state of Louisiana
have important functions to perform in all phases of the rice industry.
Extension work in agriculture should encourage the use of rough and
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clean rice grading devices in order to establish fair market prices
between farmers and millers, and should support cooperative agencies
and efficient private dealers who facilitate competition In rice
buying.

Experiment station research in adapting rice quality to con

sumer preference should be carried on to a greater extent than at
present.

Regulatory laws concerning rice storage and milling should

be enforced more rigidly.

Experiments in improved technology of rice

milling and utilization of by-products should be sponsored as a
government function.

Market news service and education of farmers

concerning current rice situations should be carried as far as possi
ble.

Particularly valuable would be a daily market news service for

rice and other crops which could reach farmers in time to guide their
marketing activities.

A Positive Program

Many of the recommendations in this chapter for the improve
ment of rough rice marketing have been general in nature, since the
intent was to outline policies rather >han practices.

In order to

give objectivity to the recommended policies, the following practical
procedures are suggested below.

They require aggressive action by

fanners, millers, and public agencies in Louisiana.

In some cases,

personal or vested interests in existing marketing practices will be
injured, but it is believed that general benefits to the industry re
sulting from adoption will far outweigh minor individual damage.

As

mentioned previously, the primary objective of these suggestions i®
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Improvement of the economic situation of rice growers , and slight
injuries to other economic groups are therefore disregarded*
(1) Agricultural agencies, Including federal, state, and farm
organizations, should carry on an educational campaign to convince
Louisiana rice farmers that essential requirements for improved market
ing are independent control of rice until time of sal© and thorough
knowledge of both rough and clean rice markets.
(2) Independent control of rice and dissemination of market in
formation can be achieved by cooperative storage and marketing, and by
securing credit from agencies not actively engaged In the rice industry.
Cooperative activities and Production Credit Association facilities
should thus reach more farmers than at present,
(3) The sale of rice through bids on samples at centrally lo
cated sales offic s should be especially encouraged, in order to re
duce the cost of expensive buying practices and to promote competitive
evaluation of rice,
(4) The state Extension Service should educate farmers on the
principle and use of rough rice grades, not as a specific guide to
price differentials, but as a guide in familiarizing growers with
their product.
(5) During the months of heavy rice marketing, the Extension
Service should assemble daily reports on rice sales and arrange for a
brief current market report through radio stations at Lake Ghstrles and
Lafayette.
(6) So long as excess capacity and bitter competition is prevalent
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in the rice milling industry in Louisiana, farmers should not attempt
cooperative milling but should take advantage of the competitive
struggle among mills.

Cooperative mills should be regarded only as a

tool to enforce competition among mills, along with the enforcement of
state and federal laws against restraint of trade.
(7) Practices of mills designed to meet price requirements,
such as mixing various grades and varieties of rice, should be elimi
nated primarily by stimulation of domestic consumer demand for better
grades of rice.

In the export market, mixing of rice is probably es

sential in meeting price competition.
(8) The rice industry and the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment
Station should embark on a systematic research program.

Research in

rice varieties should be directed more vigorously toward the development
of varieties specifically adapted to preferences in each of the leading
rice markets. Intensive study of the utilization of rice and its by
products in human and animal nutrition, and of the industrial and
chemical properties of rice, is needed to stimulate domestic demand.
Finally, the rice millers should furnish information and cooperate in
technical studies of the milling, packaging, and distribution of rice.
Particularly valuable would be studies of comparative clean idee out
turn from rough rice, annual rice distribution and preferences in
specific localities, and the effect of packaging and advertising on
rice sales.
(9) The rice industry should take advantage of the inelastic
domestic demand for rice by limiting supplies in the domestic market.
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This requires federal aid in the establishment of appropriate tax
measures, tariff preferences, or favorable quotas to maintain the
Cuban market*
(10) Hie recently established tri-state tax program to create
a fund for advertising rice in areas of low consumption within the
United States should be supported for a period of at least five years,
since the assessment on individual mills and growers is relatively in
significant and shifts in consumption habits are long-run phenomena*
(11) Louisiana farm groups should exert pressure in freight
rate litigation to insure the maintenance of a rate structure that
will permit the maximum number of mills to buy rice throughout the
Louisiana growing area, and that will prevent as far as possible the
purchase of rough rice in other areas by Louisiana mills.
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Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station
Study of Rough Rice Marketing
Rice Warehouse Schedule

Date t a k e n ______

II.

Name of warehouse

GENERAL:
1.Location

S.Person interviewed

2.Type of ownership

6.Number employees

5 .Owner* s name

7.Number whses operated

4 .Years in this whse

8 .Location of other whses

BUILDINGS:
1.Number

construction

2 .Present capacity

age, oldest part

3.Equipment: loading platform
scales

rail facilities

other

4 .State or federal bonded

are receipts negotiable

5.Estimated cost of reproduction

II. STORAGE PRACTICES (1940-41):
1.Describe charges

2*Are charges uniform for all rice
3.Does charge include: unloading

piled in whse

insurance_____________ moving out of whse________________ wei ghing
selling_______________ other services
4.Services to farmer(give charges): price quotations______________ selling on
commission______________weighing and storing in cars

c leaning

seed rice_______________________________ drying rice_____________________ _
5 .Does warehouseman ever buy rice for own account_____________________________
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6*Is any rice rejected for storage______________________
damage in whse

u sual causes of

liability of whse

7 .Normal loss in stored rice weight

adjustment

made for excessive loss
8.Protection from rats

insects

9,Largest quantities stored(rough) : 1940_____________ 1939____________1938
10*7® of 1940-41 storage owned by farmers__________________ other_________
11

rice leaving warehouse by truck____________________ rail

V* MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES:
1*7° of owner^s gross income from warehousing
2 .Supplementary enterprises of warehouse (feed, twine, fertilizer, etc.)
Type

Gross
Receipts

% of totgil
gross receipts

SP.Other storage (describe) :

4.Financing: rice production_____________
stored r

i

c

e

______________

5.Relationship to mills, irrigation companies, farm organizations

6 .Rice acreage operated by owner_______ ___________ number farms____
79% of stored rice coming from farms paying rents to whse operator
on which operator had lien___________________________________
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VI.

INSURANCE:
1.Warehouse: kind.

amount;

2 .Usual grower: fire premium________
premium cost

VII.

tornado premium______________total

valuation covered

carrier

BUSINESS PROBLEMS!
1.Years v/hen volume was too low for profitable operation_____
2 .Does rice come from same growers each year__________________
3.1s total warehouse capacity in vicinity greater than needed
4.Greatest distance rice traveled to warehouse,

1940__________

5*% of stored rice subject to lien, 1940______________________
6.Does warehouseman make all salos_________________ _________
7.1s ARGCA rice stored___________________________
8 .What mills bought most rice from warohouso this year_______
9.Do costs or competition determine storago charge____________
10.Attitude toward possibility of bulk storage in Louisiana___

322
Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station
Study of Rough Rice Marketing
Farm Storage Schedule
I. General:
1• Name

pari sh

2. Location
3* Total acres in farm, 1940

» crop acres

total available for rice

, in rice<

» water supply

4. Tenure

type of rent contract

5. Number of tenants

do tenants sell own rice

II. Storage facilities on far m:
1. Describe building(construction, roof, walls)

2. Uses of building other than personal rice storage(

3. Approximate storage space (sq;ft«)
4. Year built

.bags of rice

original cost

u sable life remaining^

5* Average annual cost of repairs and upkeep
6. Estimated annual saving on storage charges
7. Estimated annual saving in hauling costs
III. Advantages and disadvantages of storing on farm:
1. Farmer's opinion on advantages

2. Farmer’s opinion on disadvantages

3. Nearest public storage

has mill paid drayage from farm storage
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Farm Storage Schedule cont’d.
2
4. Is it more difficult to contact buyers at farm than at public warehouse

5. Have local mills bought all rice
6. 1940 transportation: distance from thresher to farm storage
hauled by

,contract rate

cash outlay for hauling
7. Is rice insured

reasons
cost

17* Marketing problems:
1. Usual quality of rice

chief factors lowering grade on

recent crops

2, Does farmer feel that he has adequate knowledge of value of his rice when
he sells
3* Does farmer store rice every year

what determines storage policy

4* Mill practices farmer regards as undesirable

5* Describe affiliation with farm organizations

6* Attitude toward ARGCA______________________

V. Interviewer’s comments:

I

Variety

i

Variety

1

)
i

i

f
}------------------------ -----------1

i
!
!

1

|

■—

I--------

Acres

.

.

Date

■■

1

i

j
ii

J
jj

■I

i

--------- ----------

--------------

Mill

— ----------1---------- ■------- --------

h-

.. 1 r

|

Used on farm
Feed &
Seed
home
Quantity

N o . bids
on lot

!

t

Price

Date

Farm storage

1--------- 1;------- - ----------- brr

i

j

1

___________________________________

Quantity
(bbls.)

P" ’

VII. Rice sales, 1940-41:

i
<
i----------------------

i
t

?

Production
(bags or
bbls.)

VI. Rice production on farm, 1940:

Buyer* s
grade

y. . ------- -

---

Quantity

i
!

f

J
1

.

1

Describe terms of sale 1
(f.o.b. point, payment)

■

|

I

i

t

t

1

}

1 Quantity
Date
4 .............. .
■■■ ■
i

(sold at threshing

j

J

..................................

Date

Public storage
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Rice Mill Schedule

Date taken

Name of mill

I . GEIJERAL;
1*Location

5.Age of organisation

2,Type of ownership

6.Ago of this mill

3,Other nilIs operated

7 .Milling capacity
8.Months operated, 194-0

4„Perscn interviewed

II.

9oProduction,193C-40

BUYING PRACTICES:
1.Number and description of buyers,1940-41

2.Months when buyers are employed___
3.How are buyers paid________________
4.Territories assigned to each buyer

5.Are farmers contacted during growing season

______ _____

6.Are farms visited at threshing___________________________
7.Aro buyers familiar with all warehouse rice in territory
8 .How is rice examined before bidding______________________

9.How docs mill chock buyer’s estimate_____________________

10.7/hat percent of rice is bought without competing bids___
11.Average size of lot bought, 1940-4-1_________ _____________

III.

MILL POLICY:
1.Usual terms of purchase_______ _____________ _______________
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2.How is fanner paid

3*Territory furnishing

percent of mill p u r c h a s e s _______________

4 .Most distant purchase in 1940-41__________________ ________________ _______
5.1s out-of-state competition for rough rice serious

_______ ___________

6.Are large lots preferred
7.Varieties preferred for milling
8.Reasons for preference
S.Is any growing area preferred
10.Are certain

warehouses preferred

11.Percent of rough rice rejected, 1940-41
Reas on s_____________________________
12.Rough rice inventory policy

13.# rough rice bought before offsetting clean rice sales__________ _______
14.Docs mill attempt to move rice from country/ warehouse immediately after
purchase________________________________________ ___________________________
15.Principal outlets of mill:
exports

domestic (areas&^)___________________________

(arcas&/5)________________________ ___________ _____________________

V .M ISC ELLAi'IE0U S :

1.Total investment in mill facilities_________________ |
___________________
2,Cost of reproduction

______ _____________________________________________

3.Other enterprises of mill owner

___________________________________

4.Percentage of rice received by true]:________________ by rail____________
5*Does mill operate t r u c k s ______________

|
_______________________

5.Mill storage capacity: rough ricc______ i
___________ clean rice____________
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Rice mills - 37.Hours operated per day

nor week

maximum days per year over oporated
8.Average milling outturn: Blue Rose
R e x o r o _______

in year
_

Early Prolific

Lady bright

9 .Average processing margin: Blue Rose_
Roxoro

Other

Early Prolific

Lady Wright

Other

10.Usual rough rice price differentials: Blue Rose 100%, Early Prolific
Roxoro

11.Docs mill buy ARGCA rice

Lady Wright___________

Other

do buyers consider cooperative grade

12.Major quality factor determining rough rice price

13.Rough rice grading: could mill buy on govTt. grade
Principal difficulties_____________________ _________
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